THE SURVIVAL VALUE OF TELLING STORIES: PINCHER MARTIN AND LIFE OF PI

Abstract: The last two decades in literary studies have been marked by increasing interest in evolutionary theories of art involving psychology, cognitive science, biology, neurology, etc., all somehow related to Darwinism. A common conclusion of various researches is that storytelling is an adaptation that has significantly contributed to human survival as a species, making man Homo Fictus rather than Homo Sapiens. A number of reasons are given as to why people tell stories and how stories make us human. In this article, I would like to argue that telling stories indeed has a high survival value, not only because Boyd (On the Origin of Stories 2009) claims art develops creativity and encourages cooperation, or because Gottschall (The Storytelling Animal 2012) believes we need to make sense of the world and satisfy our hunger for meaning by imposing patterns, but also because storytelling can be a survival technique. In this sense, the fictional Shahrazad offers an option to existentially threatened individuals. The possible survival value of telling stories will be illustrated by the characters from the novels of William Golding and Yann Martel who employ the same defensive mechanism of storytelling to different effect.

Keywords: evolutionary criticism, survival value, storytelling, Golding, Martel.

Introduction: Storytelling and Survival

It seems appropriate to start this article by referring to the views of one of the greatest living literary critics, professor Terry Eagleton1. In the September 2009 issue of the London Review of Books, he published a review of Brian Boyd’s On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, cognition, and fiction, which appeared earlier that year. My interest in Boyd arose recently after I had read a novel by Canadian author Nino Ricci, The Origin of Species (2008), which once again revived my curiosity about Charles Darwin’s seminal book, On the Origin of Species (1859). Ricci makes numerous allusions to Darwin and his theory of evolution so that doing research for a paper on Ricci, I got familiar with Boyd’s theory of narrative. His study was intriguing, even “thoroughly frustrating” (Bond 2009) so that professor Eagleton responded to it in an article titled “Darwin Won’t Help.” With all due respect, it is a harsh comment, which the book may have deserved being written in a tedious over-methodical manner, but which the ideas expressed in this book do not merit. This is how professor Eagleton summarises Boyd’s book:

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2 Professor Eagleton was one of the key-note speakers at the conference GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN: Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Language, Literature and Culture, organised by the University of Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska, June 6–8, 2013.
The point of Boyd’s superbly erudite study is to offer an evolutionary theory of art, one which must necessarily turn on its adaptive functions. Such functions must indeed exist, Boyd considers in his dryly actuarial way, since otherwise it would be impossible to account for the persistence of an activity so complex, so costly in time and resources and of so little apparent benefit to the competitive struggle for existence. Storytelling makes us more skilled in social situations, speeding up our capacity to process information and allowing us to test out alternative scenarios. It allows us to think beyond the here and now, which brings evolutionary benefits in its wake. Narratives can consolidate and communicate social norms, providing us with models of cooperation. As a richly patterned form of cognitive play, art serves to stimulate a flexible mind, modifying key perceptual, cognitive and expressive systems in ways conducive to our evolutionary flourishing. It improves our attunement to one another, thus fostering sociability within the group, and develops habits of imaginative exploration, which can have a pay-off in real life. It raises our confidence by allowing us to reshape the world on our own terms, as well as offering us general principles and social information, which can guide our behaviour and improve our decision-making. Fiction increases our range of behavioural options, acquaints us with risks and opportunities, and supplies the emotional resources needed to cope with inevitable setbacks. (Eagleton 2009)

Boyd indeed goes to great lengths to familiarise the reader with all these advantages of storytelling. The adaptive functions of narrative are numerous and varied as listed above and they may answer the question why man practices such a time-consuming activity as art. As Homo Ludens, he likes to play and enjoy which is self-rewarding. As Homo Sapiens, he benefits through increased cognitive skills, cooperation and sociality. As Homo Fictus, he develops his creativity, imagination and flexibility. It seems that art cannot be simply a by-product of the species’ evolutionary development since as such it would have died out with other no more needed adjustments (think of claws on our feet, for example). Yet, art is still with mankind, as vigorous as ever, and not only as a form of entertainment.

Boyd’s focus is art as cognitive play, which makes Eagleton create a syllogism that art is as much a serious business as play from which it springs. Professor Eagleton also appreciates Boyd’s “corrective to some of the excesses of what’s now mainstream literary scholarship” (Sala 2010), in other words his attack on Theory, his return to Nature, and his providing a fresh context for familiar knowledge. However, his conclusion just as his title is not flattering to Boyd: “Brian Boyd has produced a challenging piece of critical theory, which might well herald the return to Nature of which cultural criticism is in such sore need. But Evocriticism, if that is what it comes to be called, will need to be rather more subversive of commonsensical readings if it is to earn its keep, as well as a lot more subtle about Robinson Crusoe” (Eagleton 2009).

Evocriticism will, nevertheless, survive if one is to judge by the book that appeared last year, Gottschall’s The Storytelling Animal (2012). The subtitle How Stories Make Us Human puts forward the main idea of this book, that “story is for a human as water is for a fish – all-encompassing and not quite palpable” (Gottschall 2012). Our time in the lands of make-believe or Neverland, which are Gottschall’s synonyms for the realm of art, shapes us as individuals and as cultures, but the author hits a crucial point when he says that “nothing so central to the human condition is so incompletely understood” (Gottschall 2012). If the evolution is ruthlessly utilitarian, the question Gottschall asks with Boyd and many other researchers is why has the luxury of fiction not been selected out from human life. He repeats some of the well-known answers, like the Darwinian one, that the evolutionary source of story is sexual selection, not natural selection, or that stories are low-cost sources of information and vicarious experience, or that stories delight in order to instruct, or that, as Boyd claims, a work of art is a playground for the
mind. All the day stories and the night stories we tell to ourselves and others make Gottschall accept the view that “Fiction is a powerful and ancient virtual reality technology that simulates the big dilemmas of human life.”

However, his conclusion is that the storytelling mind has developed as a crucial evolutionary adaptation because of our hunger for meaningful patterns, which translates into a hunger for story. In other words, people feel uncomfortable when encountered with randomness, uncertainty, or coincidence, so the human mind deals with this problem by imposing patterns on experience. Famous experiments by Michael Gazzaniga prove that the brain is especially equipped to detect order. The neural wiring in the left brain deciphers the flow of information that showers the mind at all times, and makes an interpretation acceptable to the person. Since we are addicted to meaning, the mind immediately forces narrative structure on the chaos of our lives, which is how we eliminate confusion or perplexity and create an illusion of mastery over our experiences. Famous experiments by Michael Gazzaniga prove that the brain is especially equipped to detect order. The neural wiring in the left brain deciphers the flow of information that showers the mind at all times, and makes an interpretation acceptable to the person. Since we are addicted to meaning, the mind immediately forces narrative structure on the chaos of our lives, which is how we eliminate confusion or perplexity and create an illusion of mastery over our experiences. Famous experiments by Michael Gazzaniga prove that the brain is especially equipped to detect order. The neural wiring in the left brain deciphers the flow of information that showers the mind at all times, and makes an interpretation acceptable to the person. Since we are addicted to meaning, the mind immediately forces narrative structure on the chaos of our lives, which is how we eliminate confusion or perplexity and create an illusion of mastery over our experiences. Gazzaniga aptly called this brain structure the ‘interpreter,’ while Gottschall uses the term ‘homunculus’ that resonates with scientific fallacies but creates a perfect picture for Gazzaniga’s findings. It is as if in the left hemisphere there is a replica of the person spinning a story out of the information input and thus creating coherence and order. This inner Sherlock Holmes proves that ours is a storytelling mind that copes with the haphazardness of human experience by transforming it into meaningful narratives. Gottschall and Boyd agree that the world is full of stories and that understanding them has potentially a great survival value. Explanatory narratives constitute private lives and national histories, proving that the capacity to tell stories is directly related to creating meaning. Elie Wiesel says that God made Man because He loves stories (Wiesel 1966), which could further mean that human experience is by the same intention complex and confusing in order to give us plenty of material for spinning stories, and pleasing our God.

The problem is to make the story, as Rudy Wiebe would say. Namely, the experiments confirmed that human mind is over-eager to make stories so that even when there is no meaning in the influx of information, the mind will readily construct it. For example, putting two unrelated images side-by-side, one of a man and the other of anything else produces the Kuleshov effect. The audience will always differently interpret the unchanging facial expression of the man, depending on the other image: a bowl of soup, a corpse, or a naked woman. Where there is no story, our homunculus will invent it, literally imposing a pattern of meaning on unrelated images, and demonstrating that we are unwilling to be without stories. Gottschall affirms that the human imperative to make and consume stories (Gottschall 2012) drives us not only to be imaginative and creative but also to fabricate lies if meaningful patterns do not exist. The left hemisphere is a magnificent workshop where stories, true or false, are constantly being manufactured, and in that sense the problem is to make the story truthful to the experience.

However, there is another option, that the mind does not want to make a true story for the reason that the experience itself is unacceptable to the individual. Instead, it creates a distorted representation of reality as a memory, which it holds true. In medical terms, this would be a case of conflation, which is defined as a false memory and easily confused with delusion, which is a false belief. The January 2010 issue of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry was dedicated to these two medical conditions, which often overlap. (Langdon, R. & Turner, M. 2010) In both cases the patient tells a distorted story about the present or the personal past that is a symptom of a
neurological disorder with similar underlying cognitive mechanisms. Confabulation can be spontaneous or provoked, and it includes both conscious and unconscious processing. It is interesting that even perfectly healthy individuals are also capable of confabulation, though it is not that common if “delusion-like beliefs and confabulation-like fabrications” are excluded. For the purpose of this presentation, confabulation will be defined as a consistent and extensive false memory in the form of story created for its survival value by the non-pathological subject. Examples of confabulation will be taken from the novels Pincher Martin and Life of Pi.

Pincher Martin: To Be!

Pincher Martin is the third of William Golding’s novels, and the one where the coda achieves a most powerful effect. The on-going struggle of a shipwrecked sailor to survive on a small desert island takes a puzzling twist when two navy officers find his drowned body on the beach. The title of the American edition Pincher Martin: The Two Deaths of Christopher Martin helps the otherwise confused reader understand that the unfortunate sailor first died a physical death and then died (or maybe not) in a metaphysical manner. What happens in-between these two deaths is commonly seen to be a hallucination taking place at the moment of his drowning. Other definitions of hallucination do not substantially differ from this one: “a sensory experience of something that does not exist outside the mind, caused by various physical and mental disorders, or by reaction to certain toxic substances, and usually manifested as visual or auditory images” (Dictionary.com 2013). However, Pincher Martin did not suffer from any pathological disorders. Contrary to this, it could be fair to say that he was a typical representative of the modern commodified society with a hypertrophied sexual desire. He was not exposed to any toxic substances at the moment of dying either. Therefore, the visual and auditory images that constitute the plot of the book have to be explained in another way, not as hallucinations. Employing confabulation seems to be justifiable in the context where the hero spontaneously resorts to falsifying his memories as a survival strategy.

This is the point when spinning the story becomes the issue of life and death. As long as Pincher Martin manages to evolve his survival story on the rocky islet, he will live even if only as the point of consciousness in some unidentifiable part of his dying brain. His narrative impulse will take over and he will create numerous plots of the story of his life that must not end. He is just like Shahrazad, ever inventing new stories to stay alive, only he is his own audience in this existential drama. Setting aside interpretations that see Pincher Martin as a literary allegory of sinfulness, or as Christian purgatory opening to hell, or as psychoanalytical suppression of the fear of death and castration, or as another heroic Robinsonade, or as the symbolic representation of the epic evolution of the human race, or as the psychological battle to preserve sanity, we would like to propose the view that Pincher Martin spontaneously confabulates, faced with his own extinction in line with evolutionary criticism.

The most natural and immutable law of mortality runs against the essence of Pincher Martin’s nature. Though in many respects typical, he is extraordinary in his egotism and greed. Yasumori Sugimura describes him as committing four deadly sins: lust, covetousness, pride, and envy (Sugimura 1988), but it is also true that he violates most of the ten commandments, to the point of trying to murder his best friend. This is evidently a deeply flawed human being who is cast into the sea by providence, or accident, or whatever power controls human destiny where he is sure to die, only his self-centred mind refuses to switch off. While the body is tossed by the
waves after having drowned instantly, the consciousness starts fabricating a most improbable but realistic story in its detailed description of his heroic effort to survive against all odds: wild sea, barren rock, starvation, loneliness, and worst of all, gradual break-through of the truth. To die is not part of his life script, and his mind plays ingenious tricks to keep the illusion of being alive going.

Critics usually say that he hallucinates at the moment of his death. In his article Hallucination and Plotmaking Principle in Pincher Martin by William Golding, Sugimura comes to the conclusion that “eternal deferment of death necessitates the eternal activity of making plots”, which we entirely support, but even Sugimura says that Pincher Martin “does not take a shortcut to death, but makes complicated detours or labyrinths between life and death, the labyrinths of hallucinations with new plots produced one after another” (Sugimura 1988). Though it is possible that oxygen deprivation in the process of drowning may cause hallucinations, it is unlikely that this is the case with Martin because he ironically resorts to hallucinations as an explanation for the terrifying intrusion of reality into his confabulation. In the course of his imaginary survival story, Pincher Martin has fleshes of reality, the most frightening and persistent one being his red swollen hands, which he prefers to see as the claws of a red lobster. When they emerge as the hands of a dead man he calls it a hallucination, which is then part of his complex confabulation. Likewise, the rock on which he climbs is just a memory of an extracted tooth, and when this truth is on the verge of breaking into his conscious mind, he pushes it down as a hallucination. To an attentive reader, just like to Pincher Martin, it is quite clear what is going on: “He laid hold, pulled himself up, projection after projection. The light was bright enough to show him the projections” (Golding 1969). His whole experience is a film projection of his flickering centre of awareness, a projection after projection of invented survival scenes, which make the plot of his story. As an educated and experienced person, he has enough material to build many subplots drawing on different traditions, cultures, and the memories of his personal life, weaving these threads together in an attempt to create a coherent and enduring narrative. The paradox is that his confabulation must never stop despite irritable intrusions of reality. He will even fake madness to avoid confrontation with the inevitability of his death.

Science is still puzzled with the fact that confabulation can be observed in normal healthy subjects, (Burgess P. W., Shallice, T. 1996) and offers various possible reasons for this phenomenon, (Langdon, R. & Turner, M. 2010) distress being one of them. Pincher Martin is by definition distressed because of his acute physical and mental suffering caused by the shipwreck and the threat of drowning. Further, he experiences unsettling anxiety due to the possibility that he might be already dead. His personality type only contributes to his stress under extreme circumstances since as an egomaniac he cannot imagine his own death: “Not me. Precious” (Golding 1969). Heavily distressed, he begins confabulating unconsciously and spontaneously, but then continues consciously to ward off images of reality in the manner of provoked confabulation he calls hallucinations. He also understands that if he stops fabricating his survival story, his survival will end beyond any doubt. Even though science cannot with certainty locate the centre of consciousness, its extinction most likely implies the end of any form of existence valuable to the Pincher Martin type, the one who sees himself as Atlas, Prometheus, God.

Therefore, the survival value of his confabulation is enormous. His existence depends on his ability to concoct stories,
Pi also belongs in the group of normal subjects who are capable of confabulation under distress. Yet, he is different from Pincher Martin. Generosity instead of greed, altruism instead of selfishness, love instead of envy distinguish Pi from Pincher Martin. Pi is also an excellent swimmer, a creative person who solves the problem of his funny name, an imaginative being craving religious stories in his love of God, an open mind searching through science for the signs of life miracles. As unlike Pincher as one can be, Pi still falsifies his memories of struggling at sea for seven months. Pincher does it to keep his consciousness alive, while Pi using the same strategy achieves a different result.

Pi’s story is one of the most unusual survival stories in fiction. If Robinson Crusoe survived on an island for 28 years, Pi survived on a small rescue boat for seven months. If Robinson had the company of Friday, Pi had to cope with a Bengal tiger. If one had to measure the extraordinariness of their situations, Pi would definitely win. Yet, however strange his story with animals, Pi manages to convince his readers that it is possible to coexist in a small boat with a ferocious wild animal. Not for a moment does Yann Martel allow his reader to forget that nature is red in tooth and claw. All the animals in the boat kill each other in the order of pecking or in line with the survival of the fittest hierarchy: the hyena eats the zebra, and then kills the orangutan, only to be eaten by the tiger. The next one to be killed and eaten, according to the rules of the world of nature in the ecosystem on the lifeboat, would have been Pi himself, being the weaker of the two. The fact that it does not happen does not make the story less realistic. Pi is, after all, a zookeeper’s son who knows a lot about animal behaviour, and does not imagine he could kill or tame the tiger. He instead makes a great effort to establish a relationship based on mutual respect by imitating animal behaviour and imposing himself as an
alpha-male while at the same time expertly reading the signals coming from the tiger and providing him with food and water. His unusual religious feeling based on the love of God as represented in the three major religions (Hindu, Christian, and Muslim) allows him to develop a philosophy of ‘both/and’ rather than ‘either/or,’ so that he manages to keep both himself and the tiger alive, which was the only possible way either of them could have survived. Although Pi has somebody to talk to and preserve his sanity, as well as somebody to fear and be kept alert all the time, they never make friends, as is only natural. Therefore, Martel shows that co-existing with a Bengal tiger in a small boat is an option worth considering, as much as man’s living on this planet with his “extended family – birds, beasts and reptiles” (Martel 2012), as Pi himself says.

However, at the beginning of this story told in the first person by Pi, the reader is given clear hints that witnessing all this destruction around himself is too much for Pi. He cries: “I can’t bear it!” (Martel 2012), and blows the whistle desperately hoping for some life-saving authority that would explain everything. Unfortunately, there is nobody there but Pi, and so he starts confabulating. He asks a rhetorical question about the role of reason: “Why such a vast net if there’s so little to catch?” (Martel 2012), intuitively understanding that reason is insufficient to save him, and then resorting to his imagination. Only at the end of the book does it become evident that he was not in fact sharing the boat with animals but with his mother, the cook and a sailor, who killed each other. Consequently, his story that involves animals is ingeniously constructed and supported with all the relevant details that make it seem realistic, though it is entirely a product of his imagination. Pi confabulates in the sense that his false memory is consistent and extensive taking the form of a story that evolves in the course of seven months. He is not a pathological subject in any meaning of the word. Quite the contrary, he exhibits marvelous sanity and mental health when it comes to solving life problems. Therefore, he concocts the animal story solely for its survival value.

In the life-threatening situation, after the sinking of the big ship when Pi finds himself in the water, his behaviour is seemingly identical with that of Pincher Martin: “Something in me did not want to give up on life, was unwilling to let go, wanted to fight to the very end” (Martel 2012). Both castaways struggle with all their might to save themselves, and do not choose the means to satisfy “a terrible, selfish hunger for survival” (Martel 2012). Pi identifies human fear of death saying “we’re in hell yet still we’re afraid of immortality” (Martel 2012). Both of them demonstrate a tremendous will to live so they in the manner of provoked confabulation fabricate their stories /memories. It is a sort of a compensatory mechanism meant to compensate for their memory deficiency, where actual memories are suppressed (not missing) for the sake of survival and replaced by confabulations. Pincher Martin builds a mental island out of a memory of a lost tooth, while Pi composes a story where by some logic his mother becomes an orangutan, the cook is a hyena, the sailor a helpless zebra and Pi himself turns out to be the tiger. They both demonstrate remarkable competency in recollection, filling in all the tiny details in order to persuade themselves, in the first place, that that was how it all happened. Finally, both of them fight against the intrusion of factual reality in different ways: Martin denies the perception of his dead body while Pi mocks the need of the Japanese officials for dry, yeastless factuality.

Despite all these similarities between the confabulations of Martin and Pi, the crucial question remains: what is the real purpose of their story-telling besides sur-
vival? Or rather, what sort of survival is in question here? It turns out that Pincher Martins fights for the life itself, in however reduced form it may be manifested. Although his body is obviously dead, his centre of consciousness refuses to acknowledge it, and keeps working against all physical or biological laws. Not even as in some science-fiction narrative where the brain is alive in a dead body, but rather in some still inexplicable fashion on a meta-level to all that is known to mankind, Pincher Martin’s self-awareness creates an illusion that he lives a life. Telling himself a story, he grabs at this life void of his physical body, of interaction, of all emotion apart from self-love. His existence is diminished to a selfish greed for life without any human quality, an expression of the sheer need TO BE.

On the other hand, Pi resorts to confabulation not to preserve his physical existence but foremost to maintain the quality of his life. Having survived the ordeal, he could have told the truth to the Japanese officials, that the cook killed the other castaways, so Pi had to kill him. However, the horror of that truth, of what a human being is capable of doing against humanity, is unbearable to Pi. With the awareness of what he witnessed and what he did upfront in his mind, he would have not become the man he is at the end of the book: a tender husband, a loving father, a kind host. The knowledge of potential evil that runs in the genes of mankind is so destructive to Pi’s psyche that he cannot bear it, so he naturally relies on his imagination and produces a heroic story. By making a story and persevering in it, he keeps his sanity intuitively realising that what is most important is not simply to be, but HOW TO BE.

Conclusion: Storytelling as Being

Going back to Gottschall and Boyd: they both maintain “the human imperative to make and consume stories runs even more deeply than literature, dreams, and fantasy” (Gottschall 2012). In line with Evocriticism, Gottschall summarises the whole problem by saying “it would be difficult to get rid of the evolutionary bathwater of story without also throwing out the baby—without doing violence to psychological tendencies that are clearly functional and important” (Gottschall 2012). Analysing the behaviour of Pincher Martin and Pi Patel in life-threatening situations, it seems that the fact they both confabulate, however different they may be as psychological types, shows universal psychological tendencies that are indeed functional and important. They want to save themselves, and as Langdon and Turner believe, these unconscious emotional and motivational processes are potentially just as important as cognitive and memory problems. Gottschall is definitely witty claiming that the human mind was shaped for story so that it could be shaped by story, though this nice turn of phrase does not explain much. A better story, to borrow Pi’s words, has been recently offered by Anthony Brandt (Brandt 2013) in his lecture “The Science and Art of Creativity”, in which he basically argues that creativity underlies all human activity simply because that is how we are. Humans are different from all other species because we are endlessly creative, not in the sense of an adaptive function but in the ontological sense. Story-telling is therefore one manifestation of human creativity that can be occasionally employed as a survival technique, but not an evolutionary adaptation that has evolved in our species in the course of time. Gottschall is in fact supporting this idea when he asserts that we are soaked to the bone in story. Mankind is craving story because it is in our marrow, in our genetic make-up, in our way of being, and occasionally it can have great survival value when it is employed as a survival technique in the manner of Shahrazad. In view of this, both Pincher and Pi are fully human.
References

VRIJEDNOST PRIČANJA PRIČA ZA PREŽIVLJAVANJE: PINČER MARTIN I PIJEV ŽIVOT

Rezime


lovevuk@gmail.com