MIGRATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
To What Extent Does The Migration Crisis Have An Impact on EU Security Threats?

Review paper

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Abstract:
Consequences of migration flows have put international migration at the top of international, regional and national security agenda. Migration flows are not a new phenomenon in Europe however characteristics of the current European Migration Crisis lay firm ground for a unprecedented crisis. Migration divided Europe along geographical and cultural lines. Even thought the Migration Crisis does not directly impact the five EU security threats, the mismanagement of the phenomenon and disagreement over the strategies of resolution resulted into a self-induced humanitarian crisis that as a consequence poses threat to European Union Security. In order to eliminate possible threats posed by the Migration Crisis, European Union will have to look towards the source of migration flows. Failing to resolve the problem at source could pose a greater threat to global security and imminently to the security of the European Union and its periphery. Therefore migrations impact international, regional and national environments, however they represent an indirect threat to security only if the process is not handled through adequate strategies.

Key words: Irregular migration, security threats, EU immigration

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INTRODUCTION

The migration crisis has divided Europeans by geographical lines, humanitarian will and economic capabilities. Those divisions seem to have penetrated the tiniest cracks of the European system and the constant influx of new arrivals increases the hiatus.

During the first five years of Syrian war, refugees fled to the neighboring countries, predominantly Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. As a result of continuous fighting in Syria and the new influx of refugees, Turkey let immigrants make their way towards western ends of Europe. Despite the existing immigration laws, European Union has not been immune to the large-scale influx. In the wake of policy amendments and quick-fix strategies, European Union member-states began diverging towards individual decision-making thus hampered the EU’s management of the migrant influx. In this paper it is argued that the crisis in Europe has arisen once it hit the variety of individual state decisions, which showed to be incompatible, and in this way scattered the immediate possibility for the a well-organized resolution of the migration influx at the level of the whole Union. The disagreement over policies and strategies strengthened the turmoil. This paper also exposes the need for a global strategy outside the EU, in other words a strategy that stops the fashion at source and this means bringing the Syrian conflict to an end. The complexity of the Syrian conflict and the implication of international actors and their interests in the region slow down the process.

The following three chapters focus on analyzing to what extent does the Migrant Crisis have an impact on EU security. At first, the paper poses a clear five point EU security threat framework and an impact of regular migration. The paper signals out threats that have already or may surface as a consequence of regular migration but do not directly influence the five EU security threats. Further on, the paper focuses on the irregular or unmanaged immigration and how it may catalyze European Union five Security threats. The paper seeks to prove the existence of a ‘catalyzer effect’; the migration crisis indirectly impacts EU security threats, such as disputes it has provoked among EU member states. Finally in the goal of exploring in
depth the extent of the relation in question, the migration crisis will be set as a consequence of an ‘outside’, complex, international conflict arena. Only the resolution in the source of the Crisis can help stop further arrivals and in this way ease the doubt of migration threat to EU Security.

The purpose of this work is to offer an analysis of issues the Migration crisis has caused Europe, precisely the European Union. Even if it does not have a direct impact on the five points of EU security threats it does raise other questions that may permanently challenge the status quo of the European Union.

1. Defining Terms

European Migration and European Security are two broad terms that may encompass a large variety of meanings and as such will be precisely defined in the following section for the use of analysis of their relation. We also point out characteristics of migration that rise concerns on issues other then security.

In 2003 after the divergent views on US—led Invasion of Iraq, EU member states acknowledged the need for a common strategic vision of security. The High representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana drafted “the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by European Council in December 2003 where:

1. Terrorism,
2. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass destruction,
3. Regional conflicts,
4. State Failure, and
5. Organized Crime,

were defined as five categories of threats. European Security Strategy (ESS) titled “A secure Europe in a Better world” sets basis for the work of Common Foreign and Security Policy what later became Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Security threats also involve actions on EU borders or its three peripheries, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Southern Caucasus (Solana, 2003). The ESS also explicitly points out that
threats for the European Union are the threats and challenges for global security and that all threats should not be and perhaps cannot be treated by the Union alone. On demand of EU member states who called for a better implementation and complementation of the document in 2008, the High Representative presented a “Report of the Implementation of European Security Strategy: Providing security in a changing world” that supported the previous document and stressed the need for “more capable, more coherent and more active” strategies (Solana, 2008). In 2015 three out of five categories of threats became reality. Terrorist attacks in Paris, Hungarian-Serbian border clashes and smuggling of humans and goods in the Mediterranean coincide with the inflow of large numbers of new migrants. In terms of mainly these five threats pointed out by Solana, we will seek to determine if there is a direct link between the materialization of these threats and the inflows of large numbers of migrants.

Firstly, the ambiguity and impreciseness of the terms accentuates the idea of crisis; migration as a whole thus is perceived a large-scale threat instead of a dissectible and manageable issue. Who are the new arrivals? Afore exploring closer links between migration and security issues that had raised in Europe in 2015 one must disclose variances among migration as consequence of globalization on one hand, that have been common among EU member-states, and migration as consequence of conflict elsewhere on the other hand. People constituting the latter group are identified as asylum-seekers, who once grated entry, obtain refugees status or are simply refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. According to a UN Convention on Rights of Migrants “the term ‘migrant’... should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of ‘personal convenience’

2 Word firstly used in 1430 referring to “a sanctuary or inviolable place of refuge and protection for criminals and debtors, from which they cannot be forcibly removed without sacrilege”.

3 According to the definition of 1951 Geneva Convention Refugee “is any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country”.

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and without intervention of an external compelling factor” (UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants, 2005). In this work by the term ‘migrants’ we will consider those who arrive from war-thorn countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. It is at this moment of the crisis difficult to determine whether a person-seeking asylum is a war-driven, humanitarian migrant (asylum-seeker or refugee) or a defacto economic migrant, which certifies of a large mixture of profiles of those accessing European continent. It is also important to clarify the difference between irregular and undocumented migrants, those who cross over borders at unofficial crossings or do not have valid documents certifying their official entry and regular migrants who are processed and granted asylum⁴. By Current European Migration crisis this work defines the crisis that has surged on the European continent (including the non-EU member-states) as consequence of a sudden large-scale migration. Discussion on different migrations policies within Europe and within the European Union itself will be discussed in the second part of this work as one of the major issues for the involuntarily self-induced crisis.

Further on, “large-scale” labels are misleading, confusing and irrelevant given Europe’s migration history. However in terms of number/time ratio as well as number/capacity ratio and their variety of origin at once, the crisis is unprecedented. In comparison with the migrations of the past century the current European Migration Crisis is somewhat more specific. The European continent has seen large flows of displaced people since the beginning of the last century; more then a million of Belgians in August 1914, large numbers of Spanish migrants between two World wars, 12million Germans forced out of their homes in 1945 from East European countries, more than half a million Yugoslavian refugees have entered the EU in the 1990’s and about twice as much have been displaced on the territory of the Balkans. In terms of numbers of inflow the current European Migration crisis has only exceeded the previous Yugoslavian war-caused migration inflow, the total number of the early 1990’s migration from Western

⁴ Processing migrants and granting refugee status to asylum-seekers is a slow process. According to the Eurostat 1.2 million asylum seekers are registered only in 2015, additional one million asylum requests are pending, and with the heave inflow there are estimated numbers those who yet have to be processed.
Balkans towards the EU member states did not exceed 630,000 asylum requests, a number that was already reached and surpassed in 2014 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2015). According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) figures, the total number of migrants that had arrived in 2015 is around 1.015 million. In the first two months of 2016 the number of new arrivals by sea and land surpass 131,000 individuals, a number significantly higher than what was seen in the same period of the precedent year. According to IOM estimates, about 3,500 migrants have lost their lives in the perilous journey in 2014 and 2015. According to Eurostat figures more then one third have applied for asylum in Germany. Roughly half of migrants reaching Europe are of Syrian origin, about one quartier from Afghanistan and the rest come from other countries, mostly Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, Bangladesh and Somalia (Eurostat, 2016).

In addition, migration affects the future social constitution of Europe but this does not imply a direct threat to the five EU security points. A large inflow of people with civilizational differences raises questions of the European characteristics in future, however Europe still has a mixed view on diversity and cohesion unlike the US, whose empirical evidence shows a rather negative relationship (Demireva, 2015). According to Alex Betts, director of Refugee Studies Center at Oxford University, also “the fact that many are Muslims is perceived as challenging Europe’s identity” (Simpson, 2015). Today more than 300 languages are spoken in London, former refugees have been integrated and have opened small to medium range businesses and constitute an important part of the London globalized society. The previous example does not perhaps anticipate what Europe fears this time around. Perhaps an example of Bosnian refugees from 1990’s who have become Swedish city mayors, directors of large companies in Germany, and even highly ranked diplomats of recipient countries sets a clearer picture. A more heterogeneous Europe in future is a likely outcome however the integration and cohesion of these levels of diversity does not put in question the five threats of European Security.

Furthermore, the current Migration Crisis has not only exceeded the variety of countries and regions the migrants come form, but also their profiles differ from previous crisis arrivals (OECD-EU, 2015). Even though
these migrants are pushed to immigrate out of a set of similar reasons, they emigrate from countries spreading from North Africa over the Middle East to Central Asia (Eurostat, 2016). This work focuses on those who are of Syrian origin and under the impact to active warfare in their home country and are most certainly not considered economic migrants but humanitarian asylum seekers. The difference should be made because immigration from these countries has been going on for a decade intensively thus what to a certain extent caused the crisis of migration is the new large-scale numbers of mostly Syrian asylum seekers. Due to the crisis atmosphere it has been difficult to process individually and thoroughly all the new arrivals. Partly due to irregular immigration, loss of documents and certificates, exact registration of skills and professions has been scattered. However by data provided by Frontex the immigrants are more skilled and better educated than the Yugoslav immigrants from the 90's (OECD, 2014). The demographics also differ (Frontex, 2016). During the Yugoslav war, the vulnerable groups, women, children and the elderly constituted the great majority of immigrants while men from 18 to 65 years of age were accepted only if traveling with family or with a document certifying the family reunification in the country of reception. The current European Migration crisis has noted large numbers of male active groups, even if in the so-called 2nd wave in 2016 more women and children are registered. On the Macedonian Greek border Frontex figures show 40% of children under 16 years of age (Morris, 2015). This crisis is also different in terms migrant financial status upon arrival, cases of migrant purchase power advantage over the local citizens in countries mostly on the borders of EU or EU periphery such as Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Bulgaria have been observed.

In fear that the above explained characteristics of migration and the possible negative social demographic and cultural consequences that would not only reconstruct the future face of Europe but also become a threat to EU security, European Union was unable to unilaterally, accordingly and beforehand implement appropriate and indispensable immigration policies (existing or new).

5 A European Union agency, seated in Warsaw, Poland, “Frontex” coordinates between national border guards with main task to stop illegal border crossings and other threats.
2. Migration Crisis As A Trigger

Irregular migration side effects such as inflow of terrorists, criminals and illegal goods infiltrated among the humanitarian asylum seekers leave European Security at a direct threat. In the goal of managing the large inflows of people, how and which EU amendments of policies give ground for the blossom of irregular migration consequences that pose a threat to the five EU security points?

After the acceptance of a number of migrant that will bring benefit to the recipient countries and even after a number of those who until fully integrated will be a financial burden (OECD, 2015), is it relevant to ask to what extent is Europe itself responsible for the crisis that occurred on its continent? To what extent are governments or precisely decisions and policy makers responsible for sparking a crisis? In this part of work by analyzing different EU responses we seek to prove that the divergent stance, disagreement, caused mismanagement of the migrant inflow that finally hit a wall of crisis. To this extent disagreement and its consequence, the mismanagement is more likely to threaten EU five security points. Migration divided Europe along geographical and cultural lines, however Migration is rather a trigger then a direct cause. Large inflows of well-managed people would not ravage Europe.

The negligence between EU-wide rules, the member-state exceptions to EU-wide rules and the National immigration rules, weaken general EU Immigration policy in the light of the uprising issue of migration inflows. According to a Comparative study of the laws in the 27 EU Member States for Legal Immigration published by IOM and supported by European parliament, argue the compatibility of Laws and polices at both levels (Adam and Devillard, 2008). How did Immigration policy divide EU member states? “Regulations and Decisions” of the EU are legislative acts that are immediately applicable as law in all EU member-states and there are “Directives” that have to be incorporated into the National Immigration Law until a certain deadline; most EU-Wide immigration rules are Directives (Adam and Devillard, 2008). During the current Migration crisis general split happened when the Directives encompassed a field that National
Immigration purviews; the total number of migrants that can be admitted to the country and the final decision on migrant applications. Once the relocation strategy was proposed, EU-Wide directive did not apply to “exceptions”; states such as Denmark to whom immigration, visa and asylum policies do not apply at all, Ireland and the UK who are allowed to chose and decide on a case-by-case basis. It did not by pass other EU state members. Hungary and Slovakia who filed a law suite to defend themselves from rules “being imposed upon them” dismissed the meaning and the importance of directives ((Kujundzic, 2016). Disagreement over quick fixes left Europe vulnerable to the consequences of irregular immigration. Relocation strategy, amendment to Schengen regulations, Suspension of Dublin Regulation are only a few common policies that were disagreed upon by EU Member states and caused Europe to find itself, according to the UN “on the brick of a self-induced crisis” (BBC News, 2015).

The EU did not foresee such large amounts of arrivals and yet has not put in place a relevant strategy beforehand. It was obvious that management in accordance with the Dublin Regulation would not provide adequate organizational framework as certain countries stopped acting by Dublin in 2008 caused by the need to be reviewed (Norway and Finland stopped sending back refugees entering by Greece) (Official Journal of the European Union L (50/1), 2003). Under Dublin, the EU country where an asylum seeker first arrives has a duty to take fingerprints and process their asylum claim. If the migrant moves elsewhere in the EU he/she can be sent back to where they first arrived. According to the IOM more than a million refugees arrived by sea in 2015 while roughly 40 thousand by land, which leaves costal countries carried the burden unevenly. (The International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2015) Italy, Greece and Hungary were the worst hit however the asylum-seeking migrants in those countries are surprisingly small following the Suspension of Dublin Regulations in August 2015. This does not mean that there are no migrants there; this only means that there are thousands of migrants whose applications are not immediately processed. While some countries still act under the shield of Dublin

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6 Dublin Regulation also stands under the name of Regulation No.604/2013, Dublin III Regulation, previously Dublin II Regulation and Dublin Convention.
to justify the migrant deportation to the country of first entry, migrants are refusing to be fingerprinted in countries of arrival specially Greece, who has not had until recently the adequate technology for that process to be thoroughly carried out (Peter, 2015). In dealing with such large amounts of people in reception countries EU has proposed a relocation strategy where countries would each receive a number of migrants according to EU state’s total GDP, its total of asylum applicants and its unemployment rate (European Commission, 2015). Implementation would adequately relocate migrants, would not cause as many irregularities in certain crossing points and the management of those who arrived would give EU more space to suppress the irregular inflow and foresee possibilities of other terrorists and criminals infiltrating the EU that could directly threaten EU security. Hungary together with Slovakia supported by the countries in “Visehrad 4” group, took the strategy to court in voice of opposition (Morris, 2015).

Disagreements such as these threaten EU security not only from the point of view of migrants. They point out to bigger EU problems. Are the Eastern European states mature enough to stand up to imposed measures by stronger state members? Was it adequate to demand its rights on the brick of self-induced crisis? Was it fair to disagree for the benefit of its own national security? Perhaps it was not fair to add to the crisis by rejecting the short-term strategy of relocation but the argument is supported by other EU member states who are not being forced to accept measures they do not like. For instance the UK has accepted a little more then a thousand migrants and it has said that it will accept 20 thousand more over the five upcoming years yet in comparison to other EU states this type of arrangements, while legal, obviously sparks discontent. In the same time hard words are coming form Greek authorities on the need to tackle the crisis with the help of EU as a whole. Unfortunately migration triggers emergent EU inequalities. Nevertheless this does not affect EU security as much as it affects the future face of Europe.

As a consequence of unmanaged large inflows EU has taken regarding measures. Reintroduction of border controls and probing Schengen gives credit to the far right Political parties across EU member-states. Modifying temporarily the Schengen rules, spurs great fretfulness over the possible idea that it is an end of Schengen, one of the hallmarks of European
Union. Schengen will only be reintroduced in totality once countries feel secure enough. If the numbers of irregular migrants does not decrease significantly, survival of Schengen is debatable (Henrich, 2015). Under the impact of atrocities in Paris given the fact that terrorists have crossed from Begum to France with no security and documentation checks has pushed Germany to be the first to lift up its internal border controls with Austria justifying the act with large scale irregular immigration from Hungary and Austria. With in Schengen zone there is a free movement across most of the EU bloc without passports with the exception of Ireland, UK, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Under the Schengen rules the member states are allowed to reinstall internal border controls under extraordinary measures that threaten the “public policy and national security” (Peter, 2015). Furthermore EU regulation in 2013 has stressed that such actions “should remain an exception and should only be implemented as a measure of last resort, for a strictly limited scope and period of time” (European Comission, 2008). A limited period time under Schengen Borders Code Article 26 can vary from 20 days to two years in “exceptional circumstances” (European Commission, 2016). Until now six countries have imposed border controls, Austria Denmark France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Conversely if the there is no agreement or climate for implementing Schengen in totality, does this mean the end of Schengen? Will the European countries still value the Schengen benefits or will they sell it for national security?

Once again EU has tried to unilaterally provide a general framework to act unified. European Commission has proposed an amendment to Schengen to impose stricter border controls on the external borders while imposing document identification with in the Union for EU citizens, which has not been the practice. Such an amendment has been proposed since December 2015 and should come into practice 20 days after the Publication in the Official journal of the European Union yet, countries have not all agreed upon such measures. Such measure poses other problems within the Union, drifting from the migration crisis issues. This also means less migrant workers from the East Europe in the Western countries, which impacts the EU, economy but not the EU security.

The ‘domino effect’ of imposing borders as individually courtiers see fit magnified the crisis, raised the number of irregular immigration
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attempts and provided a risk for migrants and the citizens of the EU as well as the possibility of threat to EU five security points. It can be compared to a labyrinth game that keeps closing and opening pathways to the goal. As soon as the migrants find a route toward the country of final destination they may be cut off by transition states out of concerns that migrants might stay in the country as northern neighbors close borders. Most recent situation of this kind on the Greek Macedonian border catalyzes concern. Germany has allowed a certain number of refugees to come however these migrant have to cross countries that do not have adequate means to address their situation; provide adequate shelter and support. Since the last few months countries have been changing their opinion and policies on accepting or not accepting migrants. It is uncertain for route transition states to allow large inflows. There have been cases of migrants being let in the country as a transit way towards Germany, but out of incapacity to treat all migrants and rising possibility of Germany closing its borders so will Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Austria and so on. The domino effect seems a dangerous game of a large number of unidentified people residing on certain territories.

Migrant Crisis of transition states non-EU members magnify a threat to them self as and the EU. Serbia and Macedonia have been greatly hit, in accordance with agreements with EU states are managing the migration flows basically following the treads around them and acting accordingly on their own. First problem is a problem of data and transparency. The amounts of people crossing these borders is hard to compare since the countries non EU member states are not included into common research and analysis engines such as Frontex, Eurostat, IOM and so on. Financial support is needed. These countries are one of the least economically developed courtiers in Europe, usually struggling with their own phenomenon of brain drain uncontrolled emigration, unemployment, low living standards and wages. Why is it important for the EU to work closely with those countries? Geographical position of these countries in the Western Balkans is crucial. These countries are not members of the EU but they are geographically EU land locked. Mis-management of the migrants in the Western Balkans poses a hidden threat to the EU. According to Frontex in 2015, the Western Balkans was the largest transit territory for migrants (Parkes, 2015).
However, EU’s options are however far from being exhausted. According to Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) “solidarity clause” brokered after the 2005 Madrid terrorist attacks, that secure mutual support, France could have called for support, wider EU member-state support. Article 222 is however a last resort option. It encompasses solidarity of EU member states to provide support on the territory of a member state where the attack was carried out. Such Article may have called for a wider specter of action and a more unified one if the “Implementing Decision(2014/415EU)” did not address in detail the territorial scope of Article 222. Although a member state could trigger the solidarity clause in response to a disaster, which has its origins outside the EU, the disaster itself must be on the territory of a member state, as must the collective response (Parkes, 2016). As a consequence this lack of an external dimension to the ‘solidarity clause’ also appears to have ruled out its application in the aftermath of the Paris attacks. Such an action having power to act “outside” would have solved issues that triggered the migration crisis it would have solved the cause in root. In stead France has called upon Article 42.7 a ‘defense clause’ that goes beyond the Article 222’s ‘solidarity clauses’ remit, in other words a mutual military intervention outside EU. If the Article 222 was triggered, it would have acted together with EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) whose operations can be strictly deployed ‘outside’ EU. This could have called for resolution of the crisis in the root and leave smaller consequences for Europe. Even if there are no clear cuts between these articles and the EU’s CSDP, legal framework still hampers its relations.

3. The ‘Outside’ Threat

Indeed we have proven an indirect link of characteristic migration on security, we have also proven a more direct link of this current migration crisis on EU security five points however defining migration as a consequence and not only a cause of conflict leads us to analyze to what extent everything that caused such large scale asylum seekers to come to Europe will influence the resolution and management of the current crisis.
Political turmoil in Syria has engrossed actors and their interests into a conflict that is a mixture of direct and indirect international and regional war, a civil war, a revolution and fight against terrorism. Russia, EU, US, Syrian government, and Turkey are fighting terrorist organization. Russia is supporting Syrian government in the same time; the EU and US are supporting opposition parties (Stein, 2015). Certain opposition parties have turned out to be closer to terrorist organization. Those opposition parties are to certain extent supported by Turkey who to a certain extent is resolving its self-interests against the Kurd population in Syria and Iran. As a result government structures and economy of the country collapsed resulting a refugee crisis that is in great extent affecting EU itself.

EU-Syrian relations since 1977 enjoyed a good relationship within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership however recently “Financial commitments made by the EU were intended to encourage reform, especially political reform, and Syria was encouraged to take advantage of the ‘Governance Facility’ which rewards partners who are performing well with increased financial assistance” (Turkman and Heid, 2016). Government repression sparked a large revolutionary atmosphere in the country. In may 2011, EU took several measures against the Syrian government including suspension of bilateral programs, freezing draft EU-Syrian Association Agreement, suspension of European Investment Bank technical assistance to Syria and Imposed sanctions that were later expended. Out of security reasons EU delegation to Syria was withdrawn in December 2012, followed by the US, French, UK, and German demand of Assad’s resign under the assumption that Assad is no longer the will of Syrian people and that he has failed to reform the issues in questions regarding the freedom and security of Syrian people (Turkman and Haid, 2016). In may 2013 EU eased embargo on arms sale to Syria under an obligation that sale and supply must be exported only for the use of Syrian Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (Turkman and Haid, 2016).

Two months after the political opposition uprising in Syria, the EU lost political leverage and the instruments used to force Syrian government to resign only opened possibilities to Syrian government allies to expend their markets. Iran and Russia became the main suppliers of what was cut off and little by little international actors became stranded on different
sides of negotiation table in Syria. EU policy kept financing the opposition mostly in exile, EU also made 400 million EUR for the relocation of Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries (Turkman and Haid, 2016). Escalation however reached its peak when Turkey downed the Russian jet. Measures taken by the Russian government were more then imminent. However Vladimir Putin did not take the chance to escalate the conflict between EU and Russia. Instead a productive agreement followed in Paris between Putin and Holland (France 24. 2015). Three point plan that included sharing of intelligence information on terrorist positions, mutual agreements on terrorist targets and the pausing the work on Syrian government immediate resignation. The agreement optimistically promised a faster resolution of the conflicts. As a result more Syrian residents where forced to leave the territory.

With the increased number of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries and specially Turkey, Ankara demanded more benefits in return for the management of the increasing number of new arrivals. Even if there are other reasons for Turkeys release of Syrian refugees to continue their journey, such as the destabilizing factor and the tensions with its struggling low-level life standard minorities, it is mainly due to deals it trades with EU. Turkey with an important diasporas in the EU focuses on acquiring a status for membership in the EU as well as the free visa regime of its citizens and EU states. It seeks to establish closer integration. Turkey’s 80 million habitants is a reason enough to wisely and thoroughly prepare the framework for Turkish accession, which also impinges the current talks on migration (Morris, 2015).

The further mismanagement that lays outside EU borders and that EU has to perhaps fund more than the management inside the union, presents a bigger threat to the EU security. The question on how to tackle the issue at root in order to stop any further complications of consequences that have reached as far as Europe is still unclear. From the above explained relations with Syrian government and later on with the Syrian opposition has shown to be ineffective, once again sanctions have played a great role in decreasing citizens living standards but not the power of the central government which has left the Syrian population more vulnerable. It would than seem that restarting the usual program of sanctions embargo and loss
of investments does not have any benefits to the resolution of the crisis at this moment when so many global powers are involved. Only constructive and comprehensive talks with actors engaged in Syria may help stop the war and in the same way stop the crisis in Europe. Recent developments show multiple cease-fires that have no projections of predictability. If the peace talks on the global cooperation table do not succeed, global security could be threatened and within, the European Security it self.

**Conclusion**

Regular migration gives its contribution to the receiving states. It can help economies of countries with aging populations and it can also contribute to diversity of the state. Diversity can be perceived as a benefit or a threat to the traditional and cultural habits of the state, but integration of refugees does not stimulate Terrorism, usage of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional conflicts, State Failure or Organized Crime. The characteristics of current European migration, the unprecedented time-number ratio, demographic structure of the inflow, and the level of skills of migrants, set a favorable base for irregular migration however does not guarantee such an outcome. Regular migrant settlement and integration may cause discontent and unfriendly environments but not to an extent of direct impact on the five EU Security threats.

Records of high irregular migration caused by the amalgam of its characteristics and flexible, imprecise and liberal policies may cause a Migration crisis, and it is in fact what gave birth to the current Migration Crisis on the European Continent. The European Union’s open door policy attracted more asylum-seekers than EU was ready to handle. The migrant crisis became a trigger of disputes within the Union. Strategies for the resolution were rejected by some member states, blocks within the Union took divergent views on the future of migrants in Europe, and some member states resorted to individual policy and decision-making. It had all resulted into a conclusion that while a humanitarian crisis increased, a crisis of unity among EU member states increased as well. European policy framework is wide, solidarity and defense clauses only two of many other
possible frameworks give states space to find common ground. However many policies rely on mutual will and desire to act unilaterally. Thus Europe found itself on the cusp of a self-induced crisis. Irregular migration triggered events to the extent that will pose a direct threat to the EU status quo, unless disagreements are overcome and unless cooperation wins.

Diverging from the Migration crisis as a cause of conflict, and understanding the Crisis as a consequence of Syrian ‘international’ turmoil, as well as the consequence of diplomatic trade-offs, gives a broader picture of the threat dimension the Crisis poses to the EU. European Union has three battles to fight; the management of current migrants on the European continent, the fight for European Unity and the rebuilding of a safe environment in Syria for its residents. If the EU fails to address these three points and mostly the latter, it risks seeing larger triggers of further conflicts within the Union. The Migrant crisis will affect EU Security to the extent to which it fails to stop the migration at its source.

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