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Prakash Kona
English and Foreign Languages University, Hyderabad, India

DERRIDA, CHOMSKY AND WITTGENSTEIN: GRAMMATOLOGIST / GRAMMARIAN / GRAMMATIST

Abstract: *That there is no fixed point but point(s) of origin is the point of origin of this essay that begins with a play on the word gram. It could be the Derridean gramme or Chomskyean grammar. It could also be "language-game" meant to bring Wittgenstein into the conversation. I used Alfred Hitchcock's statement on psychoanalysis taken from the 1945 classic "Spellbound" as a point of "origin" for the discussion on grammar. The statement concentrates on the "origins" of the problems of the mind that psychoanalysis hopes to cure. In using Hitchcock, more of artist of language than a language-theorist, I problematize the idea of origin itself; whether it ought to come from a serious-minded philosopher like Freud - the so-called "right" source or a secondary source such as Hitchcock playing with the Freudean idea of psychoanalysis through his narrative. The origin of discussion thus turns out to be a false start. It serves a purpose in showing the apparent nature of the text that psychoanalysis is a construction like any other discourse that dominated Western philosophy from Plato to the present. Yet origin must exist in the literal sense of the term. Freud did offer psychoanalysis as a form of therapy to open the text to meaning - in this case, the text is the human mind itself. In the process, psychoanalysis itself is a multifaceted text that becomes a stage for the entrance of the gram. The idea is to show philosophy as a narrative; the narrative dimension of philosophy and philosophy itself as a form of narration. From a Derridean perspective, the point of origin is a null, which opens the text to diverse readings. It is both the anarchy of the text as well as silence at the heart of language.*

Key words: *language-game, competence, deconstruction, political correctness*

Words and Weights:

The story of the gram:

Once upon a time:

Our story deals with psychoanalysis the method by which modern science treats the emotional problems of the sane.

The psychoanalyst seeks only to induce his patient to talk about his hidden problems, to open the locked doors of his mind.

Once the complexes that have been disturbing the patient are uncovered and interpreted, the illness and confusion disappear . . . and the devils of unreason are driven from the human soul.

Alfred Hitchcock – from the movie "Spellbound"

In the introduction to his 1945 classic *Spellbound* Hitchcock opens the movie with a statement on psychoanalysis, which has interesting implications in the context of the gramme. During the course of the

movie one of the male doctors sardonically remarks to the woman psychoanalyst Dr. Constance Peterson, who is unresponsive to his attention: "It's rather like embracing a text-book." Apparently he means she is lifeless and asexual like a "text-book." The metaphor of the text-book is interesting from a post-structural perspective because it does mean something more than a lifeless object. To a psychoanalyst, the conscious mind is the text that keeps exposing the workings of the inner text or the unconscious. To the grammatologist the word "text-book" betrays some of the presumptions of the psychoanalytical technique that attempts to enfold the characters of the story within its purview[1]. In fact, an *other* narrative could be brought to light based upon the use of this single phrase "text-book." The objective of the *other* story would be to view the analysis of the psyche in terms of the logic of the gramme[2].

If embracing the gramme (i.e., also the other of the psyche) is embracing the text-book without out-lines, hysteria[3] is the logical consequence of the spell that binds the psyche into *thinking* the difference of the self from the other[4]. To say that the gramme is the text-book is to define neither the one (the gramme) nor the other (text-book). Alternately, the gramme is the inconstant, nonlinear, dynamic condition that opens the text-book to infinite meanings. The gramme is what Derrida refers to as the trace that the author leaves behind. The reader is pursuing a trace and not a predetermined legacy of meaning that the author left behind. While the book could be visualized as the material state (something concrete that can be touched), i.e., the body of the gramme/woman, the text, it could also be imagined as a fluid state (of meaning that has no fixed boundaries) of the gramme. The grammatical state has to do neither with the *state* as a political entity nor with a state of mind (of interest to the psychoanalyst), both of which are masculine centers relying upon the notion of fixed, unchanging origins. On the contrary, the text-book, owing to its alternate positioning i.e. seemingly without an origin, is in a state of illness, despair and potential suicide.

One cannot doctor the "lifeless" text-book. One is always already a patient possessed by devils of "unreason." A "text" does not fall outside domain of the psyche; it is the hologram (hollow gram) posi-

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1 In the movie, another psychoanalyst, a Freud-like Alex Bruno quotes a friend of his to Dr Patterson: "Women make the best psychoanalysts till they fall in love. After that they make the best patients." Psychoanalysis is an objective condition with the necessary intellectual requirement of detachment from the *other* or the patient as opposed to love which breaks this distinction between the self and the other--the doctor and the patient, the confessor and the penitent etc.

2 The 'logic of the gramme' is a variable term. It's not psychology, the traditional discipline of the mind, or psychoanalysis meant to cure a person by analyzing the contents of his/her speech. It is the person who is supposed to be cured, the so-called patient who is looking through the doctor. The language of the patient along with the slips is a mask, which the doctor or the psychoanalyst has to veer through. In the process, who is the psychoanalyst and who is the patient? Outside the traditional definitions both become the one of the other and the other of the one.

3 Hysteria is the borderline state of the text. There is no clear distinction between meaning, laughter and noise. The text seems to be saying something. Simultaneously it is laughing at the very idea of meaning. Meaning is a fluid state that defies a "proper" explanation.

4 How does the mind cognize the notion of difference outside language? If the body of the female psychoanalyst is like the gramme, then her role itself as a psychoanalyst is a way of countering her own otherness. She is playing the role of the master 'mind-reader' without believing in it. Essentially, she knows the difference between what she is by virtue of *being* the body of a woman and the role she plays which is that of a psychoanalyst, the doctor of "speech." The difference is also the reason of the hysteria where the essentiality of her body creeps into the role of a doctor. She is a female and then a doctor or a female doctor. The role demands intellectual detachment and an exclusion of feminineness. But in a state of hysteria, the feminineness becomes the basis of *reading* (which is also identifying oneself with) the patient who is lying on the couch.

tioned in the interiors of the page, a translucent sign of *originality* and *certitude*. The hologram far from being the pure representation of the text is a metaphor of interiority. Derrida's ironic use of the metaphor of sponge as a sign of displacement in *Signsponge* brings out both the alternateness and the beingness of the text. It is both full of meaning (sponged) and empty of meaning (sponged out). There are two positions crossing one another. "Affecting itself with everything, the sponge is sponged. itself. The sponge remarks itself. And so it annuls itself, removes itself, carries itself away, concerns itself . . . It secretes, by separating itself off, every spongism" (1984, p.74). Spongism is the underlying theme of grammatology or deconstruction itself. It is the *spongy* nature of the text that absorbs and lets out meaning. As Derrida puts it in *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*: "Unbinding, unknotting, detachment, resolution of a problem, acquittal of a task, a duty, a debt, withdrawal of promise or engagement kept, all these regimes of the *losen* govern the text we are reading, and that we are reading as an interminable narrative" (1987: 389).

Is the discussion on the gramme the essence of grammar as a study of rules to enable the proper construction of sentences? From a Chomskyean point of view, grammar (far from being the theme of spongism) is the universal basis of language; infinite sentences can be generated provided there is a grammar with finite number of rules that is able to provide consistency and meaning to the sentences. As D'Agostino notes: "A grammar is, on this account, a theory of mental states underlying the processes involved in the production and interpretation of utterances" (4). To the question regarding the origin of grammar, Chomsky would answer it with his argument based on the "rationalist approach (which) holds that beyond the peripheral processing mechanisms, there are

innate ideas and principles of various kinds that determine the form of the acquired knowledge in what may be a rather restricted and highly organized way. A condition for innate mechanisms to become activated is that appropriate stimulation be presented" (1965: 48).

A theory of generative grammar would be an alternative to the gramme as discourse in the sense that what is innate (the language mechanism existing in the mind) is beyond question and the only possible investigation would be to discover implicit rules of the mind leading to the making of a language. As Chomsky sees it: "Grammar and common sense are acquired by virtually everyone, effortlessly, rapidly, in a uniform manner, merely by living in a community under minimal conditions of interaction, exposure, and care" (1975: 144). Irrespective of gender and context, "grammar" and "common sense" are ideally properties of human species. In some sense, this places grammar beyond the pale of discourse that goes into the socially constructed nature of language. There is something *outside the text* called grammar that forms the basis to the reality of the text.

Who is a grammatist and how and why is s/he different from the grammatologist or the grammarian? The grammatist is the *other* of the grammatalogist and simultaneously the *self* (that is capable of articulating selfhood) of the grammarian. The Wittgensteinean position is a detour to the Chomskyean emphasis on language as reason and the Derridean notion of language as differance. S/he is also what neither is, a "believer," who can take a glimpse into the world outside the text. The world precedes the arrival of the text not in a chronological sense but as space confronting the imagination. As Wittgenstein puts it: "The world is *given* to me, i.e., my will enters the world completely from outside as into something that is already there" (1969a: 74). There is something of the world that

the text eliminates while simultaneously the world refuses to disclose itself completely to the language-theorist. The Wittgensteinean position is that the study of the use of language is an alternative to the study of grammar. There is a non-textual state outside language, in the form of the world or the universe that makes its impact felt on human languages. It is the Buddhist Nirvana, the Heracletean flux or Heidegger's Being - a state without words, but one that cannot be understood outside social and political discourse. Poetics is the ideal term for such a state where language is understood in the way it is used rather than simply felt, a flux that is seriously ordered while any attempt to give a final definition is a fluctuating one. "The world of physical objects and the world of consciousness . . . What actually is the 'world of consciousness'?--That which is in my consciousness: what I am now seeing, hearing, feeling . . . --and what, for example, am I now seeing? The answer to that cannot be: "Well, *all that*" accompanied by a sweeping gesture" (1977: 58). The flux of the world of consciousness could never be approached with an absolute sense of certainty. The point in raising questions "is *not* asking for a (causal) explanation; Thus, he is expressing an attitude toward all explanations" (1977: 58). The duty of philosophy is not to unduly criticize the state but to open itself to simple, ordinary, day-to-day observations regarding language and the world.

Words and chess pieces are analogous; knowing how to use a word is like knowing how to move a chess piece. Now how do the rules enter into playing the game? What is the difference between playing the game and aimlessly moving the pieces? I do not deny there is a difference, but I want to say that knowing how a piece is to be used is not a particular state of mind which goes on while the game goes on. The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feeling that attaches to the words." (1979: 3)

The flux of meanings is obedient to "rules" rather than "feelings" that one "attaches to the words." To analyze feelings rather the rules is what creates severe problems in the study of language. A performer on-stage is keen on directing the feelings of the audience but he or she does not do it without an awareness of the rules that guide the performance. To state for instance that Shakespeare understands human feelings is not to imply that Shakespeare is not aware of the rules that govern the use of the English language. Wittgenstein says: "A main cause of philosophical disease--a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example" (1953: 155). The use of language is neither one example nor just an "example". The limitation in one kind of example is that it ignores the fact that words can be used in multiple ways to mean multiple things. It becomes a "philosophical disease" when we start theorizing at an abstract level on the nature of reality using one example and hoping falsely to establish a basis to such an argument. A philosophical diet that is more than just one example is deconstructionist in "spirit." Does deconstruction have a spirit or is it a spirit in the shape of a 'scepter' (the ghost of authority dis-placed from the hands of the "real" author) that is out to get metaphysics?

The devils of unreason:

A scepter is haunting metaphysics; the scepter of deconstruction. The gramme is the physics of the human body, in short, a metaphor of illness; is deconstruction a displacement from the health of reason to the sickness of unreason? What is this *unreason* like? In her 1930 essay "On being ill," Virginia Woolf points out to the centrality of the body to any discourse and how it has come to be ignored in traditional philosophy in favor of the mind and the soul.

All day, all night the body intervenes; blunts or sharpens, colors or discolors, turns to wax in the warmth of June, hardens to tallow in the murk of February. The creature within can only gaze through the pane--smudged or rosy; it cannot separate off from the body like the sheath of a knife or the pod of a pea for a single instant; it must go through the whole unending procession of changes, heat and cold, comfort and discomfort, hunger and satisfaction, health and illness, until there comes the inevitable catastrophe; the body smashes itself to smithereens, and the soul (it is said) escapes. (1992: 101)

The idea of "health" is a metaphysical state imposed on the body in the name of reason. While illness is a gesture of defiance against order, deconstruction is the philosophy of margins (rather than origins) that, far from restoring the gramme from a diabolic state of unreason to a state of so-called health, uses marginality as a point from which one questions the opposition itself as leading to a final truth. As Derrida says at the end of his essay on Foucault, "Cogito and the History of Madness," "A division on whose basis, after which, logos, in the necessary violence of its irruption, is separated from itself as madness, is exiled from itself, forgetting its origin and its own possibility. Is not what is called finitude possibility as crisis? A certain identity between the consciousness of crisis and the forgetting of it? Of the thinking of negativity and the reduction of negativity? Crisis of reason, finally, access to reason and attack of reason" (1976b: 62-63). The goal of deconstruction is to undo the complicity between logos and madness (reason/unreason or illness/health); illness cannot be pitied; it can be hated, mocked and subjected without ever being controlled; illness is a mystical state of resistance to the mundane[5]. As Virginia Woolf puts it:

5   See Kierkegaard's essay: "Despair is sickness unto death:" "The possibility of sickness is man's superiority over the animal, and this superiority distinguishes him in quite another way than does his erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublimity, that he is spirit" (1980a: 15).

In illness words seem to possess a mystic quality. We grasp what is beyond their surface meaning, gather instinctively this, that, and the other--a sound, a color, here a stress, there a pause--which the poet, knowing words to be meager in comparison with ideas, has strewn about his page to evoke, when collected, a state of mind which neither words can express nor the reason explain. Incomprehensibility has an enormous power over us in illness, more legitimately perhaps than the upright will allow. In health meaning has encroached upon sound. Our intelligence domineers over our senses. But in illness, with the police off duty, we creep beneath some obscure poem . . . and the words give out their scent and distill their flavor, and then, if at last we grasp the meaning, it is all the richer for having come to us sensually first, by way of the palate and the nostrils like some queer odor. (1992: 108)

To Chomsky, it is not so much the crisis of reason versus madness as much as the crisis of reason itself. It is reason that has been suppressed in the name of abiding by reason; reason has been usurped by those who have been unreasonable as in unfair; contrarily, oppressed individuals and groups have historically displayed an attitude of being fair and reasonable that justified resistance to oppression. The discourse of "reason" is not a purely mental state but is connected to grammar--the individual's ability to naturally comprehend sentences owing to his intrinsic knowledge of rules that make a sentence. Reason is not something that comes with experience. Yet, how do we know that reason could've existed in the absence of experience? Literally speaking, this would be an unreasonable question because it ignores the evidence of learnability; that a child can learn any language depending on the context in which s/he is placed. Yet the child enters reason from a state of nonreason (far from being a *tabula rasa*, the non-reason is also a state of reason in the form of a rudimentary language mechanism, one which cannot recognize itself as such).

Grammar exists in the state of nonreason in a rudimentary form until the in-

dividual begins to use language. In *Syntactic Structures* Chomsky makes a clear delineation between *grammaticalness* and *meaningfulness* (1957: 10). In a state of non-reason (which is reason in a potential state), grammaticalness exists but meaningfulness based on grammaticalness exists in a state of reason. On one hand, language is "a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length and constructed out of a finite set of elements" (1957: 13), while on the other hand, "A finite state grammar is the simplest type of grammar which, with a finite amount of apparatus, can generate an infinite number of sentences" (1957: 24). Reason is guided by a set of rules. Hence, "In producing a sentence, the speaker begins in the initial state, produces the first word of the sentence, thereby switching into a second state which limits the choice of the second word, etc. Each state through which he passes represents the grammatical restrictions that limit the choice of the next word at this point in the utterance" (1957: 20).

From a Wittgensteinean point of view, the ideal is to write philosophy as if one were writing a prescription; to cure it of the illness of long and detailed explanatory prose (as apart from description); to make philosophy readable to a sick person; for one to find meaning in a line; that seems to be the modest aim of the philosopher. Philosophy is written in a short prose version of a haiku. An apt title for an intellectual biography of Wittgenstein would be "Lines" because of the attempt in his writing to communicate the striking simplicity at the heart of human languages which are lost in a maze of confusion and misunderstanding owing to a deliberate obliviousness to the fact that it is rules that determine the language-game.

The subjective universe. (1969a: 42)

I act with complete certainty. But this certainty is my own (1969b: 25).

Imagine how a child might be trained in the practice of 'narration of past events' (1958, 104).

"What makes the remark I just said into a remark about him?" (1982, 44).

I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules (1953: 39).

The beauty (if one visualizes an aesthetics of style) of Wittgenstein's "lines" is an attempt to produce an emotional connection with the reader. There is also a connection that links the above lines: the subjective universe: the subject as a universe within oneself; certainty is my own: certainty as something belonging to the subject! It springs from the universality of the subject or even the subject-ness of the universe. That's the essence of training the child in the narration of past events. A child recognizes itself as subject. It is this recognition that makes possible the reading of history and to instill in the child the faculty of recollecting past events in order to be able to place itself in perspective. In the context of the subjective universe, it is impossible to judge whether the remark I made is a remark about a "person." It could have been about virtually anything under the sun. That's because the application of a word is not always bound by rules. I can say anything and it is quite possible that I don't mean what I'm saying. It's also possible that I don't know myself, how much I really mean what I say or the exact meaning of what I'm saying.

Does that imply a celebration of meaning that refuses to actually "mean" anything in particular? Does it mean that language (in a narcissistic manner) feeds on its own resourcefulness to say all that it wants to without any need to correspond to the requirements of the world? Wittgenstein seems to say that we *know* the world as *the* world and language is evidence to our knowledge of the world. Does it mean that we know ourselves as *selves* before we are able to speak about it? We understand the world through language. It

is important that we take care how we use words. Words can be used to "heal the world" or prescribe limits as to what language must or mustn't say about itself. The latter is a way of *normalizing* language by limiting expression to what is understood in a formal manner. I can say: "I'm wearing a brown shirt today" and it means "I'm--wearing--a--brown--shirt--today" and nothing but that. To offer a context such as "I'm wearing a brown shirt today as it is my birthday and brown happens to be my favorite color" is to offer another linguistic basis to the language of my wearing a brown shirt today. The context can never isolate itself from the language used to describe the so-called context. This argument breaks the deadlock between the Chomskyean view of an essential human nature - the mental context of language that precedes the world - and the Derridean view of language as a system of signs existing by virtue of differance.

Talking about the hidden problems:

Grammatology, Linguistics, Grammaticality[6]:

To Derrida, Chomskyean metaphysics of an essential human nature would be the marginalization of language which is a social and political discourse in favor of a philosophy of grammar acting as an *original* basis to the study of language. Far from being the original *being*, the gramme displaces origin (places origin in a dis--hell; the gramme as the ghost of phenomena); it displaces the desire to know the origin as

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6 To define grammaticality is to paraphrase what Wittgenstein says in *Philosophical Investigations* "the explanation is never completed . . . It may easily look as if every doubt merely *revealed* an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that *can* be doubted, and then remove all these doubts" (1953: 41). To remove the doubts we need to further doubt everything. Grammaticality could broadly be defined as a theory of *explanation* as a never-ending process.

well as the history of philosophy as knowledge of origins. The gramme mocks the longing of philosophy to become the child, the ultimate repository of being; it is the so-called deception of the apparent, the wo/man--that is the only possible truth of philosophy. As Derrida says in *Cinders*: "Pure is the word. It calls for fire. Cinders there are . . . " (1991: 37). As a system of signs and as a sign *per se*, the gramme neither is beneath nor does it transcend the mind-body equation. As cinders or the dispersed ashes of meaning rather than *pure* fire, the gramme demands an alternate vocabulary of deconstruction; in some sense, the signs are "essences" (rather than a single essence) and the discourse of the gramme is a play of essences; it is literal-*mind*-edness decentering the **M**ind as a source of knowledge; it is *truism* making a mockery of the **T**ruth. The gramme refuses to identify itself with the Chomskyean distinction of the grammatical and the meaningful. Grammatology is a science (if science is a discourse of knowledge of the physical world rather than a world-view that relies on experiment to confirm its assumptions) apart from being the science of linguistics. As Derrida points out the repression of certain questions in the "positive sciences" leads to the possibility of writing or grammatology.

The science of writing should therefore look for its object at the roots of scientificity. The history of writing should turn back toward the origin of historicity. A science of the possibility of science? A science of science which would no longer have the form of logic but that of grammatics? A history of the possibility of history which would no longer be an archaeology, a philosophy of history or a history of philosophy? The positive and classical sciences are obliged to repress this sort of question (1976: 27-28).

Chomskyean linguistics is a science of reason. It is a science of the grammar of reason. It is both the *innate language of reason* as well as the *innate reason* of language. It is one as well as the other. While

grammar is its own reason of being, language is the necessary outcome of grammar. Consequently, grammar is a science of the condition of language. It implies that grammar gives language a being. As Chomsky put it in his interview to Rieber:

You and I can converse perfectly well about some topic we've never discussed before, which presumably means that this marvelously intricate system in your brain has developed in more or less the same way that it has developed in my way. So what we are now considering is the following assumption, or mixture of assumption and fact: (1) that the system of language that develops is very complex, far beyond physical organs; (2) what is plainly a fact, namely, that it's essentially uniform over a significant range among individuals. Now the conclusion that follows from those assumptions is that the basic properties of the whole system are genetically determined (1983: 55).

In Derrida's contention of language as position (grammatology as the *science of positions* as much as the positionality of science), Chomsky would see the role of an intelligent performer rather than a serious thinker in the classical sense of the term. If that is finally Derrida's statement - to understand philosophy from the point of view of a performer, then the disagreement with Chomsky is in fact a critique of the unified subject in possession of language.

The Derridean twist to the Chomskyean notion of a *performer* (who would be secondary to the *competent* person) could be better understood through the following idiom: Be Yourself. One cannot *be* oneself. Becoming is a process that mediates between Being and being oneself. It is becumming: one cums only after one *is*. In Cartesian terms, becoming is thinking. I **am** because I **think** (become). Yet, paradoxically, one can only (be)come after one is (being). The deconstructionist counterpoint to the discussion would be: be-cumming: *one cums therefore one is*. The text ("one") is in a state of perpetual cumming. Metaphysics is the idea of becoming oneself, i.e., becoming a being that preceded

the becoming in time, i.e., an original state of being. To deconstruction there is no such state that was or will be in future. It is merely a vacuous search for essence, an attempt to find the philosopher's (s)tone-- the tone or the voice of the stone, the mute philosopher. The idea of the golden state where one could be oneself is mocked. "One" cannot be "oneself" since there never was a *one* self. The text(s) is/are a plurality of selves operating in different time-spaces other than a single "straight" continuum stretching from the past to the present into an indefinite future.

The grammatist differs from the deconstructionist in that the one-self is a world not very dissimilar to language, which is another world. The grammaticality of Wittgenstein is a *sick* man's philosophy, less meant to cure rather than to heal, revealing the transformative power of language over the world. Hence, we "'*experience*' the *expression* of thought" (1982: 104). The *experience* anticipates in mystical ways what we go through in time. The experience is a pre-textual state, but not one without meaning. In fact, the full breadth of meaning can only be partially understood in expression. "Meaning is not a process which accompanies words, for no '*process*' could have the particular *consequences* of meaning" (1982: 105). Words don't make sense unless they mean something. There is a point before which words cannot mean anything - like a situation or a context for instance - which means that words enter an already existing state of meaning in the presence of the world. "The world is all that is the case" (1961: 5). One is born into the state of the world. One's world is *the* world. Both are meaning and space.

Grammaticality could be defined as a study of the world and the world is beyond question. Yet it is not beyond meaning because it *is* itself meaning. "What really comes before our mind when we *understand* a word? --Isn't it something like a

picture? Can't it *be* a picture?" (1953: 54). The picture of the world comes before words enter the world *as* words. Meaning *is* being and language is a welcome intruder that refers to being. Thus it makes sense to say, "What if I imagine senseless combinations of words?" (1953: 140). It is the possibility of a "senseless" meaning something that one who is unaware of the rules of the language-game explaining a particular situation find hard to comprehend.

"Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word "God." I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one . . . What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word" (1979: 32). Grammaticality is the name of the language-game which makes place for the "ridiculous" and the "blasphemous" as well. One can be an atheist, agnostic or believer; one still investigates words because one is a poet-philosopher. It is the music of philosophy that is both non-reason as well as reason. In the absence of a study of language that attempts to view the world(s) in terms of the language(s) used to describe it/them, one tends to fall into the trap of trying to say the most correct thing that is relevant to any context. One is trying to write a text that cannot be changed with time, a text that determines its own meaning, in short, a right TEXT or a politically correct one.

Uncovered and Interpreted:

Political Correctness:

Political Correctness is a dream of rightness with a purpose in mind[7]. Writing

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[7]   I began with a working definition of political correctness. The advantage of beginning in this manner is that one could use three different viewpoints in order to work on a given view. This gives definiteness to the argument which I assume would be absent if I tried abstractly to glue together Derrida, Chomsky and Wittgenstein with a "neutral" version of political correctness which means that there is a version of political correctness that transcends the many versions of the same.

takes itself seriously in order to become speech. One of the social directions that language has taken in recent times is: what is the right thing to say and how well can it be said without affecting the feelings of individuals and groups? What is the a-word, b-word, f-word, n- or m-word? The alphabet becomes a sign of concealment. What would be the function of a phrase such as "you z!" with a really awkward expression on the face? That would be an extraordinarily complicated situation. Is it a joke, harassment or nonsensical humor? The situation is political if and only when it enters the realm of public policy.

What is said in an indirect manner represents what cannot or should not be said. Is it politically correct to say m-word for metaphysics or is political correctness itself an exercise in abstract thinking and thus metaphysics? Contrarily, Derrida would visualize the gramme as the g-word of Western metaphysics? Philosophers never dared to refer to the gramme directly. It is politically incorrect to speak about the other except in terms of the functioning discourse. In the more private space of the home it is more convenient to talk about the various attributes or names given to the other. At a political level, the o-word (for the other) and the g-word (for the gramme) come into play. Taken to its logical extremes, an entire language (the l-word) can be imagined with simply alphabets. For instance, the s-word would be saint, shit and scene, sorry or soul.

What is the deconstructionist point after all - that we talk about politically incorrect terms or we avoid talking about them altogether? That is an opposition once again - the o-word! The point is precisely that political correctness, the p.c. word, is irrelevant outside the definition of public policy. Public policy has to be defined in terms of various factors that include definitions of power, the channelization of wealth, the place of women in a group etc. One of the chief aspects of pub-

lic policy[8] is that it is a reality that functions on the premise of political correctness.

There is another level at which political correctness can be countered, since an indiscriminate application of deconstruction to respond to the real issues of hunger, crime or oppression could turn into an academic exercise in the construction of stylized arguments. Deconstruction could caricature political correctness without itself trying to arrive at a version of political correctness. This seems to be Derrida's argument in *Scepters of Marx*:

If I take the floor at the opening of such an impressive, ambitious, necessary or risky, others might say historic colloquium; if, after hesitating for a long time and despite the obvious limits of my competence, I nevertheless accepted the invitation with which Bernd Magnus has honored me, it is not in the first place in order to propose a scholarly, philosophical discourse. It is first of all so as not to flee from a responsibility. More precisely, it is in order to submit for your discussion several hypotheses on the nature of such a responsibility. What is ours? In what way is it historical? And what does it have to do with so many specters? (1994: 51)

There is a floor constructed for the general purpose of the colloquium. This floor has gained historicity with Derrida's accepting the invitation to deliver his lecture on Marxism. The historicity involves an immense responsibility in terms of a political stand, which Derrida as a philosopher and a historical person (a person situated in a historical context) must assume at this point in time. To deny the material existence of the floor is to deny the very ground that one is standing upon. The floor makes it possible to ask further questions about the nature and definition of the responsibility involved.

There is a deconstruction, which relies on essence; a deconstruction that cannot be deconstructed further except at the risk of being solipsistic. The point is that deconstruction is a system of thought that operates within a larger "political" system of the academia. The grammatologist does not stand outside the system of language to talk about language. While deconstruction acknowledges that there is a system that is language, it also sees language as a feature of any system. There is a difference between viewing language as a system or alternately as discourse. While a system is defined by its limits, it also defines the limits of the kind of discussion that can be permitted within its precincts. For instance, a believer can talk about atheism only from the point of view of belief. S/he cannot stand outside the system of belief simply because s/he is situated within the language of belief. In a classroom discussion or in any public debate, the believer might exhibit a nonchalant attitude toward religion in general or particular belief. S/he may deem abortion to be a matter of choice although his or her belief explicitly goes against it. The individual as a believer functions within certain standards of political correctness (political because it involves rewards and punishments) that the system of belief expects of the person. The standards are not beyond question. Any question can be framed only in the awareness of the given parameters.

Why should the deconstructionist be any different from an ordinary believer since his or her belief too involves standards of political correctness in the way s/he goes about reading a text? It is precisely in this context that deconstruction as discourse gains significance. Discourse is an alternative to language as a system. It rests on the borderline of the system (which is a linguistic construct) while simultaneously operating *without* the given system (as de-

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8 An alternate public policy would be one that is willing to accommodate various points of view. The premise of such a public policy would be socio-economic in character i.e., one that aims at overcoming divisions based on race, gender, nation, religion, ethnicity etc and concentrates more on the over-all development of the community.

construction). While a system functions as a compact box with a given input leading to resultant output, a discourse is open-ended and inclusive. For instance, if a thousand graduate students enrolled at the University of Mississippi, it is easy to logically decide how many teaching positions can be created, how many jobs are to be provided etc. There is a quantifiable aspect to a definition of a system. In the case of discourse it is the kind of discussion that takes place in the classroom that is of interest. It is the channelization of ideas, the basis of a grade system that attempts to define what intelligence is all about, the university as a system with students as the input leading to the output of qualified labor in the market etc. – those are the aspects that gain prominence. Another instance is that of the family which as a system is a self-contained entity. As a discourse it overlaps with other systems of the state, school, market etc. Discourse does not possess any special attributes that isolate it from a system. The discourse uses a system to talk about it in a discursive manner without pretending to be away from it.

While deconstruction can be read as a subsystem of a system (Derrida, "originator" of the term grammatology), it is only as discourse that it is able to make a critique of the system. There is a tension that operates between deconstruction as a system and deconstruction as discourse; and it is this tension that offers a necessary basis of dialogue leading to change. In this context, Derrida's use of the word "strategy" to describe deconstruction makes sense. It is a systematic plan meant to disrupt the system and visualize it in terms of discourse. For instance, within a system, political correctness is a necessity. There is a kind of language defined as sexual harassment apart from what constitutes fun. In a discourse, political correctness, i.e., the way sexual harassment is defined, is itself a kind of language that has come to establish itself and therefore can be deconstructed in those very terms. Many things can be done with an f-word. It could be a foreign-word, a forbidden-word, or a forsaken-word. It could also be what a "dirty-minded" reader would think of instantly. In the very attempt to conceal, political correctness falls into the hands of discourse.

Derrida is the most as well as the least Chomskyean at this point. While Derrida would take a stand though not in one-to-one terms but rather by problematizing the stand itself, Chomsky would see political correctness less in terms of discourse and more in terms of choice regarding the truth. As he says in his "Writers and Intellectual Responsibility," "The responsibility of the writer as a *moral agent* is to try to bring the truth about *matters of human significance* to *an audience that can do something about them*. That is part of what it means to be a moral agent rather than a monster" (1996: 56). The intellectual must not only know where s/he stands from a moral point of view and the "human significance" involved in the stand. In *Monsieur Verdoux* Chaplin (in a rather Chomskyean manner) makes a statement that questions the political correctness of the state. Living during the depression era, Monsieur Verdoux has made a "business" of murder since murder, according to him, seems to be the essence of business. As he puts it: "That's the history of many a big business . . . wars, conflict. It's all business. One murder makes a villain, millions a hero. Numbers sanctify."

He's guilty of murder. Monsieur Verdoux takes a stand (literally takes the stand in a court of law) in order to be a *witness* to his own life as a victim of political correctness. If under more favorable social and economic circumstances Monsieur Verdoux would disclose the power of human goodness, it is the tragic failure of those circumstances that are responsible for his becoming a murderer. As Chomsky puts it in "Goals and Visions:"

The ideas expressed in the not very distant past by such outstanding figures as Russell and Dewey are rooted in the Enlightenment and classical liberalism, and retain their revolutionary character: in education, the workplace, and every other sphere of life. If implemented, they would help clear the way to the free development of human beings whose values are not accumulation and domination, but independence of mind and action, free association on terms of equality, and cooperation to achieve common goals. Such people would share Adam Smith's contempt for the 'mean' and 'sordid pursuits' of 'the masters of mankind' and their 'vile maxim': 'All for ourselves, and nothing for other people', the guiding principles we are taught to admire and revere, as traditional values are eroded under unremitting attack (1996: 77).

This is also Monsieur Verdoux's point that a society free of the evils of big business will lead to a more humane world because it is founded on the natural goodness of men and women.

Chomsky's idealism can be seen as metaphysical in intent unless coupled with his *politics of grammar*. This phrase implies a certain connection between the language faculty and a world of reason and acceptance. Observe the following examples that Chomsky gives in his essay "Language and Thought:"

When we turn to more complex expressions, the gap between what the speaker/hearer knows and the evidence available becomes a chasm, and the richness of innate endowment is still more evident. Take simple sentences, say, the following:

1 John is eating an apple.

2 John is eating.

In 2, the grammatical object of 'eat' is missing, and we understand the sentence on the analogy of 1, to mean (more or less) that John is eating something-or-other. The mind fills the gap, postulating an unspecified object of the verb.

Actually, that is not quite true. Consider the following brief discourse:

3 John is eating his shoe. He must have lost his mind.

But the sentence 2 does not include the case of eating one's shoe. If I say that John is eating, I mean that he is eating in a normal way; having dinner, perhaps, but not eating his shoe. What the mind fills in is not an unspecified grammatical object, but something normal; that's part of the meaning of the constructions (though what counts as normal is not) (1996: 25).

There are innumerable things, since learning by definition is an unending process) that are not learned and the mind fills the gap. Let us imagine another sentence. "Generosity is a very important quality." The "normal" reason (although as Chomsky says the definition of "normal" may vary) would of course be that the world is more inhabitable with generous people in it. Even if the second half of the sentence is unsaid, the majority of human beings would agree on this point. Just as it is plain to the mind that John is eating normally does not mean he is eating a shoe, it is plain that when one states the importance of generosity it normally implies a value-based argument with a nobler end in view. This is because there is an innate sense of generosity in the human mind (before any learning and beyond the power of learning to alter it) that the faculty to make language is aware of. It fills the gap regarding the 'why' of generosity. The experience of being a criminal in Siberia without doubt dramatically increased Dostoevsky's empathy for criminals. The experience brought to the fore the unlearned state of goodness innate to Dostoevsky. An aristocrat himself, Tolstoy neither experienced poverty nor went to prison. His writings disclose a tremendous compassion for the poor and the downtrodden. If millions of readers are able to identify themselves with Tolstoy's feelings it is because their mind is able to fill the gap regarding the unsaid aspects of the text.

Chomsky's vision of a libertarian society free of external authority is a political manifestation of the innate generosity. The theory of innate goodness (as innate language), though it works extraordinarily

well with Albert Schweitzer, Mother Teresa and Gandhi, fails similarly to explain the Big Brother phenomenon of history's villains – the Hitlers and the Stalins of the world. If human nature is originally generous, how does it explain the origin of tyranny? What explains the formation of the state as a self-perpetuating system of political correctness? Chomsky might argue that it is the failure of social conditions to bring about the innate goodness rather than willingness on the part of the human child to become a Hitler, Jew-hater and a fascist. What is the origin of those social conditions that deprive the language faculty of its capacity to innate goodness? Chomsky's response would be that the innate hypothesis is still a hypothesis, and one with the greatest degree of plausibility in terms of the present research. In fact, thinkers in the past from Plato to Dewey to Russell envisaged a notion of the innate that was politically functional to a philosophy of libertarianism.

One significant question is whether it is the innate language faculty that leads to a political response (in terms of a libertarian outlook) or whether the libertarian consciously frames a theory of the innate to explain his position within a discourse? While it is unimportant to know which arrived first, the fact or the explanation, Chomsky's reasoning is clear. Language is intuition. The basis of this intuition is a set of rules that make the grammar. Experience is a cultural fact that occurs owing to the natural fact of a language mechanism within the brain.

What would a version of political correctness according to the grammatist be like? Take the following instance from *Culture and Value*:

Ramsey was a bourgeois thinker. i.e., he thought with the aim of clearing up the affairs of some particular community. He did not reflect on the essence of the state--or at least he did not like doing so--but on how *this* state might reasonably be organized. The idea that this state might not be the only possible one in part disquieted him and in part bored him. He wanted to get down as quickly as possible to reflecting on the foundations--of *this* state. This was what he was good at and what really interested him; whereas real philosophical reflection disturbed him until he put his result (if it had one) to one side and declared it trivial (1980b: 17).

In the above paragraph, Wittgenstein is offering a definition of a bourgeois thinker. Ramsey's search for "foundations" is a way of fitting reality with theory. If real philosophical reflection is unaffected by the question of foundations, what then is the foundation of real philosophical reflection? Is philosophical reflection purely an antidote to the desire to found, in Ramsey's case, a state? Can political correctness be defined as a desire to found - to order and establish - in other words, to close the doors to reflection? It evades the questions of what, why, how and where? Richard Feynman, the Nobel Laureate in Physics describes in a serio-comic vein a couple of incidents where he was accused of sexism[9].

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9   "A few years after I gave some lectures for the freshmen at Caltech (which were published as the *Feynman Lectures on Physics*), I received a long letter from a feminist group. I was accused of being anti-woman because of two stories: the first was a discussion of the subtleties of velocity, and involved a woman driver being stopped by a cop. There's a discussion about how fast she was going, and I had her raise valid objections to the cop's definitions of velocity. The letter said I was making the woman look stupid.

The other story they objected to was told by the great astronomer Arthur Eddington, who had just figured out that the stars get their power from burning hydrogen in a nuclear reaction producing helium. He recounted how, on the night after his discovery, he was sitting on a bench with his girl-friend. She said, "Look how pretty the stars shine!" To which he replied, "Yes, and right now, I'm the only man in the world who knows *how* they shine." He was describing a kind of wonderful loneliness you have when you make a discovery.

The letter claimed that I was saying a woman is incapable of understanding nuclear reactions." (1988: 72)

Both Ramsey and the protesters in Feynman's incident are attempting to prove a point. One definition of political correctness would be: *proving a point*. Real philosophical reflection is less about proving a point and more about opening proof to points of view. Words are synthesized to form arguments instead of viewing arguments as another set of words. The desire to bring words and reality into a forced communion is the basis of political correctness. Real philosophical reflection goes against this subscription to a certain organization of the state that Ramsey imagined. Political correctness is a philosophical disease rather than not being a philosophical question at all. It is narrowing alternatives to one single example. "What is there in favor of saying that my words describe an existing connection? Well, they relate to various things which didn't make their appearance with the words. They say, for example, that I should have given a particular answer then, if I had been asked. And even if this is only conditional, still it does say something about the past" (1953: 171). A statement is in effect multiple statements since one can never ascertain the infinite nuances of a sentence. The existing connection is something that can be made up in retrospect to relate the sentence to various other things, which possibly never existed at the inception of the sentence. "What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of the language-game" (1969b: 12).

Mindfulness of language is not so much a matter of political correctness as it is of philosophical reflection. It is the way one describes the language-game or the rules of the game to suit one's interests. The logic behind a statement is not just the purpose but also the construction of a statement, which often goes beyond any manifest purpose. "We can't talk of reasons for thinking. We can't say "We must think because . . . " We can describe the game of thinking, but not the reasons why we think. "Reason" only applies within a system of rules" (1980c: 45). Even "political correctness" can be discussed within "a system of rules." To indiscriminately apply political correctness to the process of thinking is to view it as something existing outside the realm of logic or even outside the language-game itself. Such a view is unphilosophical because it transcends the limits of the game and assumes a dogmatic function.

In bringing "philosophical reflection" into play Wittgenstein inverts political correctness in order for it to stand on its feet. It is only one among so many other rules of the game that can be modified rather than a rule of transcendental importance. If the language of "philosophical reflection" is a possibility within language, then the aim of political correctness is the arresting of genuine reflection using vague arguments of what is right and wrong.

He argued, with such homely examples, that the degree of precision required in particular cases is relative to the context and that one does not necessarily improve one's communication by heightening the degree of precision, or the extent of analysis, of a proposition. In the course of attacking, by means of examples taken from ordinary discourse, the *a priori* requirement that each proposition have a definite sense, he comes to stress the importance in philosophy of detailed examination of ordinary language. It turns out that in language, as used, many propositions are vague, inexact, indefinite, but nonetheless quite adequately serve our purposes without demanding further analysis (1986: 134).

Wittgenstein seems to be talking about the silliness of arresting the movement of language in order to subscribe to idealistic theories of "exactness" or "precision." Broadly speaking, political correctness is a myth of exactness where language is denied of the multifaceted experience of reality. It denies the fact that it could become more and more punnish, quibbly and paradoxical. "Exactness" probably would fit in with an "exact" state that

Ramsey contemplated where each part fits with the whole. What Wittgenstein calls "ordinary language" has no place for wholeness. Without any doubt it has rules that make sense. The rules are rules of the game rather than having anything to do with an *a priori* wholeness as such.

This brings to the fore political diversity as a discourse meant to accommodate cultural diversity in a representative manner. Can cultural diversity exist in a structured manner, in the "ideal" state that Ramsey imagined? To Wittgenstein, one definition of language would simply be culture. Diversity is the essence of language as culture. The opening line of his book *Culture and Value* is: "We tend to take the speech of a Chinese for inarticulate gurgling. Someone who understands Chinese will recognize *language* in what he hears. Similarly I often cannot discern the *humanity* in a man" (1980b: 1). Is Wittgenstein equalizing language with humanity or is "humanity" a very regional expression generated in the discourse of western humanism to speak of a certain kind of wholeness involving "all" men and women? In her poem "Images for Godard," Adrienne Rich, in the metaphor of the city, subtly captures what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his philosophy. "Language as city:: Wittgenstein/ Driving to the limits/ Of the city of words" (1971: 47). What Wittgenstein is trying to do is drive the common notions of "language" and "humanity" to the "limits" of the "city of words."

In the process of moving in and out of the "skirts" of the city[10], language must change continuously and a philosophy of language must cope with this change rather than work against it. To be right is to believe in change, both the change within language as well as language as a means to change the world. From a Wittgensteinean point of view there is an innocent language

before the primordial fall. But it can never be cognized in a state of innocence (which is essentially static). Innocence is not a property of language although it can be used as a discourse to suggest a certain view of human nature with the objective of change in view. This brings us to the difference between a skeptic and an unquestioning believer[11]. To Wittgenstein, they're complementary states rather than contradictory. In fact he seems to be making fun of the whole debate when he says:

Does it make sense to ask "How do you know that you believe?"--and is the answer: "I know it by introspection"?

In *some* cases it will be possible to say some such thing, in most not.

It makes sense to ask: "Do I really love her, or am I only pretending to myself?" and the process of introspection is the calling up of memories; of imagined possible situations, and of the feelings that one would have if . . . (1953: 154).

Owing to the subjective nature of all belief including a *belief* in skepticism, one cannot be judged in the light of the other. That would be a misuse of language. Wittgenstein's one-word definition of political correctness would be misuse, when language is used with the idea of being right rather than useful. "Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. --The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities" (1953: 6). Use is not a way of placing language within a reductionist philosophical perspective that language *is* only when useful. Use is a way to counter much of the linguistic garbage accumulated in the basket of philosophy. This does not mean re-

10 The idea of the city as a woman and Wittgenstein taking language to its "illogical" feminine extremes.

11 As Russell points out at the beginning of his essay "On the value of Scepticism," "I wish to propose a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true" (1958: 38).

storing language to an original state of pure utility or use as the single existing alternative that philosophy must eventually base itself upon. The use of language is one of the many possible ways in which language can look at itself. It becomes politically correct and misused or useless when it sees a single face in the mirror on the wall of truth.

This does not take away the original contention that there is an innocence that permeates multiplicity, which involves an act of translation[12]. In his book *A Story of My Experiments with Truth*, Gandhi mentions an incident that took place in South Africa[13] when he was thrown out of a train that, in an important way modified the remaining course of his life. Viewing the situation in a historical context, it wasn't an unusual occurrence to be kicked out of a train in a colonial situation. Gandhi was able to translate the experience into universal terms, both in a linear and horizontal manner. In linear terms he saw it as the condition of the oppressed where historically the strong have always attempted to dominate the weak. In horizontal terms, he saw it as something currently happening and in which he as an individual and a repository of human goodness had a duty

to change the situation. It is a Wittgensteinean situation when a particular experience can be used to see the larger picture. It is innocent in the way it views the essential oneness of language (or humanity) that can only be known through multiplicity (cultural diversity). In a revealing paragraph from his *Last Writings* Wittgenstein says:

The evolution of higher animals and of man and the awakening of the spirit, of consciousness, at a particular level. The picture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.

What this language primarily describes is a picture. What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure. Quite clearly, however, this must be explored if we want to understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us this work; it already points to a (very) particular use. This is how it takes us in[14] (1982: 53).

The question remains: how do we deal with abuse (hate-talk) except in politically correct ways? In the Gandhian-Wittgensteinean terms, abuse would be the existing condition of language that can be changed in the way one translates one's immediate experiences into more universal terms. That's what Wittgenstein means when he says: "Why in the world *do* we play this game!--But what are we after here? The game's surroundings, not its causes" (1982: 36). The way we accept the game (that there is nothing outside the game) is the way language accepts and for-

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12 Translation, in this context, is meant to indicate a radical transformation in the way one lives one's life owing to the fact of a certain kind of experience that acts as a motivating force leading to the transformation.

13 Gandhi ponders on the gravity of the incident in order to make a choice that would determine what he must do: "I began to think of my duty. Should I fight for my rights or go back to India, or should I go on to Pretoria without minding the insults, and return to India after finishing the case? It would be cowardice to run back to India without fulfilling my obligation. The hardship to which I was subjected was superficial--only a symptom of the deep disease of color prejudice. I should try, if possible, to root out the disease and suffer hardships in the process. Redress for wrongs I should seek only to the extent that would be necessary for the removal of the color prejudice." Gandhi, Mahatma (1927: 82).

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14 Wittgenstein underplays the idea of essence in his description when he talks about the use of the picture. There is a vision of light as something of a constant that the human being eventually moves out of his darkness and language is a picture of the universal vision. The particular language points to the universal picture. Not surprisingly, Wittgenstein says in the immediately preceding (which could also have been the following) paragraph: "Do I *know* this only from my own experience, and do I merely surmise it in others?" (1982: 53).

gives its own situatedness. A politically correct language is not the viable alternative to abusiveness. It is based on a sense of fundamentality that ignores multiplicity and change.

The problems of the sane:

A new multiplicity means having another game. (1979: 12)

How can change be rendered possible in a "non-politically in-correct" fashion? Any theory of change is also a theory of making connections where they are the least obvious. There is a spell of "truth" that binds words. The Freudean point is that the project of *unbinding* the spell is a psychoanalytical one. It is a scientific process, where words must be divided and an explanation is constructed in order to make a whole. A theory of change is aware that "reconstruction" in the way psychoanalysis practices it is a form of constructionism. The basis of change is the gram, simply a word, and a weight that binds the grammatologist, grammarian and grammaticalist. The gram is an economic term. It denotes estimate. Broadly there are two kinds of estimate: difference and division. The latter implies a closure of the gram to illness, unreason and situatedness. Difference, on the other hand could be seen as a way of living. A way of living could further be defined as an understanding of things in a context, i.e., writing a text of difference or a different text altogether from a politically correct one.

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Prakash Kona

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DERIDA, ČOMSKI I VITGENŠTAJN: GRAMATOLOG / GRAMATIČAR / GRAMATA

Rezime

Ono što predstavlja tačku porijekla ovog eseja, koji počinje igrom riječi *gram,* upravo je tvrdnja da ne postoji fiksna tačka nego tačka, odnosno tačke porijekla. To može da bude derideanska *gramme* ili čomskijanska *grammar.* Isto takođe može da se odnosi na 'language-game' (igru u jeziku), što bi značilo i uvođenje Vitgenštajna u konverzaciju. U radu sam iskoristio jednu od izjava Alfreda Hičkoka na temu psihoanalize, preuzetu iz njegovog klasika „Spellbound" iz 1945. godine, kao tačku „porijekla" u diskusiji o gramatici. Ta izjava usredsređuje se na „porijekla" problema ljudske psihe koje psihoanaliza nastoji da izliječi. Oslanjajući se na Hičkoka, više kao na umjetnika u jeziku nego jezičkog teoretičara, nastojim da problematizujem samu ideju porijekla, bez obzira na to da li ista potiče od jednog ozbiljnog filozofa poput Frojda - koga možemo nazvati „ispravnim" izvorom, ili dolazi iz sekundarnog izvora koji predstavlja Hičkok dok se poigrava sa frojdovskom idejom psihoanalize kroz vlastiti narativ. Ispostavlja se da je porijeklo diskusije pogrešan početak. Ono služi cilju da se psihoanaliza prikaže kao konstrukcija poput bilo kog diskursa koji dominira zapadnom filozofijom od Platona do današnjih dana. S druge strane, porijeklo

mora da postoji u bukvalnom smislu te riječi. Frojd je zaista ponudio psihoanalizu kao formu terapije kojom se tekst otvara prema značenju - a tekst je, u ovom slučaju, upravo ljudska psiha. U tom procesu, sama psihoanaliza predstavlja višeslojni tekst koji postaje pozornica na koju stupa *gram*. Ideja je da se filozofija prikaže kao narativ; odnosno narativna dimenzija filozofije i sama filozofija kao forma naracije. Iz derideanskog ugla, tačka porijekla je ništica, što otvara tekst prema raznovrsnim iščitavanjima. To u isto vrijeme predstavlja anarhiju teksta kao i tišinu u srcu jezika.

prakash@efluniversity.ac.in