

УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У БАЊОЈ ЛУЦИ
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EMOTION IN MOTION: CONCEPTUALISATION OF *FEAR* IN ENGLISH IN TERMS OF MOVEMENT AND LOCATION

Abstract: *This paper investigates the conceptualisation of fear in English in terms of movement and location to show that conceptualisation of emotions relies in part on metaphorically understood motion. One line of investigation focuses on fear as location, which can be the destination of movement the Experiencer may or may not reach, the starting point of movement, or an intermediate location in transition. Linguistically, fear as location is realised by prepositional phrases, which often acquire causal meaning in addition to the locative one. The other line of investigation consists in analysing fear as a moving entity. It has been shown that fear can be conceptualised as an entity capable of self-propelled motion, but also as an object whose motion is caused externally. Finally, it is proposed that conceptualisation of fear as a location or a moving object fits in with other possible metaphorical conceptualisations of fear in English, as they all assume the underlying force-dynamic principle.*

Key words: *English, fear, motion, location, metaphor, conceptualisation.*

1. Introduction

In this paper we aim to show that conceptualisation of emotions in English relies in part on metaphorically understood motion. We propose to do this on the example of fear, which is deemed as a basic emotion in numerous, if not all psychological and anthropological studies¹. Our argumentation is based on syntactic and semantic analysis of original examples containing nouns belonging to the semantic field of fear, which is in line with Ekman's (1992:172) statement that a basic emotion is not one single affective state, but a "family of related states", in which each member shares certain commonalities with the rest, and these characteristics,

which are shared between members of one emotion family, are substantially different from characteristics associated with other emotion families. This principle is in accordance with the prototype theory, one of the tenets of cognitive linguistics. Nouns examined in this paper are *fear, fright, terror, apprehension* and *panic*.

We suggest two directions of investigation: first we examine emotions as locations in relation to movement. Emotion is thus conceptualised as a landmark for the Experiencer², who is conceptualised as a trajector³. Fear can be conceptualised as a

¹ On basic emotions see Scherer, 1987; Ortony and Turner 1990; Ekman 1992; Averill 1994; Mesquita et al. 1997; Prinz 2004; Lim 2003; Thamm 2006.

² Experiencer is that participant in the situation who "neither controls nor is visibly affected by an action. Prototypically an EXPERIENCER is an entity that receives a sensory impression." (Payne 2011:138)

³ In brief, trajector is a more prominent participant in a situation, which is located, evaluated or de-

destination of movement, a starting point, or an intermediate location in transition. Syntactically this is realised with different prepositional phrases, which, in addition to spatial, develop a causative meaning as well.

The second line of investigation focuses on emotions conceptualised as trajectors – i.e. we suggest that fear can be conceptualised as a moving object – either as an entity in the exterior world, or a separate entity inside the Experiencer. In order to show this, we analyse verbs of motion that go with the nouns we have investigated, as well as the types of constructions in which they appear.

Last but not least, we propose to show that, on the example of fear, emotions understood as locations or trajectors complement other metaphorical conceptualizations, which can be found in Kövecses (2000).

The description presented here is based on original examples, which are taken from subparts of electronic dictionaries containing examples from corpora of both written and spoken English. In line with the aforementioned goals, the data from the corpus were handled in two ways: in order to show that fear can be conceptualised as a location, we performed a corpus-based analysis of the extracted examples, searching for the prepositional phrases with prepositions with primarily locative meaning. In order to show that fear can be seen as a moving object in English, we carried out a corpus-driven analysis⁴, letting the resulting findings emerge from the raw data. It is therefore appropriate to insert a

scribed. Another participant, with the secondary focus in the situation, is called landmark. For a detailed account see Langacker, 1987: 231–243; 2003.

⁴ In short, the distinction between a corpus-based and corpus-driven approach is the following: in corpus-based studies, corpus data is used to validate a starting hypothesis, while the corpus-driven research allows the theoretical statements and categories to emerge from the data. For a detailed account see Tognoni-Bonelli 2001.

caveat here: however detailed and systematic the analysis is, the findings are dependent on the structure of the corpus and are by no means exhaustive.

The source of every example in the text is given in the parentheses following it.

2. Emotion and motion

The English term *emotion*, which reflects a model of reality based on modern insights in psychology, entered the global scientific vocabulary in the mid 19th century from folk English, in which it had previously been used in a variety of senses connected with its Latin root *MOVERE*, meaning *to move*. The connection between feelings and movement is present in contemporary general, non-scientific English as well, as demonstrated by expressions such as *move to tears*, *fly into a rage*, or *fears rose*, to name just a few. Parallels between motion and emotion are also evident in the historical overview of meaning of this word given in the Oxford English Dictionary.

The first meaning that OED lists for EMOTION is “A moving out, migration, transference from one place to another” and dates the first example to 1603:

- (1) The divers *emotions* of that people [the Turks]. (OED)

The notion of motion in its physical sense is also retained in the second meaning that OED provides, “A moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in a physical sense)”. The earliest instance of this word meaning is dated at 1692:

- (2) When exercise has left any *Emotion* in his blood or pulse. (OED)

The first example of the transferred sense dates back to 1579, which OED defines as “A political or social agitation; a tumult, popular disturbance”.

- (3) There were great stirres and *emotions* in Lombardy. (OED)

A figurative sense, defined as “Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state”, appeared in 1660:

- (4) The *emotions* of humanity...the meltings of a worthy disposition. (OED)

It is not difficult to detect polysemic relations between these senses, which all rely on motion, either in the physical reality surrounding an individual, bodily movements, social tumults, or “feelings” as distinguished from other mental phenomena.

The question that arises is why emotions are associated with motion. Part of the answer lies in physiology – physiological symptoms and expressive behaviour often include actual body part movements, such as facial expressions or an accelerated heart beat rate, or subjectively perceived ones, such as an increased muscle tension or chest constriction, for example⁵.

The second part of the answer relates to culture – emotion vocabulary, defined as a “subpart of the lexicon of a language as a whole referring to emotions, emotional states, feelings and related phenomena” (Vainik 2004: 16), is never the result of direct mapping between what is actually felt and what is linguistically coded. Every language uses some sort of a “cultural filter”, to borrow the term from Dobrovolskij & Piirainen (2005: 16), which lets through only those biological components that are considered relevant for proper functioning in a particular society, regardless of the fact that physiological experiences are most probably universal among all people. What follows is that emotional content is coded differently in different languages. In other words, it is the culture that plays the key

⁵ For a more precise and detailed description of the relationship between emotions and feelings see Damasio 1999, Wierzbicka 1999, Goddard 2003.

⁶ For a list of emotions and symptoms and expressive behaviours associated with them see Guerrero et al. 1998: 12.

role in matching physical experiences and actual linguistic behaviour via different mental processes, the most prominent of which is metaphorisation. Kövecses (2006: 3) calls this “a differential experiential focus”, determined by cultural models in a society and represented by particular syntactic patterns and chunks of meaning in language of the society in question (see Deignan 2005: 159; Yu 2008: 404).

Among the works that focus on the linguistic relations that exist between emotions, locations and motions, we would like to point out Pérez Rull (2000), who gives an overview of locative prepositional phrases with emotion-nouns and attempts to link them to our general bodily experiences. In researching emotional causality, Dirven (1997), Radden (1998), and Radden & Dirven (2007), draw a parallel between expressing spatial relations in the “real” world and expressing causality in the domain of emotions.

Kitis (2009a; 2009b) pursues a line of investigation complementary to our own, focusing on the verb *fear* and its predicates, underscoring that the original propositional meaning of this verb can be traced to the spatial domain of bodily motion, while its emotional meaning evolved metonymically, only to develop pragmatic functions in the discourse later.

Finally, Sandström (2006) examines verbs of motion in conventionalised emotion metaphors and concludes that verbs of motion are essential for the construal of emotions, as the human mind normally relies on the concrete to express the abstract. She, however, does not limit herself to investigating just the examples in which emotion-nouns are explicitly coded, and her findings give an insight as to how motion can be understood. We have tried to approach the matter from a different angle, though, putting the emotion of fear into focus and associating different verbs of motion with it.

3. Background: Conceptual Metaphor

The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor opposes the traditional stance, by which metaphor resides in language, and starts with the hypothesis that both metaphorical language and thought arise from the fundamental embodied experience (see Kövecses 2010: xii).

Lakoff & Johnson (2003: 3-4) assume that metaphor prevails in our everyday lives; not only in language, but also in thought and actions because our conceptual system is metaphorical by nature. By studying language we can find evidence for this claim, as language itself is structured by the same conceptual system present in thinking and acting. Metaphor proves itself to be a suitable means for perceiving reality, because it is “the missing link between implicit background and explicit formulations, phenomenological experiences and semantic utterances.” (Kaufmann 2003: 137).

Cognitive linguistics also assumes that metaphor is the key mechanism with which we understand abstract concepts and which enables us to think in abstract terms, because it provides a means to manipulate mentally the concepts that are invisible and intangible. It follows that metaphors exist in language solely because they exist in thought as well.

Generally speaking, metaphor is a way of conceiving one thing in terms of another. More specifically, conceptual metaphors are “structured, unidirectional mappings of elements from a more concrete domain, called the source domain, onto a less tangible target domain” (Strugielska and Alonso Alonso 2007: 3). The structures of the respective domains have to be mutually consistent, according to the Invariance Principle, which states that as much knowledge from the source domain should be mapped onto the target as the coherence between the domains allows (see Lakoff 2006: 233; Kövecses 2010: 131). The

mapping between the domains is not arbitrary, though – it is grounded in our bodily experience in the physical and cultural world that surrounds us. The conceptual domain of space is extremely significant in cognitive linguistic research, since it is frequently mapped onto more abstract domains in two principal ways: an abstract concept can be understood as a three-dimensional location, as in

- (5) He lived *in fear* of his wife and daughter and he made no noise at all in the apartment. (CC)

or as an entity in space, as in

- (6) He said: Everyone’s *got fears*, everyone should *have fears*. (CC)

Yu (2003: 30) states that spatialisation is a general cognitive principle.

According to the cognitive function they have, conceptual metaphors can be divided into three types: ontological, structural and orientational (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Kövecses 2010: 37-40).

Ontological metaphors assign a new ontological status to abstract concepts from the target domains. Their function is to identify and/or quantify immaterial experiences in such a way to enable us cognitively to manipulate them more easily. One such metaphor is STATES ARE CONTAINERS, illustrated by

- (7) Fat, ugly and acned, she lived *in awe* of her sister. (OED)

Once an abstract concept obtains this new status of a “thing”, it can become a target domain for a structural metaphor, which enables understanding the more abstract domain in terms of a more concrete structure another domain has. Metaphor TIME IS MOTION exemplifies it:

- (8) *Time flies*, he gets older, she blossoms out – and not a sausage. Just walks by and scorches you with a look of contempt. (OED)

Oriental metaphors aim to order the concepts from the target domain in our conceptual system in a coherent way. They are connected to our basic orientation in space, referring to dimensions such as up-down, front-back, inside-out and alike (see Delschen & Fechner 2002: 10). What is meant by coherence, can be shown by the following example: states that are considered to be beneficial to a human being are conceptualised as being up on this imaginary axis, as corroborated by the following conceptual metaphors: HAPPY IS UP – SAD IS DOWN (9a); HEALTHY IS UP – SICK IS DOWN (9b); CONSCIOUS IS UP – UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN (9c) etc.:

- (9) a. Johnson was *in high spirits*, he talked with great animation and success. (OED)
- b. Three days later all of us, including the cat, were *struck down* with Asian flu. (OED)
- c. I was a very slow developer. By the time I started to *wake up* and think for myself, it was too late. (OED)

Although in their 2003 *Afterword* Lakoff & Johnson (2003: 264) revise this classification saying

“The division of metaphors into three types – orientational, ontological, and structural – was artificial. All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational (in that they map orientational image-schemas)”

we believe it is useful for perceiving different aspects of conceptualization that metaphors help to coordinate, regardless of the fact that a single conceptual metaphor can comprise all three of them, or the fact that it cannot be put into one category.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that all languages present an identical picture of the world, even though all human beings share the same biological structure

and possess the same cognitive capacities. As Deignan (2005: 22) states, “Our biological structure projects itself into culture which in turn generates metaphoric guidelines for the inhabitation of our world.” It is culture that provides the schemes that determine what is associated with what. This begs the question as to why some metaphors seem to be universal, while others show strong cultural markedness. That is why contemporary theory of metaphor suggests decomposition, which results in two types of conceptual metaphors – primary and complex ones (see Grady 2007 [1999]).

Primary metaphors are said to be most directly motivated and are said to have the least arbitrary structure because they stem directly from physical experience. Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 54) exemplify this type with the metaphor MORE IS UP, as in (10):

- (10) With 93,000 savings accounts opened over the year, *balances went up from £18 million to £2.64 billion*. (CC)

This metaphor is embodied because it relies on an experientially common everyday experience that the more things we pile together, the higher the pile grows.

Complex metaphors, however, come into being as a result of the combination of the primary metaphor on the one hand, and culturally conditioned knowledge on the other. Thus, in English there is a metaphor RATIONAL IS UP – EMOTIONAL IS DOWN, as in

- (11) *The jury has risen above raw emotion, passions and prejudices and judged the case on the Evidence the law court gave them*. (CC)

This metaphor also incorporates elements of the cultural model of emotions in English, which is based on the dichotomy

between reason and emotions and which holds reason superior.

4. Emotions as locations

Speaking of general mappings in the metaphorical understanding of the event structure in English, Lakoff (2006: 204 et passim) claims that states can be conceptualised as locations, i.e. bounded regions in space. In combination with another conceptual mapping, EXISTENCE IS PRESENCE (Lakoff 1987: 397), this mapping becomes applicable to emotions, yielding the conclusion that emotion is bounded space whose existence comes into focus when the Experiencer is in that space.

Locations in English are generally coded with prepositional phrases. In constructions denoting emotional experiences this locative prepositional phrase influences the meaning of the verb of motion used, which then acquires a more metaphorical meaning. In that sense, such prepositional phrases are obligatory, which becomes apparent when we compare utterances (12a) and (12b):

- (12) a. She flew into a rage.
b. She flew.

Depending on the verbs of motion used, emotions as locations can be conceptualised as destinations, starting points, or middle locations in transition⁷. Particular conceptualisation in combination with the verb of motion used determines the constitution of the prepositional phrase.

4.1 Fear is a location

In this section we are going to explore the syntactic and semantic possibilities of conceptualising fear as a location related

⁷ Another possibility of conceptualising emotions as locations is EMOTIONS ARE LOCATIONS WHERE WE LIVE (Pérez Rull 2001: 358), but is left out of scope of this paper as this conceptualisation assumes a stative picture and syntactically it is realised with stative verbs.

to movement. The Experiencer is always a trajector in motion.

What follows is an account of the commonest prepositions that head locative prepositional phrases with fear-nouns. Since movement in the domain of emotions cannot be understood but metaphorically, many of these phrases develop an additional, causal meaning as well.

4.1.1 Fear is a destination

4.1.1.1 TO

Pérez Rull (2001: 354) says that TO is a syntactic marker indicating the destination of a movement towards an emotional state. Fear can be conceptualised as a destination at which the Experiencer can, but need not arrive, as in

- (13) *But that just leads to a crippling paranoia, a truly debilitating fear which is the greatest threat of all.*
(CC)

4.1.1.2 INTO

This preposition is used where the direction of motion towards an emotional state is expressed (Pérez Rull 2001: 355). Emotion thus simultaneously becomes the goal of motion and the container for the Experiencer.

When *fear* is conceptualised as the destination the Experiencer reaches, most frequently this destination is coded with the noun PANIC, which is logical, since it denotes a sudden, strong fear. Verbs of motion used, show different possibilities of conceptualisation. In (14), the verb *throw* denotes the event of caused motion (see Fillmore: FrameNet):

- (14) Now, far be it from me to suggest a strategy for winning this kind of man (I can assure you, you don't want him), but such a simple push-pull dynamic is operating here that merely reversing it, and acting even more like a Visitor than he does, dissolves the

whole structure and *throws him into a total panic*. (CC)

Caused motion, together with the element of surprise, which further emphasises the Experiencer's inability to control the situation it is seen in (15) with the verb *hurl*:

- (15) Elsewhere, the awful spectre of an unfettered Neil Kinnock running the country *hurled the City into major panic*. (CCB)

The element of surprise is also present with the transitively used verb *startle* and the resultative phrase, as in (16):

- (16) Though winded, *the impact seemed to startle him into a state of panic*. (LDOCE)

The Experiencer's inability to control the situation comes into focus with verbs *fall* and *lapse*, as in (17):

- (17) a. *Every widow*, no matter what her assets, *falls into a panic* over her financial future, and you're not going to sleep well until you've done some financial planning and know where you stand. (CC)
b. *The cold, stark questioning lapsed into undisguised panic* as she repeated the question a second and a third time, fuelled by my silence. (CCB)

The incorporated direction of movement is downward, which is in line with the conceptual metaphor RATIONAL IS UP – EMOTIONAL IS DOWN.

Slightly more neutral regarding the Experiencer's free will are conceptualisations with verbs *go* and *get*, as in (18):

- (18) a. Let's say the President does nothing about the Russians until well after the shooting starts, but then *the country and the allies go into a panic*

when the Red Army starts rolling across the Ukraine, and the President finally decides he better do something. (CCB)

- b. The process of learning good eating habits takes many years, so *don't feel in any rush or get into a panic* about a child who is fussy with food. (CC)

Interestingly, though, the situation can also be conceptualised as if the Experiencer moves consciously and willingly towards an emotional state, with the verb *steer*:

- (19) Before John could invent words of comfort, *she steered abruptly into the true heart of her panic*. (CCB)

Finally, the situation can be conceptualised as if the Experiencer brings herself into an emotional state by her own doing, in which case the construction is resultative:

- (20) *Chronic blushers talk themselves into a panic*. You have to try and talk yourself through situations, recognise the negative, and deal with it. (CCB)

4.1.2 Fear is a starting point

4.1.2.1 FROM

Since this preposition focuses on the source of motion, i.e. the point that is situated farthest from the goal, in more metaphorical uses, this preposition expresses the indirect cause; that is, it cannot evoke a cause-effect relationship in which the effect follows automatically from the cause (Dirven 1997: 61). Speaking of emotions as causes, Dirven (1997: 62–64) says that this preposition evokes exit from a confined container, which takes place despite the confinement. In other words, the notion of free movement is incompatible with this

preposition. Hence, conceptualisation of emotions as causes with FROM phrases is different from that with the preposition OUT OF, but shares some of the properties with conceptualising emotions as causes with prepositions IN and WITH. Let us examine the following example:

- (21) Sofia Petrovna's knees were shaking – *from fright*, from the heat and from the old woman's bad-tempered shouting. (CCB)

This form approaches in meaning prepositional phrases *in fright* and *with fright*, which would also be possible in this utterance, but stays more general than these. In fact, causal prepositional phrases with IN, and nouns denoting emotional states imply that the emotion concerned is intense (see Radden 1998: 276). An emotional state conceptualised as a container constrains the movement, and, relying on the conceptual metaphor INABILITY TO MOVE IS INABILITY TO ACT, the conceptualisation implies that when the Experiencer is subject to strong emotions, he is in no control over his actions. Interestingly enough, in the example (21) above, it would also be possible to use the prepositional phrase with IN, in the second phrase – Sofia Petrovna's knees were shaking *in the heat*, underscoring thus the similarity between conceptualising emotional states as external circumstances – they cannot be controlled and they produce reactions that are independent of our will.

Prepositional phrases with WITH have a somewhat different focus, however. Emotions conceptualised as causes and coded like this are understood as immediate triggers of a physiological reaction. Emotions are seen as concomitant with the psychological reaction they cause, and the causation link is seen as more direct (see Radden 1998: 283; Radden & Dirven 2007: 329–330). Prepositional phrases with FROM, though, keep the causal link, but without any of the additional meaning

components present with other prepositional phrases. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the preposition FROM denotes the most general causal link between an emotional state and the subsequent reaction (see Dirven 1997: 64).

Another possibility is specialisation towards the adverbial modifier of source, but not the source of movement:

- (22) Marlette cursed inwardly and immediately lowered the pistol, but *he could see from the fear in the boy's eyes that the damage had already been done*. (CC)

4.1.2.2 OUT OF

This complex preposition normally evokes the picture of getting out, or emerging from a three-dimensional container. Used with the emotion noun, it acquires a causal meaning, which can be defined more precisely as a motive.

In (23) the emotion noun is conceptualised as a three-dimensional container, which limits the movement of the Experiencer who is inside. The metaphorical movement is aimed upwards, which is again in line with the metaphor rational is up – emotional is down. Also, another underlying metaphor is the inability to move is the inability to act:

- (23) a. *Parsons finally shook himself out of his panic*, grasped the wing sweep handle, and shoved the wings forward past the 54-degree lockout and all the way to 24 degrees. (CCB)
b. They must have thought the Germans had landed. At the last, *the Lord delivered me out of my panic*. (CCB)

The more spatial reading of utterances in (23) becomes more apparent when compared to the more motivational one, as in (24):

- (24) Later he realised it was having the reverse effect: *people started to join the IRA in greater numbers out of fear and anger.* (CC)

Conceptualised like this, the situation implies that the Experiencer thinks about the state he is in first, and then makes a decision and acts in accordance with it. Emotional states and reactions are thus seen as controllable. Dirven (1997: 62) says that the complex preposition OUT OF is metaphorised in the sense of free movement out of the container. Free movement out of a container maps onto free motivation for actions. In addition to this, the three-dimensional conceptualisation of emotion allows its depth to map onto the deeper sources, or reasons for actions, which are seen as more rational.

What follows from the comparison of examples (23) and (24) is that the more spatial meaning of OUT OF does not implicate freedom of movement. Rather, spatial readings incorporate opposition and hindrance, while only motivational readings, in which the Experiencer has control over the situation, allow the free emergence reading.

This conceptualisation imposes yet another significant constraint: since the Experiencer can rationalise only emotional states that are of a relatively longer duration, and which do not provoke strong, instantaneous reactions, this preposition does not head the phrases with emotion nouns that denote sudden emotional states or explosive emotional reactions. Searching the OED, we were unable to find a single example with phrases *out of passion/joy/surprise*⁸. Accordingly, we have been

⁸ This does not mean that these phrases are absent from the English language altogether. As the anonymous reviewer of this paper kindly pointed out, the phrases “crime out of passion” and “killed out of passion” do occur in appropriate contexts:

- (25) a. Well they you have it, if anyone commits a crime out of passion they deserve to be pardoned so just let out 95% of the murder-

unable to find any other noun in this phrase except the noun FEAR, which is the hyperonym in the lexical field denoting the domain of this emotion family. All other nouns investigated denote more intense feelings, rendering them incompatible with the meaning of this phrase.

4.1.2.3 FOR

The present-day preposition FOR preserves only a loose connection with the spatial meaning it once had, and which survives today in a very limited number of expressions, including *before one's eyes*, for example. As the OED shows, this preposition indeed had a range of spatial meanings grouped around the imaginary front-back axis. This front-back schema moved metaphorically to the domain of causality, mapping the fact that something that happens before something else can be seen as its causal source. Here the metaphor that underlies the mapping is TIME IS SPACE. More precisely, emotions are seen as reasons, which Radden & Dirven (2007: 330) define as “real or conceived states of affairs adduced as an explanation for a given situation”. Typically, only positive emotions and hypothetical situations can be conceptualised as reasons for actions. Radden (1998: 286) says that this is so because re-

ers because most of them will assert that claim! (<http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/15/chasing-haley-barbour-ex-governor-dodges-questions-about-pardons/comment-page-8/>)

- b. Experts say there are three main reasons why people commit murder. They kill out of passion, they kill for profit and, scariest of all, they kill for no apparent reason at all. (http://southshorenw.ca/old_site/archives/2001/120501/news/19.html)

It is obvious from the examples above that the context supports the thesis that phrases with OUT OF + emotion noun refer to the quest for the reason behind the act in question. We believe that the commonality of such phrases is related to the Anglo-American cultural interpretation of an emotional person, who is often judged to have a diminished responsibility for his or her act (see Lutz 1986: 292; Solomon 2007: 132-133).

actions to positive emotions are less specific or conditioned, which makes them less of the necessary causes. Hypothetical situations gain this status due to their counterfactuality:

- (26) The Department of Health said last night that the inquiry could not have released details of the 28 any earlier *for fear of compromising the final report*. (CC)

The phrase *for fear of* underwent the process of petrification, rendering a complex conjunction with the meaning “in order to avoid or prevent” (OED).

As the gloss in the entry for *fear* in OED suggests, *fear* does not have its full sense in this phrase. When the emotional content is in focus, FOR is substituted with the preposition THROUGH.

4.1.3 Fear is an intermediate location in transition

4.1.3.1 THROUGH

In prepositional phrases with THROUGH, *fear* can be conceptualised as a location in metaphorical transition towards a goal, which can be some new, altered state. Also, transition through time can be conceptualised as transition through space, which is in line with the metaphor TIME IS SPACE:

- (27) *Every widow before you has gone through the anxiety, depression, fear, panic, and emotional paralysis that accompany the death of a husband*. (CC)

The transition, however, is not a simple matter of moving, or time passing: emotional states are considered as capable of influencing the Experiencer, and therefore, these prepositional phrases are likely to develop an additional, causal meaning. The causal meaning is evident in the following examples:

- (28) a. Dozens of women have filed complaints against Wood, 46,

but *detectives believe many more have held back through fear of being identified later*. (CC)

- b. That night we retired to our muddy billets. *I did not sleep well, Father, but not through apprehension*, or rather I felt sunk in depression, I have to report, following the deaths of so many good fellows - and now of Raglan himself - to such little effect. (CCB)

5. Emotion as a trajector

Emotion conceptualised as a trajector can move on its own, usually with verbs that describe manners in which animate beings move (see Levin 1993: 267), as in

- (29) *A familiar sense of irritation crept up on him*, he didn't like being beholden. (CCB)

or alternatively, emotion nouns can be used as arguments of verbs that denote externally caused motion, as in

- (30) The Spurs midfield is not one designed *to strike fear into the hearts of opponents*. (CCB)

What is more, the corresponding landmark can be either in the outer world, or in the Experiencer, who is conceptualised as a container for the emotion. In the next section we will offer an overview of possibilities with fear nouns, as found in our corpus. Syntactically, fear nouns are realised as subjects of corresponding verbs, which ascribes to fear agentive and human-like characteristics.

5.1 Fear as an argument of verbs denoting self-propelled motion

Most frequently, fear is conceptualised as an entity, which is capable of coming or going on its own, which emphasises its agentive properties:

- (31) a. Naturally, a twinge of fear came with the haze. (CC)
b. The ol' freshman terror had gone, and the girls started lookin' good. (CC)

in the general direction of the door handle, which darling Moira sometimes held fast from the outside! (CCB)

- Traversing (Fillmore: FrameNet) – fear is conceptualised as if it moves over an area. The location is also salient in the situation and is profiled in the construction, and it is a body part:

- (32) He watched with a trembling of intensity as *surprise, disbelief, confusion and terror chased each other across her face*. (CCB)

- Light emission (Levin 1993: 233) – in combination with the visible change in Experiencer, fear is conceptualised as a beam of light:

- (33) *The panic flashed at John again*. (CCB)

- Accompanied motion (see Levin 1993: 270) – the situation is conceptualised as if there were two persons present, and one person takes the other one from one location to another. The nature of the relationship between the participants, one of which in our case is an emotion of fear, can be different:

- (34) a. He kicked away his stool and left the office. *Fear slid at his heels after him*. (CCB)
b. *But the relief was followed by apprehension* that I was expected to get rid of the mouse. (CCB)
c. As the door slammed, *the overpowering darkness closed in upon me, bringing terrors with it*, and I lay in sweaty paralysis until I could muster the courage to leap out of bed and dash across the dark room

5.2 Fear nouns as an argument of caused motion verbs

Fear is conceptualised as an entity that changes location under the influence of some force from the outside that puts it into motion. Typically, the movement verb implies a considerable force and the landmark is a human being or some body part, which is conceptualised as a container. What underlies this conceptualisation is the ontological metaphor EMOTIONS ARE THINGS, which allows mental manipulation of fear as if it were a concrete object in reality. The possibilities of linguistic realisation are manifold:

- (35) a. The sight of his long hairy hands, his hump covered in dandruff, and *his yellow unshaven face struck fear into her*. (CC)
b. Until then, *Lewis had done little to put fear in the heart of Finkel*. (CCB)
c. And once more she stopped in mid-stride as *the fear she was trying to control by words, by anger, by indignation, was edged aside by a darker, heavier terror*. (CC)
d. *I want to remove the fear from the disease*. Increasingly we're talking about living with cancer rather than dying from it. (CCB)
e. *The thought sent a little chill of panic through Sally's stomach*. (CCB)

Syntactically, fear nouns are realised as patient arguments of verbs of caused motion, and the construction is either transitive or passive.

6. How it all adds up

Kövecses (2000: 23–24) provides a summary of fear metaphors in English, which includes the following⁹:

FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

- (36) a. He hadn't said much in response to this announcement, but surprising himself, inside he had felt *a sudden surge of unfamiliar panic*. (CCB)
b. *Fitzpatrick poured out his fears* about the Saints handing over control to someone with no knowledge of their history, of the town, of any of the things which have consumed his own life for 27 years. (CC)

FEAR IS A HIDDEN ENEMY

- (37) Not just the beauty of a wide expanse of estuary under a huge dome of sky made its impression, but also *the lurking fear* of the speed with which the tide came in over those flats. (CCB)

FEAR IS A TORMENTOR

- (38) It was written by Sir Andrew Lloyd Webber, but *he is nagged by the fear* that he may have subconsciously copied it from somewhere. (CCB)

FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING

- (39) *Fear of victory haunts many sportspeople*, but on Saturday, Christie was immune. (CCB)

FEAR IS AN ILLNESS

- (40) He shepherded her out of the room and she shied away from

him *as if fear were contagious, as if terror were catching*. (CCB)

FEAR IS INSANITY

- (41) The men on the quivering, battered boat were *mad with terror*. (LDOCE)

THE SUBJECT OF FEAR IS A DIVIDED SELF

- (42) A few weeks ago she had talked about breaking it off with him, mostly because *her fear for him was difficult to live with*. (CCB)

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE

- (43) *NEW HOPE* for arachnophobes everywhere: London Zoo is running three-hour hypnosis programmes to help people *overcome their fear of spiders*. (CCB)

FEAR IS A BURDEN

- (44) For someone with Lowry's Wesleyan upbringing and its attendant sense of sin and guilt, combined with the knowledge gained at the Museum of the most pathological cases of advanced syphilis, *the whole business of casual sex in the dangerous purlieus of the Liverpool dock area must have been fraught with excitement and terror*. (CCB)

FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE

- (45) *Calm gauger of the swelling tide of mortal agony and fear*. (OED)

FEAR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR

- (46) How did it happen that *the fear, or the hope, or the mere fact of October 1917 dominated world history* for so long and so profoundly that not even the coldest of Cold War ideologists expected

⁹ We were able to verify all the metaphors that Kövecses posits in the data used in the present analysis.

the virtually unresisted disintegration of 1989? (CCB)

The first of these, FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, is not the central metaphor for conceptualising fear in English, according to Kövecses (2000: 23). This very general emotion metaphor is based on the humoral theory, which dates back to Hippocrates, and which claims that all vital processes in the human body are governed by four bodily fluids, the disbalance of which could lead to emotional outbursts (see Stearns 1994: 62–63). This theory served as a basis for a later hydraulic emotion metaphor, according to which emotions are capable of filling, overflowing or being channeled (Solomon 1995). This means that emotions as fluids located in the container, which is typically a human being, are capable of movement under pressure. What follows is that movement is an important aspect of this metaphor, and what is more, the movement itself can be seemingly self-propelled, or under the influence of forces that are beyond the Experiencer's control, so that it seems to be self-propelled, as in (36a). Conversely, fear can be conceptualised as the object of caused motion, where the Experiencer is conceptualised as if he is in control of the situation, as in (36b).

This notion of force is present in other metaphorical conceptualisations as well. Among the remaining metaphors, it is notable that in a considerable number of them, the target domain is a human being. This means that a whole range of human, agentive characteristics are ascribed to fear, including the ability to move on its own. What is more, fear conceptualised as a human being is either a superior in the social hierarchy or an opponent in the struggle. In both cases it exerts a force on the Experiencer, who cannot easily put up resistance to it – social norms constrain the opposition to the superior, and physical struggling can be tiring, and its outcome unpredictable. It is this exertion of

force that connects these metaphors with the one in which the target domain is a natural force, which can instigate an action, but not consciously or willingly (see Payne 2011: 137). Fear conceptualised as burden is also connected to force, as it presses the Experiencer.

Another view of force is present in the metaphors FEAR IS AN ILLNESS and FEAR IS INSANITY. Illness can be understood as a biological force that stands in opposition to the life force in the struggle for survival. When localised in the Experiencer's mind, this force can be so strong that metaphorically Experiencer's consciousness splits, rendering the insanity metaphor.

Force is easily connected to motion, rendering force-dynamic principle, which Lakoff (2006: 213) formulates like this:

- A stationary object will move only when force is applied to it; without force, it will not move.
- The application of force requires contact; thus, the applier of the force must be in spatial contiguity with the thing it moves.
- The application of force temporarily precedes motion, since inertia must be overcome before motion can take place.

What may not be that obvious is how force dynamics relates to emotions understood as locations. At first glance, fear as a location does not show any agentive characteristics, but as we have seen earlier, the conceptual image that emerges from the location metaphors is one of pressure and movement. The image of fear as a container combines with that of force in preventing free movement of the Experiencer. Oppositely, prepositional phrases with OUT OF conceptualise fear as if it enables or even instigates metaphorically understood movement. The combination of the locative imagery and the causation, which exists in prepositional phrases with FOR and THROUGH, adds the element of force to the typically stative notion of location.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the umbrella metaphor for conceptualizing *fear* in English is FEAR IS

FORCE. More generally, this metaphor is an instantiation of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS FORCE. According to Talmy (2000: 409), when interacting with respect to force, entities undergo the exertion of force, resistance to it, the overcoming of such a resistance, the blockage of the expression of force and the like. This model is to a high degree similar to a folk theory of emotion in Western culture, which Kövecses (2010: 110) gives as

cause of emotion → emotion → (controlling emotion) → response

According to Talmy (2000), force dynamics plays a significant role in several language levels, including both grammar and lexis¹⁰. If this view is accepted, then the model of emotions in English fits more general patterns in line with the structure of both language and culture in which it exists.

7. Conclusion

Fear, as a concept that belongs to the abstract domain of emotions, is a suitable object of research for metaphoric conceptualisation. This conceptualisation relies on both physiological and cultural realia that exist in a certain society. That emotion is connected to motion in Western culture to which English belongs is evident not only from the etymology of the word, but also in numerous expressions and underlying metaphors that exist in contemporary language. As motion in general presupposes the existence of a path schema, which consists of a starting point, a goal and a series of intermediate points, as well as an entity that moves along this path, it is of little wonder that emotions can be conceptualised as participants in this schema, and consequently coded linguistically in different ways.

We have shown on the example of fear-nouns that emotion can be conceptualised as any of the points along the path mentioned. This is linguistically coded using different prepositional phrases. And since in the case of fear movement is metaphorical, prepositional phrases acquire a causal in addition to a spatial meaning, the borderline between which is not always clear.

Even when fear is conceptualised as location, there are some elements that link it to other possible metaphorical conceptualisations – first of all the notions of pressure and movement, which can both be related to force dynamics, which we believe to be the underlying principle of emotion conceptualisation in general.

When conceptualised as a trajector, fear can be conceptualised as capable of self-propelled motion, and this conceptualisation attributes to fear agentive characteristics. This is also in line with the force dynamics, as agents typically exert force and direct it towards some other entity or simply move relative to the position of another object in the situation.

We have also found, however, that fear can be conceptualised as an object that is causally affected by another participant in the situation, i.e. fear-nouns appear as object arguments of caused motion verbs. Although this runs contrary to the previously mentioned conceptualisation of fear as predominantly agentive, this conceptualisation conforms to another conceptual metaphor in English, ABSTRACT CONCEPTS ARE THINGS. This does not deprive fear of its agentive characteristics – rather, multiple metaphorical mappings with the same target domain exist because the metaphor is always contextualised: different aspects of an abstract concept become mapped depending on which one is considered adequate in a certain situation in reality. The multitude of mappings available only proves that abstract concepts can only be conceptualised via metaphorical processes.

¹⁰ For a more detailed account see Talmy 2000: 466–467.

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ЕМОЦИЈЕ У ПОКРЕТУ: КОНЦЕПТУАЛИЗАЦИЈА СТРАХА У ЕНГЛЕСКОМ ЈЕЗИКУ ПОМОЋУ ПОЈМОВА КРЕТАЊА И ЛОКАЦИЈЕ

Резиме

У овом раду испитује се концептуализација страха у енглеском језику помоћу појмова кретања и локације, како би се показало да се концептуализација емоција делом заснива на метафорички схваћеном кретању. Један правац истраживања концентрише се на страх као локацију која може бити одредиште кретања до којег онај који доживљава страх може

али не мора стићи, затим као полазиште, или као локација кроз коју се пролази. Страх као локација у језику реализује се предлошким фразама које често, поред локативног, добијају и узрочно значење. Други правац истраживања бави се анализом страха као ентитета у покрету. Показали смо да се страх може концептуализовати као способан за самостално кретање, али такође и као објекат подстакнутог кретања. На крају, скрећемо пажњу на то да је концептуализација страха као локације или ентитета у покрету компатибилна са осталим могућим концептуализацијама страха у енглеском језику, пошто им је заједнички инхерентни принцип динамике силе.

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