Aleksandar Janković

Slobomir P University
Slobomir-Bijeljina

The changes of value orientation of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation

Abstract

This paper analyzes the changes in value orientations of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation in relation to the period prior to the collapse of socialism. The aim of the research is to determine the intensity and direction of change in value orientations: gender inequality, intolerance, nationalism, organicism, religiosity, political and economic liberalism and market fundamentalism. Changes in value orientations are interpreted as the product of the process of social change: modernization, retraditionalization and systemic changes.

Keywords: post-socialist transformation, modernization, retraditionalization, systemic changes, liberalism, youth

Introduction

In the last two and a half decades in BiH there has been a dramatic social changes that are reflected in the decay of socialism, the degradation of the joint state, tragic ethnic conflicts and the process of social transformation to a market economy and political pluralism. These processes have led to the fact that today’s BiH society, in many respects, is substantially different than what it was at the end of the eighties. Social changes that have taken place in this period can be seen as mutually interlocked operations of the system changes and modernization.

1 Assistant professor at the Faculty of Economics and Management Slobomir P University, e-mail: alekjan@hotmail.com
Systemic change involves a change in the mode of production of social life, or change of the established social relations between classes, with which thereby is changed the basis upon which the class relations exist and the manner of constituting the classes themselves. Unlike socialism, where there was no separation between the economic, political and cultural subsystems and which were managed from one (party) center by a single ruling class (political and economic officials), capitalism leads to their separation and management from various centers. Thus, from a single ruling class, in the process of social transformation stand out three groups: economic, political and cultural elite, from which gradually is constituted the ruling capitalist class. And in other parts of the social structure occur significant changes. Members of the middle class, professionals and lower executives, acquire greater autonomy from the ruling class, but their social position in the new social system becomes unstable because it depends primarily on the market position (from the knowledge and skills they own). Similarly, the position of the working class is increasingly dependent on fluctuations in the market, the country’s position in the global economy, the market needs for a particular type of occupation, branch of activity in which they are employed, unionisation and the like. In the process of structuring a new social system appear “new” classes and strata such as private entrepreneurs, who in the previous system were virtually the “extra-systemic category”, very scarce and economically marginal group, but
Aleksandar Janković

The changes of value orientation of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation

in the new social order, they form the backbone of the economic, and overall social development. On the other hand, some social classes, in the process of transformation, in structural terms disintegrate and are used to form other classes and layers (eg. The ruling class of socialism is crumbling, and its members in a large percentage are becoming the elite)⁷.

The transition to a market economy and political pluralism can be considered and as the modernization of society, because they fulfill the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) assumptions for faster and more dynamic economic development and democratization (socialism is “static” and “capitalism dynamic society”)⁸. However, it should be noted that the transition from socialism to capitalism does not necessarily have the character of modernization in all aspects, but in different societies and at different periods of transformation, to a lesser or greater extent, have emerged processes which are incompatible with modernization (decline in production and exports, technological lag, the outbreak of social conflicts, intensifying the social inequalities, the impoverishment of the population, massive unemployment, loss of social rights from the period of socialism such as free medical treatment and education, etc.). It is important to note also that the transition from socialism to capitalism had a different flow and dynamics in each society (Path Dependence Theory), which depends on the achieved level of economic development before the collapse of socialism, culture and traditions of society, historical factors, as well as political support from the European Union (which is best seen if we compare, for example, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, which have had political support, with Macedonia, Turkey and Serbia, where the support was not forthcoming). This caused that the initial, emphasized optimistic, single line understanding of the transition (the so-called. “Transition”) from socialism to capitalism was abandoned (to which contributed the most sociologists) and replaced with more flexible concept of the post-socialist transformation (PST). Gradually was crystallized the notion that there is no single model that can be implemented by all the post-communist countries on the road to capitalism, and that there is no only one form of capitalism that can be established.

In addition to changes in class-layered structure, post-socialist transformation has brought a number of other changes in the post-socialist societies. This is primarily related to changes in social mobility (there is a growth of self-reproduction of class)⁹, then changes in the economic inequalities (data

⁷ Ibidem.
show that they are increasing)\textsuperscript{10} and changes in the value of basic forms of the social classes and strata. Volume and dynamics of these processes differ from one to the other.

**Theoretical and hypothetical framework**

To examine the changes in value orientations of young people in BiH in the period of the PST, we started from a few theoretical assumptions. First of all, we will start from the assumption that major social changes (such as modernization and PST) are inevitably followed by the changes in people's consciousness, value patterns, as well as the specific behaviors of individuals and groups who are trying to adapt their social functioning to changing social circumstances (the new system of social relations). From these assumptions depart most of the researchers value, provided that among them there are some differences in understanding between the deterministic herring of social changes and changes in value. While some believe that value changes occur as a product of social change, others believe that this is the two-way relationship, i.e. that the values are changing under the influence of fundamental social relations that have been established in the society, but that they are also the factor that can contribute to social change (they “prepare the way” to normative and institutional changes in the society). So, for example, Pantić believes that “value changes are late for structural changes and that the real distinction in the field of consciousness lags behind social differentiation”\textsuperscript{11}. Similarly, Inglehart in his revisionist theory of modernization as an independent variable in a deterministic sequence sets the socio-economic development, which leads to certain cultural and value changes, and these to increasingly strong demands for the introduction of democracy where it does not exist, or its empowerment in countries that are already democratic\textsuperscript{12}. On the other hand, from the theory of the value-normative dissonance ensues the seemingly paradoxical conclusion of the two-way connection between social changes and value changes: value orientations are formed under the influence of the dominant system of social relations, while at the same time, to change the social system there has to be a certain set of (anti-systemic) value orientations in social groups that want to abolish the old and establish the new social

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} Dragomir Pantić. „Are the values of the citizens of former communist countries similar“. Novi Sad, The Collection of Serbian Social Sciences. 118-119. 2005: 60.

order. Sekulić argues the attitude almost identical to Lazić's, given that he claims that "value orientations are depending on the changes in society (but they also anticipate these changes)."\(^{13}\)

The next assumption is that the acceptance of certain value orientations depends on the class-layered affiliation and that at different classes are formed a distinctive value systems. Research conducted in the seventies and the eighties in the former Yugoslavia have confirmed it. Here we primarily refer to several studies of values among young people.\(^{14}\) Location in the class-stratified structure of society determines the class interests and class interests condition the social action and the way of the interpretation of social reality: how they perceive the social relationships, how they see the other community groups and their mutual relations, which values they adopt and what goals they want to achieve.\(^{15}\) If there is an awareness of common interests, from it derives more or less willingness to defense interests from the collective efforts, or to oppose the interests of the competing groups / classes, which is described by the concept of the "working potential," which is defined as "the extent of the ability of a group that, in order to achieve their interests, it mobilizes the collective action of its members, or to oppose such action of a competitor (opposing) group."\(^{16}\)

The empirical research has observed that the values which legitimize the social order, the so-called. "Dominant values" are created and played in the ruling social classes, and then are gradually spread, or rather imposed, to the other social strata as a conceptual framework for interpreting the social reality. Whether the ruling group succeeds or fails to enforce its own, ideologically biased interpretation of reality to a large extent depends on the long-term stability of the social order. The imposition of a specific image of reality by the ruling groups some researchers call the "cultural hegemony"\(^{17}\). In addition to the ruling classes, an important role in the transmission of the dominant values to the lower social strata (workers, small farmers) have the middle classes (professionals, intellectuals, lower managers, etc.), and they

\(^{13}\) Duško Sekulić. „Value-ideological orientation as a sign and consequence of social change”. Political Thought, Year. 48, No. 3, 2011: 62.


\(^{17}\) The term originally comes from the Italian Marxist Gramsci, and here is used by M. Lazić.
depending on the socio-historical circumstances, culture, tradition and the current constellation of social relations easier or harder adopt, or to a lesser or greater extent oppose them.¹⁸

The relationship between the normative system (which regulates the functioning of the social order) and the dominant value system (which directs the individual and collective action in the desired direction) is explained by using the theory of value-normative dissonance by Mladen Lazić.¹⁹ In a situation of stable reproduction of social order, social action takes place in accordance with the dominant values, which are determined by the prevailing system of social relations and historical factors of a “long duration” (tradition, culture, etc.). In this situation, the existing norms and values are dominantly agreed. However, when there is a change of the system of social relations, that is normative and institutional order, it happens that individuals and groups continue to operate in accordance with the values that correspond to the previous social system (as a result of slower changes in the value patterns compared to normative). This brings us to the concept of value-normative system dissonance, which denotes the degree of compliance, or non-compliance of value orientation of a class with the ruling normative order. What the gap is larger, the greater the dissonance, and vice versa. The mismatch between the values and norms can occur without changes in the social system, in a situation of internal reorganization, without the substantive change of the principles on which the system works. In such a situation, when there are different and even contradictory norms according to which the system works it is impossible the unequivocally value basis, which leads to a state of intra-value-normative dissonance. As an example, here is a period of economic crisis, when many countries with developed market economy reached for the state-interventionist measures in order for certain enterprises (vital) to be saved from destruction even though it is contrary to the elementary principles of the market economy. Here is necessary to introduce the concept of value consistency, which means the degree of identity (homogeneity) of the value orientation, and which on the analytic level is on the level of concurrency in the attitudes of members of the same social class. High consistency is a prerequisite for collective action towards the promotion and protection of class interests²⁰.

If a social group has a high and valuable consistency and high dissonance, it

²⁰ Mladen Lazić The same, p. 180-184.
can be a carrier of social changes that establish a new social order, or if it has a high consistency and low dissonance, this social group can be a mainstay of stabilization and the playback of the order. Social groups which have a pronounced evaluative inconsistency can not be the central player in social change, but at best they can only help the change agents.

The changes of value orientation we will follow on the basis of presented theoretical assumptions and theoretical models of the several most experienced researchers of values in our region, thet we will adapt and adjust to our research. We have already said that the change in value orientation we will observe as a product of two processes of social change. The first is an evolutionary process of modernization of the society, and the other is a discontinuous process of systemic changes (the transition from socialism to capitalism).

Modernization of the society, we will look at the area of cultural subsystem, and the value orientation that we use as an indicator of modernization are: gender equality, tolerance of non-traditional forms of behavior and social identification, intolerance of homosexuality, religiosity, nationalism and organismism. Although we basically followed Inglehart’s revisionist theory of modernization, the choice of value orientations that are taken as indicators of modernization deviated from the two main dimensions of value changes mentioned by Inglehart (moving from traditional to secular-rational values and from survival to the values of well-being). However, these are the values that Inglehart believes they were very close to the values of self-expression: First, they highlight the possibility of free choice in decision-making and so encourage the human emancipation; second, they are closely associated with democracy because it is impossible to imagine a democratic society where there is no tolerance for diversity and equality for the genders; Third, according to the findings of Inglehart, these value orientations, such as self-expression values have probably dynamically changed in recent decades,

21 Mladen Lazić, The Same, p.184.
22 In Serbia: Dragomir Pantić and Zagorka Golubović; in Croatia: Duško Sekulić, but on them due to the limited space, we will not elaborate.
23 At one point Inglehart says: “Societies that highly value the expression emphasize the autonomy and quality of life ... These societies are also relatively highly ranked in terms of gender equality and tolerance of homosexuals, lesbians, foreigners and other outsiders...” (Cited from: Inglehart, Ronald; Welzel, Christian. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, Zagreb: Political Culture. 2007. ).
24 In second place Inglehart says: “We would argue that gender equality - along with tolerance of outsiders such as people of other races, foreigners and homosexuals - becomes an essential element of democracy” (The Same, p. 264). Or, similarly: “Emphasis of the man's choice between citizens favors a political system that provides the widest space for choice: democracy” (The Same, p. 144).
so it is easy to register their change. In addition, failure of application of Inglehart's concept of self-expression values several times in Serbia has led us to give up its application in our research and to switch to other indicators of modernization.

On the other hand, the main direction of value changes that occurred due to the systemic changes we will observe in the area of political and economic regulation, and the main indicators of this process are the expansion of value orientation of political and economic liberalism. While selecting the indicators we followed Lazić’s theoretical model, which we have expanded by introducing another value orientation - the market fundamentalism.

After the presentation of our theoretical model that will be used in research of value orientation, we will focus on performing the concrete research assumptions about value orientations in the period prior to the collapse of socialism (1989) and during the “accelerated” post-socialist transformation (2012).

The socialist system in Yugoslavia in terms of the dominant values represented the values of characteristic mixture for traditional and modern society. There were initiated the processes of modernization (electrification, industrialization, urbanization, the growth of the educational level, the strong upward social mobility of broad social layers, etc.) who have “shaken up” traditional value system and accelerated the spread of values characteristic of modern societies - secularism, gender equality (which mirrors the increasing employment of women), ethnic tolerance etc. However, given that there were rejected the fundamental aspects of modernization - the market economy and political pluralism, such a system could not be fully modernized. In addition, some of the values that are typical of traditional societies have never been eradicated. The reasons for this should be sought in the fact that the ideological-value forms on which rested socialism in many respects is similar to traditional (anti-individualism, supremacy of the collective interests to individual, strict adherence to hierarchy, social autarchy and preoccupation with “its own path of development,” the egalitarian principles in the distribution of social goods, focus on consumption, and not on the accumulation

and savings, anti-entrepreneurship, etc.) which contributed to the survival of traditionalism in these areas. We expect that the data for 1989 will indicate the extent of patriarchy (which, among other things, is reflected in inequality between the sexes), ethnic tolerance and atheism. Patriarchal orientation is the part of a broader authoritarian syndrome, but it is known that during the socialism authoritarian consciousness was quite widespread among the population, and also among young people. The largest area of gender inequality we expect in those social classes that are largely authoritarian and traditionally oriented - for the rural population, less educated, lower layers and the like. When it comes to attitude towards religion, the ruling ideology was atheist, which is probably reflected in the adoption of such a view of the world by most respondents. In addition, most respondents we suppose to be tolerant towards other nations, especially in ethnically mixed areas such as the BiH.


This is not to refute the fact that the socialist system at the same time had a significant merit in the eradication of underdevelopment and the remains of traditional society in Yugoslavia, and in many areas: literacy of the population, urbanization, electrification, breaking the patriarchal prejudices, eradication of some authoritarian behavior patterns (inequality of women in society), fostering the inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance, greater social mobility, openness of the elite for the recruitment from the lower social classes (workers and peasants), etc. There are beliefs according to which there is the mismatch between the „self-governing consciousness“ and traditionalism and it is reflected in the fact that they are „diametrically opposed ideological systems, (...) that do not contain any common orientation,” and the departure from traditionalism can be recognized in connection of „self-governing consciousness, with ideological orientation: modernism, openness to the world with the materialism and non-egalitarianism (cited by Dragomir Pantić. „The values and ideological orientation of social classes“ in: Mihailo Popović ur. *Social classes and social awareness.* Belgrade: Center for Sociological Research, Institute of Social Sciences. 1977: 294-297).

29 See the chapter on data.


End of the eighties in Yugoslavia was marked by a profound legitimacy crisis of the socialist system, which will probably be reflected in the presence of political and the economic liberalism. We assume that the liberal values of the late eighties were the most widespread in the ruling class, primarily because of their interest to provide more permanent (intergenerational) reproduction of their own privileged position in a situation when the socialist system was about to collapse, but also because of the lack of interest of its members for the ideological and political defense of the existing order. The penetration of liberal values is expected and with members of the middle class (mostly professionals) due to their interest in acquiring greater autonomy than the ruling class in the political, economic and cultural subsystem of society, which would create preconditions for the relative improvement in their economic situation. In contrast, in the lower social classes is expected the greater resistance to the acceptance of liberal values because of the strong rootedness of the values that are contrary to them (traditionalism, egalitarianism, solidarity, collectivism, self-governing consciousness, etc.).

Period of the nineties was marked by extremely unfavorable social circumstances for unwinding of modernization and systemic changes in the republics of former Yugoslavia who have been directly or indirectly affected by the war (Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). In the literature, this period of social transformation is called “blocked” or “slow” post-socialist transformation. As a result, one can expect a different sequence and pace of change in value than those in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

---

36 In short, these circumstances were reflected in the following points: the post-socialist transformation was marked by the disintegration of the common state, launching the „national question” (where, as a rule, „solving” the national question of a nation meant endangering those same rights of other nations) construction of independent nation states, many years of civil wars, political and economic isolation of Serbia and the Serbian Republic by the „international community” (actually the West), breaking of the economic ties with foreign countries, the mass outflow of the most educated population abroad, the criminalization of society, creating a general climate of lack of prospects, etc. .
On value plan in the nineties marked a series of processes: the growth of nationalism, ethnic homogenization and the revival of traditional values (religiosity, authoritarianism, collectivism, egalitarianism), and on the other hand, the relatively slow penetration of liberal values. Since the nationalism and liberalism are the opposing ideologies, we assume that the incitement of nationalism was hindering factor for stronger penetration of liberal values. Slower penetration of liberalism is bound for other reasons: first, the real interest of the ruling class from the period of socialism was to slow and control the systemic social change in order to successfully convert their high social positions in the economic capital (directly or through family members, relatives, business partners, etc); Secondly, the beginning of social transformation in the former Yugoslavia, in addition to nationalism, was marked by ethnic conflicts so that liberal values were suppressed for a long time, a “lost cause” was spread before the reforms began; Third, in the collective memory of most population of the former Yugoslavia socialism was remembered as a system in which was a better and safer living compared to the nineties, so that the rejection of that system was difficult and traumatic process.

Period after the end of the civil war was marked as the “unblocked” and “accelerated” social transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia, but still delayed compared to most other post-socialist countries in Europe. Entering the new millennium is symbolically taken as the revival of transformational processes on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

38 The first is the ideology of a post traditional society and is based on collectivism, the second is the ideology of civil society and is based on individualism and the freedom of the individual.
42 It turned out that the initial benefits that the countries of Central Europe gained by previously initiated the transformation processes (in the first half of the nineties) were irrecoverable in a short period of time, which has become apparent after their entry into the EU in 2004 and 2007, when their development was further intensified.
consolidation of the new social order. We expect our research to confirm that liberal capitalism is more accepted than at the end of the eighties, and that it comes to a reduction in value-normative dissonance. Such expectations are justified if we take into account that the period after the year 2000 is marked by the gradual consolidation and strengthening of the capitalism and it is seen more and more as we move away from these time points. The greater acceptance of the liberal values we expect in the higher social classes, the so-called. “Transition winners”, while at the level of the entire sample, we expect the greater acceptance of political rather than the economic liberalism. The main reason for this is that the liberalization of society in the political sphere does not affect so much (or at least not directly) the economic interests of the ‘losers layers’. The fact is that the economic transformation is a lot more painful and complex process and that, in fact, it is more threatening to living standards and economic interests of citizens, than the process of democratization. On the other hand, the interests of the lower classes, the so-called. “Transition losers” is that they do not accept normative solutions that threaten their financial situation (market regulation leaves many without employment; lowers the cost of labor, especially the manual, certain professions are becoming less wanted and require less and less pay), or make their chances in the labor market permanently uncertain. This will, we believe, reflect in the growing acceptance of the state intervention rather than the economic liberalism.

Our assumption is that the effects of the economic crisis in the area of the dominant social values will manifest through the emergence of the intra-value-normative dissonance, primarily in the area of the economic regulation, the weakening of the support for liberal values and the creation of the confusing value patterns. In other words, we expect the expression of support for the state interventionism, particularly from the lower social strata and existentially vulnerable population. On the other hand, we are convinced that this is about finding solutions within the existing capitalist normative and institutional systems and not about its rejection. Finally, not globally, nor locally, there has been profiling some social group that would be able to perform such a reversal (first to achieve the necessary working level of resources for the execution of turns, and then to create a new mode of production of social life, to build an alternative system of social relations, etc.), nor were cre-

---

44 Although in recent years were organized massive protests of workers and vulnerable populations across Europe (in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Italy, UK, etc.), they have not strongly shaken the capitalist order.
The changes of value orientation of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation

Ated the objective socio-historical circumstances so that such an achievement was possible\(^{45}\).

On the other hand, we assume that the economic crisis is not the only factor affecting the rejection of liberal values. When it comes to our areas, it should be noted a long history of state intervention in the entire period of the existence of Yugoslavia, and after its dissolution, which created a certain “familiarity” of the population to the dominant role of the state in the regulation and organization of the economic activity\(^{46}\). We should not ignore the failed expectations of the population in terms of growth in living standards, slow economic recovery and the deepening economic slowdown in comparison with the developed countries, so-called. “Center” of the world capitalist system\(^{47}\).

Completion of the civil war and ethnic conflicts were the main precondition for the continuation of the modernization process in the former Yugoslavia. One can therefore expect a decline in the authoritarianism and the growth in gender equality, which according to the results of some research happened in Serbia and Croatia in the postwar period\(^{48}\). In these studies, it is mentioned that there was no decline of nationalism and religiosity, on which we can assume that this value orientation is still very widespread among the population. Since the BiH after the war is ethnically deeply divided society, with constant latent danger of the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflicts (due to attempt for unitary state, on the one hand, and disintegration, on the other hand) one can expect a significant presence of nationalism in BiH. In addition, we should expect a high level of religiosity among the population, a trend that is also present in other post-socialist countries\(^{49}\).

Given that in the period of peace-building, we expect the continuation of the process of modernization, we assume that there has been a growth of gender equality and tolerance. Also, we believe that these values are the product of long-term pre-civilizational modernization processes: the growth of levels of education and enlightenment, strengthening the rights of individuals and

minority groups, the spread of “the modern way of life”, etc., rather than a direct result of economic development, as it is believed by Inglehart\textsuperscript{50}. They can also arise as a product of systemic change, because liberalism and modernism, as value systems, support and have a number of points in common: a positive attitude towards the individual freedom, tolerance of diversity, social equality regardless of race, gender, ethnic and other differences between individuals, individual identity dominates over the collective identity, cosmopolitanism, etc.\textsuperscript{51}.

\section*{Operationalization of value orientations}

Gender inequality both at time points (1989 and 2012 year) was operationalized using the same items, but in 2012 we have been able to expand the scale with another testimony (concerning the upbringing of children). The items were as follows: If in the marriage only one spouse is employed, it is more natural to be a man; Most jobs in the household by their nature are more suited to women; It is good that there is equality in marriage between husband and wife, but it is usually better for a husband to have the last word; To men are closer public and to women private activities; Education of children is before mother’s than a father’s duty. The analysis of reliability determined that both scales are highly reliable: the scale of 2012 had a Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.793, and the scale of the 1989 0.746. A factor analysis (method of extraction: analysis of the main component, rotation of factors: direct oblimin\textsuperscript{52}) it was determined that both scales are factorial and that means that with one


Dragomir Pantić. „The characteristics of the modern personality and psychological structure of modernism as a value orientation“. Psychology, Vol. XXIII, No. 3-4. 1990a.

\textsuperscript{52} It is believed that orthogonal rotation provides solutions that are easier to interpret, but it starts from the problematic assumption when it comes to social sciences, and that is that the components of the studied phenomenon (ie. Factors) are uncorrelated. We decided for Direct Oblimin because we believe that it is more appropriate to the theoretical concepts and in general it is more realistic in the social sciences because it does not exclude the interconnection of the constituent elements of phenomena that are studied (up. Duško Sekulić 2014: 161). However, since we have in most cases gotten a single-factor scale, in such cases the use of orthogonal rotation gives very similar results as we have testified.
single factor can be explained 56.85% of the variance in the first case (1989) and 55.16% of the variance in the other (2012).

Intolerance is a value orientation, which is operationalized as a group of negative attitudes towards behavioral patterns and social identification that deviate from traditional norms. The scale we could construct only in 2012, and we used the following five items: Abortion should be prohibited by law; It is not right that unmarried couples live together; Divorce should be prohibited by law; Homosexuals are no better than criminals and should be severely punished; Homosexuals and lesbians should have the right to live their lives the way they want. The analysis of reliability was found for scale to be reliable as alpha coefficient was 0.601. A factor analysis (method of extraction: analysis of the main component, rotation of factors: direct oblimin) has found that the scale of intolerance consists of two factors: the first factor gathers the items on abortion, unmarried couples and divorce, and second factor the two items used to express views on homosexuals. Each item is a part of only one factor, and the other factor can only conditionally be considered as a factor because it consists of only two items (it takes at least three), which should be kept in mind in the further analysis. Both factors together explain 63.5% of variance, where the first explains 39.5% and the other 24% of the variance. Although all correlations between individual items are in an inter-correlation matrix positive (range from 0.022 to 0.450), the correlation between factors is low (r = 0.188 in Oblimin and 0.236 in the Promax rotation), it is difficult to say whether this is a one-dimensional scale and whether we can use it as a summation scale. Therefore, we decided that as a measure of latent intolerance we take two factors that we named traditionalist intolerance and intolerance of homosexuality.

Nationalism is a value orientation which is operationalized as the national exclusivity, or the perception that members of different nationalities should live separately and that mutual contacts are harmful and undesirable, and should be kept to a minimum. Exclusive ethnicity was operationalized for the year 1989 using the following statements: The national mixed marriages must be more unstable than the other marriages; A man can feel completely safe only when living in a community where most members are of his nation; Among nations can be established cooperation, but not the complete trust; Every nation must have its own state. The scale of national exclusivity for the year 2012 included the following four claims, to which were added three more: It is best that in villages and towns, live people of the one (same) nationality; When choosing a spouse, nationality should be one of the most im-

---

53 If we remove the last sentence alpha coefficient remains practically constant at 0.603.
important factors; For now, the best for people is to work with those of their nationality, and not to try to build relationships with people from other groups. The analysis of reliability determined that scale from the year 1989 has an alpha coefficient of 0.51754 while the scale from the year 2012, has a higher alpha coefficient of 0.845, which can be a result of using a larger number of items, but also of more consistent attitudes of respondents on nationalism (we assume that there are more of those who reject the nationalist attitudes as we are moving away from the nineties). A factor analysis (method of extraction: analysis of the main component, rotation of factors: direct oblimin) has found that the scale of nationalism from the year 1989 consists of one factor with which it is possible to explain 43.08% of variance. Scale of 2012 also consists of one factor that may help explain 51.87% of variance.

Organicism is a value orientation that is operationalized in the form of the idea that the nation is an organic community, based on the shared past (which is usually considered glorious, heroic, etc.), tradition and origin (blood ties between members of the same nation), as opposed to modern bourgeois conception of a nation as a community of compatriots tied with a common culture, nationality and language. Scale of organicism we have only for the year 2012 that we constructed using the following items: The past of our nation for all of us must be sacred; The people who do not nurture the tradition deserves to perish; The survival of their own people is the main task of every individual; Common origin of our people is the foundation of our trust; The farmer has always been and will remain the backbone of our nation. The analysis of the reliability of the scale was found to have satisfactory reliability because the alpha coefficient is 0.708. Factor analysis (method of extraction: analysis of the main component, rotation of factors: direct oblimin) showed that the scale consists of one factor by which it is possible to explain 46.6% of the total variance of views.

The scale of religiosity is constructed differently than the other scales (not Likert scale), and comparisons with the other scales are only conditionally possible, which should be borne in mind when analyzing. This scale is ordinal fifth-degree where one-half of the scale indicates religiosity, and the other half a lack of belief. The scale is based on the question: “If someone asked you about your relationship with religion, where would you classify yourself?” Value 1 belongs to response “He is not religious and is the opponent of religion”, a value 2 belongs to response “He is not religious, although it has nothing against religion”, the Value 3 belongs to replies “I’m indifferent towards

54 Also, low Cronbach alpha coefficients were given by Duško Sekulić (0.639) and Jelena Pešić (0.553) by applying identical scale of the data collected in 1989 in Croatia and Serbia (see the list of literature: Duško Sekulić 2011; Jelena Pešić 2011).
The changes of value orientation of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation

Aleksandar Janković

religion “and” a lot of thinking about it, but I’m not sure if I believe it or not “(these two responses are combined into one because their meaning is very similar), the value 4 belongs to the answer “I am religious, but I do not accept all that the religion teaches,” and the value 5 belongs to reply “I am convinced believer and I accept all that the religion teaches.” The scale can be applied at both time points.

Value orientations of political and economic liberalism and the two opposing value orientations - authoritarian collectivism and the redistributive statism - have derived from two different forms of reproduction of social life and two different forms of normative and institutional regulation of political and economic processes: capitalist and socialist. These two pairs of value orientations were obtained by factor analysis of a large number of items, expressing a dominant value in the capitalist and the socialist system in the field of political and economic regulation. We have taken and used them in our study of value orientation. The scale of political liberalism for 1989 originally contained of the following eight testimonies: The judiciary must ultimately serve the authorities; Without leader every nation is like a man without a head; Full freedom of speech today leads to disorganization of society; There are two main types of people, strong and weak; The most important thing for children is to teach them obedience to parents; Collective interests must be more important than the interests of individuals; Multiparty system guarantees the expression of the interests of all social groups; Superiors should be listened to, even when they are wrong. However, such a solution is not very satisfactory because it gave the scale that was made up of two factors, which are very low correlated. Very quickly we decided to eject the item of the multi-party system (which will be considered separately in the analysis) because in this way increases the Cronbach alpha, but more importantly, we get the scale consisting of only one factor.

The scale of political liberalism in 2012 was identical to the first six testimonies, and there were added two more: The media should have more understanding for power; Media that does not take into account the national interests should be banned. (Since both scales contain six identical statement, an alternative option is to use in the analysis completely identical scales at two time points, if they have adequate psychometric properties).


56 The scales of political and economic liberalism differ somewhat depending on the specific researchers who apply them and / or the specific research, which probably depends on the specifics of the collected samples and differences in theoretical approaches of researchers. Even the designers of these scales, Lazić and Cvejić, do not always apply them in the same form (see: Mladen Lazić & Slobodan Cvejić 2007: 65; Mladen Lazić 2011: 196-197; Jelena Pešić u: Mladen Lazić ur. 2014:183, 186; Selena Lazić and Dunja Poleti in: Mladen Lazić ur. 2014: 160-161).
The analysis of reliability found that Cronbach alpha for the scale of 1989 amounted to 0.622 (before deploying the item of a multiparty system alpha was 0.601), and for the scale of 2012, it was 0.690 which means that both scales have acceptable internal consistency. A factor analysis (method of extraction: analysis of the main component, rotation of factors: direct oblimin) has found that the scale of political liberalism in 1989 consisted of only one factor, by which it is possible to explain 31.15% of the total variance. The scale of political liberalism from 2012 consists of two factors. The first factor consists of five items: the leader, the freedom of speech, the strengths and the weaknesses of human beings, obedience to parents and the interests of the collective. Another factor is composed of three items: the judiciary, the media that should have the understanding for the government and the media that does not take into account the national interests. Paragraph about the freedom of speech became part of both factors. With the help of the first factor can be explained a 31.7% of variance, and with another 13.3%. The correlation between the factors is of medium intensity and amounts to \( r = -0.312 \) (if using Promax rotation \( r = 0.397 \)), and its negative sign indicates that the isolated factors may be at opposite ends of the same dimensions. Since the factors are correlated with each other and that all the inter-correlations between the items are positive (ranging from 0.078 to 0.322), we can consider that the scale is one-dimensional. However, we decided that in analysis we should use two scales, which proved to be justified.

The scale general economic liberalism - state intervention could not be formed because of the low reliability and are therefore analyzed the individual items: Social progress will always rest on private property (2012 and 1989) - expresses the market liberalism.

The less the government intervenes in the economy, the better for the RS / FBiH (2012) / State today must have a greater role in the management of the economy (in 1989) - expresses the market liberalism. The government should not try to control, regulate, or in any other way interfere in private companies (2012) / The complete independence of labor collectives from the country is a prerequisite for the economic growth (1989) - expresses the market liberal-

57 By cutting off the items on the collective interests of the scale alpha coefficient remains virtually unchanged at 0.692.

58 Although the scale is one-factorial suggesting the high interconnectedness of the items, it explains a small percentage of variance, indicating that probably, during the operationalization, were not included all the essential elements of the phenomenon under study (up. Irena Petrović. „The changes of value orientation of the economic elite - patriarchy, authoritarianism, nationalism“ in: Mladen Lazić prir. Economic elites in Serbia in the period of consolidation of the capitalist order. Belgrade: Čigoja štampa. 2014. p.202).
ism. Only private farming allows better supply (1989) - expresses the market liberalism.

The scale specific economic liberalism - the redistributive statism consists of three items: The government should provide a job for everyone who wants it; The government is supposed to guarantee a minimum standard of living to everyone; The state should intervene in the economy to reduce inequalities and protect the poor and the weak. The scale consists of a single factor with which is possible to explain the 58.61% of the variance.

The scale market fundamentalism - economic protectionism consists of the following items: The state should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect the domestic economy; Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in this country; Large multinational companies more and more harm the local companies.

With the analysis of reliability is established that alpha coefficient is 0.577 which was probably due to the small number of items. It was conducted the factorial analysis (extraction method: principal components analysis, the method of rotation: direct oblimin) and it was yield a single factor with which it is possible to explain 54.8% of variance.

The data

Empirical data available to us are collected in two surveys. The first study is The changes in the class structure and mobility in Yugoslavia, which was conducted in 1989 in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia on a sample that included almost fourteen and a half thousand respondents. From this sample we have selected a subsample of young people in BiH aged 18-29 years and it was the size of 559 respondents. The sample was quota type, and the basis for the quota were accounted for classes that were operationalized through jobs of respondents. The sample includes both employed and unemployed, and were excluded pupils, students, private sector employees, housewives and dependent persons with which was violated the representativeness.

Another study which was used to collect empirical data on young Doboj region in 2012, is our own Source research. The sample was consisted of almost equal number of respondents as in 1989, and it is 553 respondents. The sample was stratified, multistaged, with strataums of proportional size.

Stratification was performed by combining the socio-economic and territorial respondents. However, the survey is due to financial and organizational reasons, carried out on the territory of the Doboj region (municipalities of Doboj, Doboj Istok, Doboj South and Usora) under the assumption that this region may well represent BiH because of their ethnic and religious mixture (more than a third of the sample consists of non-Serb respondents), no matter what the administratively and in the awareness of population is not perceived as a whole. Issues related to socio-demographic data, information on occupation, education, standard of living and financial situation we have created on our own. Questions relating to the value orientation we took from the research South-Eastern European Social Survey Project from 2003-04. year, which was conducted in all the republics of former Yugoslavia (except Slovenia) and Albania. This study was planned to be comparable to the aforementioned survey of 1989 in Yugoslavia and research of value orientations of 1993 in Serbia\textsuperscript{60}.

**Results**

In the period prior to the collapse of socialism prevailing the value orientations in the field of cultural subsystems were gender inequality, atheism and inter-ethnic tolerance, which is consistent with the thesis about the lack of socialist modernization which is reflected in the field value in the existence of inconsistent mixture of traditional and modern values. Traditionalism is reflected in the presence of gender inequality, and modernism in the presence of rational, atheistic view of the world and interethnic tolerance. Data show that gender inequality was widespread in lower classes (workers, farmers and private entrepreneurs), and only slightly less in the ruling class and professionals, although it was in these classes also the predominant orientation. Taking into account the previous studies from the socialist period in Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{61} We could say that patriarchy was a value constant of this social order. When it comes to inter-ethnic tolerance and atheism, these value orientations were also distributed in all parts of society, considering that the inter-ethnic tolerance was more deeply rooted. This is the result of decades of government efforts to suppress the nationalist outbursts and strengthen the supranational

\textsuperscript{60} Head of both studies was Mladen Lazić. The survey of 1993 was published in the book The destruction of society (1994).

Aleksandar Janković
The changes of value orientation of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation

Yugoslav patriotism (under the slogan “brotherhood and unity”). Certainly it can not be excluded the fear of population of the possible consequences that could bring the eventual spread of nationalism, which was especially pronounced in ethnically mixed areas. Atheism dominated with the ruling class and the experts (percentage of religious was below 10%), which is not surprising considering that they constituted the strongest ideological stronghold of the regime, while the lower classes were more religious (among the farmers was 60% religious), as a result of the large proportion of rural and less educated population in these layers.

The presence of the liberal value orientations at the end of the eighties was the result of the specific character of the Yugoslav self-management socialism (liberal and west facing open system in relation to the countries of the Soviet bloc) and the ideological crisis of socialism. Liberal values were gradually spread, gaining a foothold primarily among members of the ruling class, the intelligentsia and professionals. It is believed that the ruling class accepted the liberal values due to interest by the establishment of a permanent, inter-generational transfer of high social positions (which is described as a process of “conversion of resources”\(^\text{62}\)), and experts because of interest in enlisting greater autonomy than the ruling class, which would allow them in perspective relative improvement in living conditions. On the scale of political liberalism, liberal orientation has been accepted by the ruling and the individual layers of the middle class (professionals and lower managers), while other classes were authoritarian-oriented. An exception to this existed in some of the individual items. Thus in the item expressing the collectivist orientation (Interests of the collective must be more important than the interests of individuals) all classes embraced collectivism, while in the item expressing the general support to the multi-party political system (multiparty system guarantees the expression of the interests of all social groups), all classes were liberal-minded. This shows that one of the basic ideological postulates of liberalism was deeply rooted in all parts of society at the end of the eighties, but that at the same time was strong a collectivist orientation, which is incompatible with liberalism.

The amount of the available empirical data in the area of the economic regulation was smaller, which directly impacted on the ability to perform broader conclusions. Of the four items with which we tested the acceptance of general economic liberalism, three were in the zone of acceptance, and one in the zone of rejection, which confirms that the assumption about the spread of liberal values at the time of the disintegration of socialism is justified. The

most accepted items are those expressing support for private farming enterprises and independence from the state (which accepts more than half of the respondents), while items which express support for private ownership and reducing the role of government in managing economic are admitted to a lesser extent. Based on this, we conclude that the economic liberalism was more widespread than political. This is clearly seen when the analysis is directed towards the individual classes and strata. The rejection of liberalism boils down to isolated cases and in those situations when it is directly threatened the economic interests of individual classes. So, for example, the ruling class rejects the liberal orientation only when it comes to attitude on private property, and workers, clerks and technicians only when it comes to the attitude on the state management of the economy. This confirms the assumption of the existence of value-normative dissonance in the period prior to the collapse of socialism. High levels of variances on individual testimonies indicate the existence of value inconsistency that is reflected in the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of liberal orientation. It is present in the area of both forms of regulation, and insufficient number of respondents did not permit a detailed analysis at the level of individual classes.

Although we do not have the empirical data on value orientations in the nineties and the first decade of the new millennium, there is no doubt that the “compressed” historical events, especially those with the traumatic consequences, affected the pace and direction of change in value orientations. During the nineties, there has been a break-up of Yugoslavia, ethnic conflict, economic collapse, international isolation of the Republic of Srpska, etc., resulting in that period treated as a period of “blocked transformation”. In the new millennium has come to accelerating the transformation process and this period is known as the period of “rapid transformation”. Towards the end of the first decade of the third millennium, the world economic crisis begins to manifest in our region as well, and in 2012, when the survey was conducted, the economic crisis was probably peaked.

The introduction of research results in 2012 in the analysis does not bring a complete picture of the overall dynamics of value changes in the period of PST because we could compare the data in only two time points, which are distant nearly a quarter of century, and within this period occurred significant events that could affect the dynamics of value orientations. The data provided indicate that the field of culture is occurring the opposed processes of modernization and re-traditionalization, and in the area of the economic and political regulation processes of simultaneous acceptance and rejection of liberal orientation.
In 2012 there was a growth of modernist but also a significant presence of traditionalist value orientations, which can be interpreted as the result of incomplete modernization in the period of socialism, but also the revival of tradition in a period of social crisis and ethnic conflicts. Modernization is reflected in the growth of gender equality in relation to the period of socialism and the presence of tolerance, a retraditionalization in high religiosity of the respondents, and the presence of nationalism and organicism. The growth of gender equality is consistent with the assumption of the progress of modernization processes in the period of the social transformation, no matter it is about a slight increase (the predominant orientation at the level of the sample is still gender inequality). When it comes to tolerance towards different forms of behavior and social identification that deviate from traditional norms, the lack of data for 1989 does not allow us to perform more precise conclusions about the unfolding processes of modernization in this dimension. The problem is that traditional norms are at different degrees accepted and rejected which does not allow execution of a unified conclusion. Thus, for example, respondents are most tolerant towards divorce, to a lesser extent tolerate life with a partner in a common-law marriages and are overwhelmingly against abortions. On the other hand, the respondents’ attitudes towards homosexuals are intolerant, but also non-consistent, which means that they do not have a uniform opinion on this issue. However, considering that less than a fifth of young people accept the “traditionalist intolerance” and about a third of them, “the intolerance of homosexuality,” we assume that in this area modernization processes are also taking place (the intensity of these processes is difficult to speak about because of the lack of data for the socialist period).

Retraditionalization in the nineties left a deep imprint in the social consciousness, and two decades after that, regardless of many social factors that led to the revival of traditional values ceased to act or lost deterministic force. This refers to the big jump of religiosity of the respondents, which happened in all post-socialist countries in Europe, regardless of the specifics of the transformation times of each country. We can freely say that the growth of religiosity is one of the most important features of the post-communist transformation. The amount of growing religiosity is shown by the fact that among young people in BiH at the end of the eighties were 57% of atheists, while after a little more than two decades, 85% of young people in the Doboj region were religious. Nationalism has also increased in comparison to the socialist period, however, the situation of this growth is not as pronounced as in religiosity (the average score is in the zone of rejection). This is the opposite situation than the one that existed in the late eighties when interethnic tolerance was more deeply rooted than atheism. When it comes
to organicism, this value orientation is more widespread than nationalism (located in the zone of acceptance) and the possible explanation for this is that nationalism in the period of “peace-building” is knowingly concealed. The expansion of the organicism can be linked to the establishment of a new identity that is predominantly based on ethnicity (common origin, history, tradition, nation, etc.). With regard to the ethnic heterogeneity of the population, it involves the construction of different identities that are based on the specificities of each nation, and have very few common elements upon which one could make a constitution of civil society on universal components, such as was the case during the modernization of West European societies\(^{63}\). In such a situation it is difficult to imagine that it is possible to build a modern civil society at which center would be the individual-citizen. In other words, national identity in BiH today is largely a factor of disintegration rather than the integration of society.

Observation of those value orientations at the level of individual classes has allowed verifying the hypothesis of the ruling class as the holder of modernization processes. Here we conditionally observed and some layers of the middle class (professionals, managers below) because of their important roles in initiating transformational process and persisting the social reforms in a number of post-socialist countries\(^{64}\).

When it comes to gender inequality, all except the ruling class have made a modernization step forward towards the rejection of inequality of women in society. However, in 2012, gender equality was the dominant orientation only at professionals and lower managers, while the members of the transition layer (clerks, technicians) both accepted and rejected, and the other classes and strata rejected the Gender Equality (mostly workers and farmers). A similar situation exists with the intolerance of homosexuality. The only difference is that the members of the ruling class had even more traditional attitudes (for which they equated with farmers and unskilled labor) and in the “neutral zone” could be find even more social classes (private entrepreneurs, transitional layer and skilled workers). When it comes to tolerance towards non-traditional behavior norms, all classes and strata show tolerance (mostly experts and lower managers), except unskilled workers and farmers, for whom is not difficult to assume that accept traditional values. With nationalism is present almost the identical form. It is rejected by virtually all classes (mostly experts and lower managers), except skilled workers and farmers.

---


Organicism and religiosity are deeply rooted value orientations in all parts of society, except that in the case of organicism farmers, workers and the ruling classes have more traditional attitudes in relation to other classes and strata. On this basis we can say that the hypothesis is only partly confirmed. It is obvious that the ruling class is not a holder of modernization values in post-socialist period and that together with workers and farmers can be considered the “hard core” of traditionalism. The explanation for this should be sought in several directions: the lack of quality part of the ruling class, since much of this class consists of respondents who through “bow ties” (over fathers and spouses who are holders of class position) matured in this group, who live in rural areas and who do not have higher education. In addition, the territorial framework of the research was quite narrow (only 100 thousand inhabitants) and did not include Banja Luka as the main administrative, political, economic and cultural center of the Republic of Srpska, which could be reflected in a reduced possibility of “abstraction” of members of the ruling class using a random sample. Third, a subsample of the ruling class was too small to draw reliable conclusions. On the other hand, specialists and lower managers have expressed the highest level of acceptance of modernist values, and our expectations were met when it comes to these layers.

Accepting liberal value orientations in the post-socialist period is one of the most controversial findings. Extensive empirical material has enabled the adoption of wider and more precise conclusions. In the area of political regulation of social relations most of our assumptions were not met. Contrary to the expectation of the growth of political liberalism in the post-socialist period, which would be in line with the new normative and institutional order, there was its decline, and the growth of its opposing orientation- the authoritarian collectivism. In other words, the value-normative dissonance has not reduced but increased. Although the growth of authoritarianism was not dramatic (a half point on a scale of 1 to 5) it is present in all classes / layers, which tells us that this value orientation deeply penetrated into all segments of society. Specific forms of political liberalism (which relate to the independence of the courts and the media) to a somewhat greater extent are more accepted than the general, although and in the field of regulation is dominated the authoritarian political orientation. By looking at value consistency, we see that the number has been increasing, but in a way opposite to the expected. Instead, as we have assumed, more respondents agree in accepting liberal attitudes, they are increasingly agreeing in accepting to them conflicting, authoritarian attitudes. This is evident in all individual items where we have data at both time points. In other words, authoritarianism not only spread in comparison to the socialist period, but more respondents agree about its
acceptance. The only group that “stands out” in terms of acceptance of political liberalism are specialists and lower managers, but only when it comes to specific political liberalism. What is also important to emphasize is that collectivism was held at the same level as it was during the socialist period (the average score in both periods is the same and amounts to 2.19), and that this is the predominant orientation in all classes and strata, as the socialist and in the post-socialist period. Perhaps therein lies one of the reasons for rejection of political liberalism, but also an explanation for the survival of nationalism, long after the ethnic clashes.

In the area of the economic regulation of social relations we have had the opportunity to observe a larger number of value orientation which this part of the analysis made more complete. When it comes to general principles of the economic liberalism, such as the dominance of private property, the non-interference of the government in the economic processes and the work of private companies, in the post-socialist period there has been a decline in the percentage of respondents who accept the liberal orientation, on the basis of which it could be concluded that there was the increase of the value-normative dissonance. However, while there also has been a decline of the opponents of the liberalism and the increase in the percentage of the unstated which contributed to the average scores to be in the zone of the acceptance of liberalism. The real surprise appears on the class level of analysis given that the members of the middle class reject the liberal orientation (which they accepted in the socialist period) and accept the typical forms of the state interventionism, which is surprising. The question is how to explain the fact that experts and lower leaders reject the overall economic liberalism, but at the same time that the other classes and strata accept it? The explanation probably lies in the fact that the most educated members of society first realized that there was a change in normative base of reproduction of global capitalism and that state intervention has become an instrument for overcoming the economic crisis (which was most evident where the crisis was the most severe - in the most developed Western capitalist countries). From this perspective, the support of state interventionism can be seen as a progressive effort of the most educated strata of society to prevent the deterioration of the domestic economy, no matter the fact that it is undermining the fundamental principles of the economic liberalism and creates the intra-value-normative dissonance. When it comes to a values consistency, the data indicate that there is to be extended at the level of the sample, that is, that respondents more and more agree in their attitudes towards the general patterns of the economic liberalism, which is in line with our assumption.
Rejection of specific economic liberalism and accepting the opposite orientation - redistributive statism is so present that it represents the biggest surprise in the research work related to the intensity and the extent of value orientations. Although the redistributive statism represents an essential feature of the socialist system, this value orientation is very present and a quarter-century after the collapse of this social order. It is so deeply rooted in society as a whole and all the individual layers that we can freely say that this is the most accepted value orientation in the post-socialist period. To this must be added the fact that respondents distinctly reject one of the basic principles of liberal capitalism - market fundamentalism and accept the opposite orientation - economic protectionism, both at the level of the sample, as well as all the individual layers. It is paradoxical that in that precede those whose existence is based on the private ownership and market competition with competitors (entrepreneurs and farmers). Their views probably do not express disagreement with the principles of the functioning of the market economy, but the fear of the unfair foreign competition, primarily from the EU.

**Conclusion**

Given the data presented, it is evident that the value-normative dissonance in the post-socialism has grown, which is contrary to the initial hypothesis. This can be partially attributed to the changes of normative base of the capitalist order due to the effects of financial and economic crisis, which has led to the within the system dissonance. However, respondents strongly resisting the basic postulates of the liberal-capitalist system can not be solely the result of the economic crisis, nor the crisis of the neoliberal model of accumulation. We believe that it is about the simultaneous action of multiple factors acting at different levels of social reality and with different deterministic force. Here we point out: the legacy of socialism in the form of value orientations that are incompatible with liberal capitalist policy (authoritarianism, collectivism, redistributive statism, economic protectionism), disappointed expectations of the population in terms of socio-economic reforms and structural necessity of state redistribution. This is primarily related to an unfinished process of restructuring of the state-owned enterprises, which from time to time produces the need for the state to “help” large companies, the so-called. “Losers”, which have large economic potential, but are not able to operate commercially. Nothing less of a problem is a lack of “healthy” investments and the low level of the economic activity, leading to a reduction in consumption, the
rising unemployment, declining of the living standards and other negative consequences. In this way one enters the “vicious circle” in a way that “structure allows mass mobilization based on the redistributive collectivist values, and a possibility of such mobilization helps the maintain of such structures”\textsuperscript{65}. In other words, we came out of socialism, and in capitalism we did not enter, at least not in the kind of shape that would be enticing to the broader strata of society. As the state of value-normative dissonance is unsustainable in the longer term, there must be a change or value orientations of the population, and young people (which is a slow and laborious task), or to redefine the strategies and directions of the PST ao the social reform could be more acceptable to citizens. Otherwise, the normative and institutional order will not have the necessary legitimacy, the reforms will be imposed “from above” (the joint efforts of the EU and local authorities), and life of “ordinary people” will take place in accordance with the value-forms that more or less deviate from what is desirable and prescribed. When we say that a possible values reorientation would be slow and painstaking work then we have in mind that value consistency of young people in the post-socialism is quite high and it additionally increased, which means that young people are increasingly agreeing in resisting the basic principles of liberal capitalism. In a situation where is not completed a fundamental transformation of the economic and political regulation that may hamper the overall economic and social development\textsuperscript{66}.

The situation is no better when it comes to the modernization of society and the spread of modernist value orientations. It seems that the events in the nineties significantly influenced the course and dynamics of the process of modernization, with the possibility of modernization thread in some point in time to be completely disconnected. Incomplete modernization from the period of socialism is an upgraded process of retraditionalization during the nineties, which left the long-term consequences in the social consciousness. The dominant value orientations in the cultural field, like in the period prior to the collapse of socialism, are the confusing mix of traditional and modern value patterns. Although in the period of PST it comes to a decrease of patriarchy, it is still the dominant orientation, even among the young. The high level of nationalism, organicism and religiosity does not offer hope for a quick and comprehensive modernization turnaround. In other words, ethnic and religious divisions and a strong patriarchal collectivist consciousness form ossified value structure that provides a strong incentive for the survival of traditionalism in our society.

\textsuperscript{65} Cited by: Mladen Lazić, „The post-socialist transformation and re-stratification in Serbia“, 
\textit{Political Thought,} Year. 48, No. 3, 2011. pp.139.

\textsuperscript{66} Mladen Lazić, The same, page.141.
Literature


Lazić, Mladen; Pešić, Jelena. „The impact of modernization on the components of the national identity in the contemporary European countries“, Sociology, Vol. LVII, No. 2. 2015.


Aleksandar Janković  
The changes of value orientation of young people in the period of the post-socialist transformation

Pantić, Dragomir. „Are the values of the citizens of former communist countries similar“, Proceedings of the Serbian Social Science, No. 118-119, Novi Sad. 2005.
Pantić, Dragomir. Value orientation, personality and class, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, doctoral thesis. 1977a.


Županov, Josip. „Egalitarianism and industrialism“, *Sociology*, Year. XII, No. 1, pp. 5-45. 1970