Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness

Abstract

Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective.