

ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT MILITARIZATION

Review paper

| | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|
| DOI: 10.7251/DEFEN1501001M | UDK 355.015+355.4 |
|----------------------------|-------------------|

Goran Maksimovic¹

European Defendology Centre Banja Luka

Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of military during crisis. The armed forces play an important role in crisis management, especially those of large scale because of their special expertise, ability and resources. Controversy over the use of military exists; however, it is necessary to consider their best integration into the crisis management cycle and to what extent the military model is appropriate. The effective integration of military into the crisis management matrix will depend on finding the right balance between community involvement and philosophy of crisis management and military culture. This paper discusses issues such as military pattern of command and control, constraints on the use of military in crisis management process and a critical assessment of military approaches in crisis management and potential weaknesses. The conclusion is that the armed forces can be important in crisis management.

Keywords: *management, crisis, military, militarization, model*

INTRODUCTION

Crises are a constant in human history and in the modern and globalized technological world, they are becoming more numerous and diverse in nature. Crises are situations that require an emergent response, but the risks that critical decision-makers are faced with, are much more difficult to define because there is a lack of clarity and/or complexity of the situation itself. Crisis management is defined as a set of functions or processes which aim to identify, analyze and predict potential crises and establish specific procedures that will enable the organization of crises prevention, effective response and its successful resolution while minimizing the consequence of a quick return to its origi-

¹ Corresponding author: Goran Maksimovic, P.hD., Assistant Professor, e-mail: gomax5575@yahoo.com

nal state. This paper examines the role of military over a range of crises, from small scale emergencies to disasters, primarily from a military perspective. The concept of crises spectrum does not have a universal definition. The United Nations International Strategy for Disasters Reduction (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2009) defines a crisis as “a serious disruption of the community or society that involves extensive human, material, economic or environmental losses and influence that goes beyond the ability of the affected community or society to confront its own means but for a detailed discussion the analyses of Perry and Quarantelli (Perry and Quarantelli, 2005) may be considered. Crises are seen as disruptive events that still cannot be stronger than the ability of the community to achieve continuity of action, while disasters are observed to be so serious that people and institutions involved in the response and recovery are the victims themselves in a highly significant way.

This calls for a differentiation of the concepts of emergency management and disaster management. These two terms are not identical and there are different definitions in the literature that denote crisis management in outbreaking situations (Drabek, 1991) and preparation for disaster management and disaster management itself (Lindel, Prater and Perry, 2007). The definitions emphasizing bureaucracy, technology and plans, are not the most applicable ones. The terms could be best understood in a bigger social context, appreciating the scope of the definitions for the terms emergency and disaster, including a series of processes and actions under the broader concept of society. The armed forces usually have a prominent role when used in an emergency of a larger scale. Their role is distinct and it is conditioned on its strategic culture. Fast, efficient and decentralized response by the armed forces, demonstrates their ability to operate in many urgent situations and unstable environments. The paper addresses the following two issues: the role of the armed forces in the cycle of crisis management and the implications of militarization in a crisis management process. For the purposes of this paper, the term militarization (which is quite different from the use of the military) relates to the allocation of increased responsibilities and powers of the armed forces and/or adoption of the military culture in crisis management by civilian agencies. Military involvement in disasters comprises a number of activities when the local and civilian capacities are exceeded.

1. DEFINING CRISIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis is a too complex phenomenon to be easily defined and it is often misconfused with the emergency situation, disaster or conflict, so it is necessary to make a distinction between these terms and concepts they stand for. Crisis is most often seen as a serious threat to the fundamental structure or the fundamental values and norms of the social system which, in terms of time pressure and very precarious circumstances, requires critical decision-making. A crisis is any irreversible process endangering and violating the basic structure, values and norms of an organization which, in highly unstable environment, lack of information, time pressure and urgent action, requires from the central organization actors to make critical decisions. It is an irreversible process because the changes that occur during a crisis, create a new situation that doesn't have any longer the characteristics of the situation before the crisis. Crises are a process and not just the

appearance of threats and disturbance that affect and influence the basic structure, values and norms of the organization and hinder the functioning and achievement of the organization's objectives. They are characterized by highly unstable surroundings conditions, lack of credible information, time pressure and urgent action (Maksimovic, 2013: 25). Crises occur in both internal and external environment and they are influenced by the effect of these factors. The external environment is particularly important and it is defined as a political, legal, economic, social and technological environment (Crandall et al, 2001: 43-52) since the internal environment is determined through internal cohesion, enthusiasm, response plans, readiness and training organizations and complementary team. Crises require by central organisation actors, the organization's management and crisis managers to make critical decisions. As seen from the above, it is often very difficult to distinguish an emergency from accident or disaster in practice. The meaning of the word "crisis" is interpreted in a different ways (Perry and Quarantelli, 2005). The UN definition implies an extremely wide range and type of events that can be physical, social and cultural in nature and occur during short or long periods. Like the hazards that cause them (Burton et al, 1999; Perrow, 1984), typology of disasters includes different categories, slow or rapid, concentrated or diffused, known and unknown, social/physical/ cultural/natural/ technological/human, linear and complex, local/national/international crises - in short, the variety of typologies of emergencies is wide. A successful strategy for managing the crisis must necessarily take the type of crisis into account.

It does not mean that planning of all types of hazards should be abolished (an integrated planning approach that emphasizes the existence of common points with regard to planning of different hazards), but it is simply a recognition of some events which have special characteristics that require special attention. In some types of crisis, the role of the military is clear and unambiguous, because of the intensity and events scale that go beyond the capabilities of civil authorities in responding to the crisis and their available resources. Military capacities are significantly used in response to an international disaster (earthquake in Sichuan, China 2009, and the Haiti and Chile in 2010), while for other situations, such as droughts or mild epidemic, the role of the armed forces may be marginalized. The ranking crises issue is fundamentally crucial, as it is largely determined upon the need for military action, and it is made by decision-making of the highest level in any democratic society. Crisis management is defined as a set of functions or processes which aim to identify, study and predict potential crises and establish specific ways that will enable the organization for effective crisis prevention or response and its successful resolution while minimizing its consequences and a quick return to its original state. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction uses two concepts that include crisis management:

- disaster risk management – a systematic process of using administrative decisions, organization, skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and related environmental and technological disasters. This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of hazards.
- disaster risk reduction – a conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks through-

out a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.

Crisis management is typically understood as a process of several interdependent phases. The first relates to a long-term actions to reduce the risk of crises and continues with a phase which includes emergency planning and the resource establishment necessary for the response. The answer is associated with actions taken after a crisis situation had occurred and it sublimates urgent service activities during and immediately after the crisis occurrence. The recovery includes long-term reconstruction activities and a return to the situation before the community crises. This phase is also the moment of activities commencement that reduce vulnerability to future crises. The term "comprehensive emergency management" is often used to refer to these stages, which are usually presented in a cyclic, continuous format (Coppola, 2006). This cycle is useful in terms of understanding the idea of militarization and it will form the basis for analysis. The cycle takes place in the context of a number of components: formal systems containing planning, such as action plans in crisis; laws and agreements on mutual assistance; informal networks and community involvement and the system capacity of civil society; the private sector and non-governmental organizations, which determine the efficiency of the crisis management. In order to achieve a successful planning in crisis, the military capacities form a critical component for each of these processes, and the armed forces all over the world are very involved in crisis management, especially in the response phase, many years from now already (Anderson, 1994; Kohn, 2003).

The circumstances of the military use during emergencies differs in many countries, depending on the number of political, legal and judicial circumstances, which sometimes lead to significant problems scheduled and coordinated between different state levels. Although the reaction to the crisis in democratic societies is concentrated on the local level, regardless of the political form, and local governments do not have control over the military capacities and thereby don't have the possibility to increase their own capabilities during crisis. As a result, although the forces normally are deployed throughout the country, their assignment has no influence on the ability to provide support to local authorities in a crisis because their engagement is usually clearly defined by the law. The concept of civilian democratic control and oversight over the armed forces implies that the armed forces can be engaged in support to civilian authorities only upon request and as a last resource (last resort), and it is regulated by legislation in democratic societies.

2. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The armed forces are only used in cases of large scale crisis and their role is reserved to a limited use as reinforcements and support to existing civil capacities. Seen in the light of partnership between the public and private sector in enhancing the resilience of societies in crisis, the armed forces have never been a central player of the public sector. Crisis response is principally under the direction of civilian agencies that may be

supported by the armed forces. The armed forces are used as a "last resort" in crisis of non-military character, and should be based on three basic principles: contribution to the general welfare of the citizens, emergency use and the lack of an adequate civilian alternative. Although the armed forces have the capacity to be the first on the incident spot, they must be used as a last resort. Military capacities are observed through: trained personnel, an adequate machinery and abilities that civilian agencies do not have as an effective mechanism for decision-making and ensuring stability in the affected areas, as well as the effect of the uniformed personnel that has on the population and their character as public service. The argument that the armed forces engage effectively in the framework of crisis management is based on a very few facts. In contrast to the strict application of the military command and control model, the armed forces tend to delegate responsibility to the lowest levels in the chain of command and control. The policy context within which military resources act, encourage the cooperation between the other agencies, particularly among the civilian organizations. The armed forces have specific and unique capabilities and resources that are needed in some aspects of crisis management and they successfully work with other agencies, in both, national and international context. In general, the civil - military cooperation and the general framework in which the armed forces fit into the management of the crisis could be summarized in a few paragraphs:

- The armed forces always act to support or to be a supplement to the resources of civil authorities,
- The armed forces, upon request, produce rapid, positive and relevant impact on the crisis due to the ongoing nature of training and operations,
- The armed forces provide and offer a unique set of relevant skills and abilities, and
- The armed forces act in the function of strengthening civil authorities and they are never in direct contact or conflict with the public.

An application of the concept of military command and control style is extremely well linked to an effective crisis management because it allows the delegation and allocation of tasks to the lowest level where it actually achieves effect. Chaotic and continuously rapid change in performing operations in a challenging environment, characterized by modern military operational context, is actually a replica of the chaos and confusion that occurs during emergencies. This is precisely the reason why decentralized approach in crisis management accelerates decision-making for persons who are closest to the problem, local experts and officials, who know the situation the best and who can take measures in accordance with the situation. This approach works on the basis that senior managers and officials perform an analysis and decide what needs to be done at the strategic level, while ensuring that it does not deal with tactical detail and decisions and how exactly the people who are closest to the problem can achieve the goals. As long as the intention on a higher level is achievable and the main course of action is in line with intention, the situation is not micro-manageable, but it is more coordinated and simultaneously "loosely coupled" at the operational and strategic level. Priority of operational (tactical) decision making is being left to person directly involved in solving the problem, not to the people in the command centre far away from the scene. In fact, the concept of incident command system, which is used as a model of crisis management, is taken out and makes

a variation of the standard military system of command and control, with managers at lower levels of responsibility, who have priority in decision-making, while they are supported by functions of planning, logistics and so on. Advantages of the military management style and the concept of incident command is intended to explicitly take into account the operational and cultural differences between the various agencies involved in responding to a crisis, regardless of whether they are military or civilian. This has the potential to greatly facilitate civil-military cooperation. Some of the most common tasks performed by the armed forces in crisis include: air transportation, logistical support and airspace management, medical services and support, the provision of general services, supply of food and drinking water, infrastructure support and provision of shelters, search and rescue, communications, engineering support, providing professional staff, etc.

3. CRISIS MILITARIZATION IMPLICATIONS

The core for discussion is the understanding of the term "military culture". Certainly there are differences between civilian and military culture but nevertheless some authors believe that it is important to emphasize that the military culture is heterogeneous, varying not only from country to country but, as noted by Capstick, but also varying within the national military structure to a significant extent (Capstick, 2003:48) who also notes that the definition of specific military culture is no easy task. Culture is both complex and contextual and there cannot exist gaps between the explicit values and those which do really exist. Also, it must be recognized that culture is dynamic. Although the current definition of culture is dominated by the notion that a culture refers to a human activity and behavior, most definitions are of complex character and introduce to the definition of culture the concepts of norms and patterns, values and symbols. Thus, for example, the definition that Kroeber and Parsons give sees culture as transmitted and created content and patterns of values and other symbolic systems which form human behavior and products (artefacts), as well as the results of behavior (Kloskovska, 2001:10). The essential components of culture are transferring already created values (tradition) and development of entirely new values (progress). Tradition is an important component of culture which is characterized by acceptance and transfer of already formed and adopted cultural achievements and preservation of the existing results of the social and cultural life, and thus could be positive or negative. Culture is a complex multidimensional category and could be seen from a different standpoints. From the security point of view the culture could be seen as adopted and widely accepted way of protecting all those processes, changes and creations resulting from social and material human creativity, with the aim of social progress, development and survival (Maksimovic, 2010: 30). Military culture is seen as a perceived and actual role of the armed forces in society and one of the key variables that influence the policy of use the military capacity. To define military culture is particularly difficult within military organizations that exist in countries characterized by heterogeneity in ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious and historical sense. There is no doubt that each of the ethnic groups in such society has developed a distinct culture, so the military structure in such societies is based on their unique and very specific operational requirements, history and tradition. In other words, the military culture and orga-

nizational climate of the basic unit is different from that of higher level of command and control. The result is that there is no a unique military culture that can be applied throughout the organization.

Taking into account the specificity of military culture, there are basically two divergent views of the role of military capacities in a crisis, one supportive of increased militarization and the other supportive in reducing the existing role of the armed forces. Increasing the role and participation of the armed forces is not as simple as it might seem at first sight. First, the primary mandate of the armed forces is to achieve and maintain combat capability in order to protect the national interests and not to respond to domestic or international crises or disasters. There are concerns regarding civil liberties, as noted by Mitchell (Mitchell, 2003) who noted that increased military involvement of the military in disasters might signal an erosion of citizen rights and responsibilities to those who are advocates of civil authority. The use of military force could create specific problems, especially if there are competing agencies within the country, and the support is seen as biased or if the military force is used by the undemocratic regime, as a control mechanism to oppress and exploit citizens. This may be particularly sensitive during the engagement of the armed forces in the international environment, as they are unlikely to provide the armed forces intervention during a crisis that will have a positive context and in line with the concept of supporting the UN, ie. "the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity" (Oslo Guidelines, 2006). Typically, the armed forces are constrained by legislation and policy in order to maintain a strategic national defensive capability, and to avoid undue risks to civil liberties. In most democratic countries this is achieved by the use of military capacities in crisis situations only after received an official request from the civilian authorities, which have command over the military capacity. Therefore, the change of the armed forces role in crisis is not as easy as it may seem, there are political and legislative difficulties, including the reality of civil jurisdiction. Likewise, military officials have serious doubts about the misuse of usually scarce military resources, which is contrary to their primary role and to be engaged as "cleaning crew" in the post-crisis period. The second alternative approach, which is critical for the military approach to crisis management, is mainly rooted in the academic literature and practitioners in crisis management. While crisis management has its roots in the model of civil defense, which was developed during and after the Second World War, the trend of further development is moving towards a broader and more comprehensive approach (Canton, 2007), an increase of sharing decision-making with the victims of crises and coordination between various agencies requiring cooperation and negotiation. Hierarchical model of command and control, based on the pyramidal structure of government, has been criticized as the most efficient model of handling complex emergencies. In particular, this approach is not sufficient enough to include local government, culture and expertise. Hightower and Cotou noted that the vertical structure is not compatible with the required horizontal coordination, which is necessary for efficient reaction during complex emergencies (Hightower and Coutu, 1996: 69). Horizontal coordination is the one that helps replace inappropriate and ineffective management structure. Hierarchical management structure, the confidentiality of plans and information about the situation as well as the system of self-isolation, is not the best way to manage and include civil and voluntary organizations and agencies in crisis, although it is completely appropriate for some organizations, such

as emergency services (police, fire department). Using a similar analogy, Drabek notes that the model of resource coordination in crisis is more effective for crisis management than the one based on command and control (Drabek, 2003). Waugh notes that the sensitivity is necessary for intergovernmental and multiorganisational efforts to perform tasks smoothly and efficiently (Waugh, 1996:347). This is one of the reasons why the military style of the command and control system and structure are often inadequate in military operations during crises, and that the conflict between civil and military organizational culture, with some forms of non-compliance with local capabilities, result in less efficient management of crisis than it is preferred. Clarke emphasizes the importance of informal action (Clarke, 2006: 168), while other authors point to the weakness of the military model of command and control in relation to the aspects of crisis management (which tend to establish the myth of panic and create confusion between control and coordination) (Dynes, 1994; Quarantelli, 1989). The concept of the use of the armed forces is usually equated with the concept of command and control management model.

The aforementioned generates concerns regarding the use of military resources as part of a strategy in crisis management. In this case, the aspects of military culture may be counterproductive and must take into account the existence of risk to civil liberties. At the same time, the armed forces are an important part of society and should be included in crisis management due to their expertise and resources as well as because of the important role they play in a society. The discussion about the usefulness of military style of command and control and its application in crisis management may be a too simplified approach. Professional crisis managers certainly have different opinions on this topic. Their name has a background in classical and bureaucratic management theory (Fayol, 1949), which is primarily concerned about control, rules, regulations and procedures. Taking into account that first responders are centralized during emergencies, it is reasonably to conclude that there is a certain degree of added value from the structure, rules and principles, regardless of whether they have a basis in bureaucratic agencies such as police, fire department or military organizations. In some situations, the military model of command and control is very effective and the best way to involve complex civil and voluntary organizations which could be sometimes of use for command structure.

4. THE MILITARY IN A CRISIS – A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

To properly propose and consider the context and scope of the military use in all phases of crisis management, a conceptual model is developed where a type of crisis is an important criterion. For the purposes of discussion, a type of crisis is limited to quick, well-defined natural, technological and man-induced events that cause damage to critical infrastructure. Overall, crisis management involves several phases of crisis management within they must work together to protect the community in a particular area or a particular organization. For the purposes of this paper we will study a model that consists of three phases, prevention, response and recovery. Prevention phase anticipates a series of actions, activities and measures to be undertaken for the prevention and reduction of crisis probability and to offset their impact on the community. It consists of two parts, the prevention which involves threat and risk assessment, continuous process re-

peated as needed, and preparation that includes proper planning, allocation of resources, training, organization and execution of exercises and simulations that provide the necessary skills and equipment and the other resources required for efficient use in real-life situations. Exercise and testing plans are particularly important from the point of revealing shortcomings and mistakes, thus providing sufficient time to correct the same prior to the crisis. The response phase includes several steps and the first is observation of the crisis and taking planned steps in decision-making process, the activation of the crisis plans or completely new response planning. Resource coordination during the engagement and involvement of the community in this phase is accompanied by effective crisis communication. Aspects of response includes the first responders activation, activation of additional capacity and specialized forces and resources (the armed forces), providing medical assistance, evacuation of people and property, evacuation of animals, provision of shelters, provision of basic living conditions, search and rescue, surveillance and monitoring, assessment damage etc. Very important at this stage is the media attention that could be attracted by a smaller crises and particularly by the crisis of larger scale or intensity. Because of this, the crisis occurrence takes up more space, attract attention of the media and implicitly the public during the response phase of the crisis than those detected in a precrisis stage. Recovery phase begins during the response phase and continues after its completion. Anticipated return to pre-crisis situation, the establishment of the basic functions of society, rehabilitation of public infrastructure and re-establishment of the conditions for a normal life. This phase includes providing assistance to the affected population. Phase should be planned as an integral part of crisis planning. An integral part of this phase is learning from the crisis, as a precondition for the experience gathering and pursuing changes in accordance with the lessons learned. Each phase from the preceding, claims the next one. Activities at one stage may overlap with the activities in the previous. These phases of crisis essentially do not have beginning or end because recognition of the threats can motivate alleviation as well as the actual event. Coordination of a series of these, sometimes very complex activities and their interconnection, as well as connecting a series of operational segments of the defense system protection and rescue, is an essential task of program segment in crisis management system. The usual role of this segment of public administration is direction of other departments of administration and the other organizations to act in order to minimize the consequences of crisis that could happen. The focus of modern crisis management system is no longer just reacting but also adequate planning and preparation involving the community and residents, private and non-profit sector and crisis management will certainly evolve in the future. The area of crisis management is an important pillar of the security system.

In this conceptual model, the application of the armed forces in a crisis (Figure 1), the vertical axis represents the scale of the crisis. Emergency situations are relatively localized events that require the presence of first responders. Accidents have already been defined above, while in disasters the people and institutions involved in responding to a crisis become victims themselves in a significant way. Despite some ambiguity in the delimitation of these terms, they represent a continuum of vocabulary and discussion events increased the scale and size. The horizontal axis represents the phase of the cycle of crisis management.

Figure 1: *Potential application of military capacities during crisis*

| | | Prevention | Response | Recovery |
|-------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Emergencies | Bureaucratic model C2 | Undesirable | Desirable | Undesirable |
| | Limited military engagement | Undesirable | Desirable in special circumstances | Desirable in special circumstances |
| | Full military engagement | Undesirable | Undesirable | Undesirable |
| Accidents | Bureaucratic model C2 | Neutral | Desirable in special circumstances | Undesirable |
| | Limited military engagement | Neutral/ Desirable | Highly desirable | Desirable |
| | Full military engagement | Neutral/ Desirable | Highly desirable | Neutral |
| Disasters | Bureaucratic model C2 | Desirable in special circumstances | Desirable in special circumstances | Undesirable |
| | Limited military engagement | Neutral/ Highly desirable | Highly desirable | Desirable |
| | Full military engagement | Neutral/ Highly desirable | Highly desirable | Neutral |

The panels within the axis showed a number of scenarios for crisis management, and the first on the scale of desirability of the use of military is a bureaucratic model of command and control to make strategic and tactical decisions in various crisis situations. Next on the pyramid of desirability is a limited use of military resources and it refers to the area of planning and coordination with civil authorities establishing liaison officers in the relevant emergency management staffs of civilian agencies. Last on this scale is an option of complete military engagement in terms of use the required number of military personnel and adequate resources, on a larger scale in order to complement the capacity of civil society in crisis management. The use of the armed forces is the most visible at the level of the limited use of military resources and the comprehensive deployment of military capabilities. The level of bureaucratic military model of command and control means more fundamental philosophy of command and control model, which currently exists, both in the civilian emergency services as well as in other civil organizations. Levels of limited use of military resources and more comprehensive deployment of military capabilities suggests increased use of military personnel and resources, that is not considered as “militarization” in the context of this paper. Use of military assets is particularly observed in the prevention stage, because while in one part of this phase of crisis desirability of engagement could be presented in a single volume, in the second part of this phase could be a completely different scope of desirability.

Perrow states that the implementation of a centralized strategy and approach in crisis management is more convenient for linear systems, while more complex systems require a more decentralized approach (Perrow, 1984). For this reason, the command and control model is considered to be better suited to respond to small scale crisis situations

and explains the traditional emphasis of emergency services on it. Although it could be concluded that the command and control concept is in the most inappropriate, one might also imagine a crisis situation in which civil organizations are dysfunctional and where the concept of command and control may be required, at least on a temporary basis (ie. floods in the Republic of Srpska 2014). Limited military engagement has been historically used mainly for search and rescue activities, in which civilian capabilities are too limited. The armed forces often are not willing to engage in the response to a crisis situation because it is not their primary mission, although in today's circumstances, this task is more often on the list of the armed forces basic tasks. This is particularly true in the case of involvement in international operations. One of the basic mottos of the military engagement in crisis situations is the "last in, first out" and it reflects the entire concept, philosophy, engagement and most of all the view that the primary responsibility for responding to crisis situations lies with the civilian agencies. Generally speaking, the armed forces will not be used in the recovery phase, especially for less urgent cases in which civilian resources are sufficient. The use of military force in most localized crisis situations is not advisable (except in the field of communications and planning), because, by definition, community expects from their civilian agencies to respond to a crisis, through the use of its own available resources.

Desire and necessity for the use of military resources is increasing as the scale and seriousness of the crisis increases and as demands for action overwhelm the capabilities of locally available resources. Citizens often forget that they are a true backbone of civil response to emergencies and that there are no available special resources for this purpose. This forms the basis for the realization of the security functions from the inside, which is a bit forgotten in the past 20 years. The involvement of military resources usually occurs during the response phase. However, an adequate response requires preparedness and planning, so it is absolutely necessary to establish a connection, coordination, necessity assessment and planning that involves the armed forces in all phases, including this stage of the prevention phase. In all emergencies, although military personnel still receives orders from their own chain of command, the tradition of the armed forces involvement in the manner expressly sought by legitimate civil authorities, will continue to ensure that in crisis, the use of the armed forces will be carried out strictly in accordance with the requirements and restrictions of civil authorities. Because of this, the role of the armed forces in the phase of prevention of crisis situations involves the organization of links with civilian agencies, planning and providing expert advice on the deployment of its resources. This does not include the formulation of policies and procedures for crisis reaction.

The results of the analysis indicate that the armed forces have an important and continuing role in the planning, organization of communication links with civilian agencies, coordination and engagement of strategy and tactics consultants in all phases of the cycle of crisis management. In fact, the involvement of the armed forces is the best in the prevention stage (in particular part of the preparation) and response, with a proportionate increase of engagement as the levels of danger and crisis increases, and when it becomes clear that the resources of local agencies for crisis situations are not able to cope with the demands of the situation. In addition to the current planning and organization of communications, because of the competence, responsibility and the other reasons, military capacities should be the first to be removed, reassigned and returned to the primary role of the defense system, which consequently results in the least likely involvement of the armed forces in a recovery phase of a crisis situation.

CONCLUSION

The fact is that the armed forces in democratic societies have so much to offer to their citizens during crisis situations, although it is clear that military capacities must be selective and properly used in terms of amendments but not replacing local and national authorities and civilian agencies in crisis situations. In addition, military officials have been actively involved in organizing communication links, coordination and planning with civilian agencies for crisis situations in order to ensure that, if and when you need their support, integration could be implemented easily, quickly and efficiently as possible, and under the direction of civilian authorities.

The effective integration of the armed forces in the matrix of crisis management will depend on finding the right balance between the community engagement and management philosophy top down. A fast, efficient and decentralized response of the armed forces to many crisis situations points to their ability to effectively function in crisis and unstable environments. The conclusion is that the armed forces can be important in crisis management. Through the examination of relevant legislation and policies, cultural background, historical relations between civilian and military organizations and the military as well as current civilian and military cultures and doctrines of action, it is clear that for democratically accountable governments and their subordinate the armed forces, participation in crisis as “additional resources” could be very useful for both, the community and the citizens.

Various academic critics have identified potential problems and obstacles related to a good cooperation between the military and civilian cultures. No doubt they exist, but these obstacles are probably specific to each country and culture. The key to effective collaboration is to ensure continual planning, coordination and communication, information sharing on needs assessment between civilian and military organizations, as well as sensitivity to different cultures, in order to determine the most appropriate and most efficient mode of use of the armed forces as an additional resource in crisis situations.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, E. (1994). Disaster Management and the Military. *GeoJournal*, 24(2), 201 – 205.
- Burton, I., Kates, R. & White, G. (1993). *Environment as Hazard* -2nd edition, The Guilford Press: New York.
- Capstick, M. D. (2003). Defining the Culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century. *The Canadian Military Journal*, 47-54.
- Canton, L. G. (2007). *Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs*. Hoboken NJ: Wiley Inter-Science.
- Clarke, L. (2006). *Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Coppola, D. (2006). *Introduction to International Disaster Management*. Butterworth-Heinemann.

- Crandall, W., Parnell J.A. & Spillan J. E. (2010). *Crisis Management in the New Strategy Landscape*, SAGE: Pembroke.
- Drabek, T. E., Hoetmer G. J. (Eds.). (1991). *Emergency management: Principles and practice for local government*. Washington, DC: International City Management Association.
- Drabek, T. E. (2003). *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster Responses*. Boulder, CO: Program on Environment and Behavior, Monograph 61, University of Colorado.
- Dynes, R. R. (1994). Community emergency planning: False assumptions and inappropriate analogies. *International Journal of Mass emergency and disasters*. 12(2). 141–158.
- Fayol, H. (1949). *General and Industrial Management*, Pitman.
- Hightower, H.C. & Coutu, M. (1996). *Coordinating Emergency Management: A Canadian Example*. In Sylves, R & Waugh, W. (Eds.), *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics, Policymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Management*, (69– 100), Springfield: Illinois.
- Kloskowska, A. (2001). *Sociologija kulture*. Čigoja: Beograd.
- Kohn, R. (2003). Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 4(1), 165-192.
- Lindell, M. K., Prater, C., & Perry, R. W. (2007). *Introduction to emergency management*. Danvers, MA: Wiley & Sons Publishing.
- Maksimović G. (2010). *Bezbednosna kultura u prevenciji ugrožavanja bezbednosti malim i lakim naoružanjem*. Fakultet za bezbednost i zaštitu: Banja Luka.
- Maksimović G. (2013). *Model upravljanja kriznim situacijama u Republici Srpskoj*. Fakultet za bezbednost i zaštitu: Banja Luka.
- Mitchell, J. K. (2003). The fox and the hedgehog: Myopia about homeland vulnerability in US policies on terrorism, *Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas – Research in Social Problems and Public Policy*, 11, 53–72.
- *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief “Oslo Guidelines”* (2006), Rev. I, Annex II: CMCS Generic Request for MCDA.
- Perrow, C. (1984). *Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies*. New York: Basic Books.
- Perry, R. W. & Quarantelli, E. L. (2005). *What Is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions*, Xlibris Corporation.
- Quarantelli, E. L. (1998). *Major criteria for judging disaster planning and managing their applicability in developing societies*. Preliminary Research Paper #268, Disaster Research Center. Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware.
- Waugh, W.L. (1996). *Disaster Management for the New Millennium*. In Sylves, R & Waugh, W. (Eds). *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics, Policymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Management*, (344-360). Springfield: Illinois.
- UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009). *International Strategy for Disaster Reduction*. Retrieved March 21, 2015, from <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html>.