

УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У БАЊОЈ ЛУЦИ
ФИЛОЛОШКИ ФАКУЛТЕТ

ФИЛОЛОГ

ЧАСОПИС ЗА ЈЕЗИК, КЊИЖЕВНОСТ И КУЛТУРУ



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THE ONTOGENESIS OF LANGUAGE

Abstract: *Those of Deleuze and Guattari's texts that pertain to their ideas on language are characterised by sometimes gradual, sometimes dramatic, modifications of concepts,¹ by accessions to new dimensions of thought as they turn to face (or to create) new problematics,² by aporias resulting from the abandonment of concepts,³ and by generally fluid and sometimes amorphous ideas. All of which makes their refusal to devote a single text exclusively to the question of language rather appropriate. This clearly fits with Deleuze and Guattari's view, counter to the in-vogue linguistics and semiologies of the time, that language is not an epiphenomenon. However, the question of language, of what it is and how it functions, is never far from the surface of Deleuze and Guattari's writing and, I will argue, an exact and yet rigorous consistency of thought – or at least a number of relatively stable points amidst a sea of shifting perspectives and structures – can be found. These points, or axis are at far remove from all other schools of language and linguistics, making a comparative analysis problematic, as they rely on perhaps some of Deleuze's most illusive, yet most powerful, concepts. This paper works through how 'Sense', 'the Event', 'Aion' and 'Chronos' provide open yet reliable conceptual parameters for a theory capable of capturing language's profoundly open and heterogenic nature.*

For Deleuze 'language never has universality in itself, self-sufficient formalisation, a general semiology or a metalanguage' and due to its essentially amorphous nature, is the primary manifestation of becoming and the poetics of life. Here we have an iteration of the underlying logic to Deleuzian thought, repeated in all his works from painting to cinema, social assemblages to biological milieu and exemplified by this theory of language. The creation of a conceptual system that has an armature, is productive and coherent, its features (the Event, Aion and Chronos) can be subjected to critique and analysis, yet is consubstantial with life's polymorphous nature and creative potential. The essential point being that the pulsations and movements of Chronos and Aion, Event and Series, are themselves not transcendental structures or manifolds, but folded, aliquid interactions that form the melodic counterpoints of life and therein lies the ontogenesis of language.

Key words: *ontogenesis, Deleuze, sense, event, aion, chromos, metalanguage, language.*

The convolution of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of language is attested to by Dorothea Olkowski when she notes that the 'extremely complex relation between bodies and language, is a relation whose complexity is certain to be understated' (Olkowski 1998: 214). Deleuze – Guattari's ideas are made labyrinthine perhaps by the fact that much of their already intensive conceptual armoury

is assumed in their key writings on language – namely, the two chapters in *A Thousand Plateaus*, "November 20, 1923: Postulates of Linguistics" and "587 B.C.-A.D. 70: On several Regimes of Signs", and the 1969 book *The Logic of Sense*, which James Williams has described as 'resistant to a closed logical consistency which it replaces by a series of problematic paradoxes connected by partial and differently prob-

lematic responses' (Williams 2008: 7). Add to this their other writings on Literature – *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Deleuze and Guattari 1986) and *Proust and Signs* (Deleuze 2000), as well what Lecerle calls 'a theory of poetic language and style' in Deleuze's last work on literature, *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Deleuze 1998) – and we find that whatever theoretical coherence is to be found its nature remains open, fluid and multiple. The complexity is compounded by the fact Deleuze and Guattari only intermittently make clear whether they are responding to specific claims of, say, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Noam Chomsky or to vague undifferentiated fields they group together under the banners of 'linguistics' or 'structuralism'.¹ Although this indiscipline at least has the merit of avoiding a series of easy comparisons and points of analysis in the creation of an intensity of multiple relations. A more profound difficulty arises out of the fact that in these works Deleuze and Guattari invent many novel, not to say idiosyncratic, concepts and refocuses thought onto underlying forces that elude the conventions of linguistics and semiology. Such thought, Lechte points out, operates largely according to its own norms and concepts, making correlation with other forms of thought if not unyielding then at least laborious (Lechte 1994: 102).

The very real difficulties in delineating an overarching Deleuze and Guattari-an philosophy of language are the same as those pertaining to their general Aesthetics² or Philosophy of Science, particularly given their habit of creating, across their entire corpus, different systems or layers of thought that are ever changing, contingent and seemingly incommensurable. Indeed, even while agreeing with Claire Colebrook that 'thinking is difference, disruption and encounter' (Colebrook 2005: 227) we are reminded by John Marks (1998) of Foucault's suggestion that *The Logic of Sense* might be subtitled *What is Thinking?* This

complexity amounts to a methodology that befits a philosophy distinguished by the processes of activating thought rather than the creation of fixed systems, logics or rules. Formally speaking, Deleuze's methodology tends to have three dimensions: 1) critical analysis and pursuit of contradictions in the thought of others; 2) the promotion of 'minor' modes of thought and 3) the creation of concepts. While the complexity has been recognised, what tends to be understated are the beauty of Deleuze's distributions and the poetry of his transformations and affirmations – the fold, in which the Other provides the lining of thought, providing only the most obvious example. But whether the text is considered poetic or philosophical indeterminate, the reader is expected to wrestle with each new conceptual assemblage as it creates collisions and often unexpected disjunctive intensities. Until, that is, what appears to be contradictory (the oppositions between for example the 'distinct and obscure' [Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 84] or 'surface and depth' [Deleuze 1990]) create not a paradoxical or analytical failure but the potential for thinking more fully – for thought that can reconceive hitherto unresolved problematics in a way that creates encounters with change, difference and transformation. These *plications* are well captured by Tom Conley in the following passage:

Thinking takes place in the interstices of visibility and discourse. When we think we cause lighting bolts to flash and 'flicker within words and make us hear cries in visible things.'³ Thinking makes seeing and speaking reach their own limits. In what concerns power, thinking is equivalent to 'emitting singularities', to a gambler's act of tossing a pair of dice on to a table, or a person engaging relations of force or even conflict in order to prepare new mutations and singularities. In terms of subjectivation, thinking means 'folding, doubling the outside with its so-extensive inside.'⁴ A topology is created by which inner and outer spaces are in contact with each other. (Conley 2005: 174)

It should come as no surprise to the reader already familiar with Deleuze and Guattari thought that they posit multiple semiotics, and that this accords entirely with their view both that 'society is plied by several semiotics, that its regimes are in fact mixed' (Deleuze 1987: 84) and that 'the world or cosmos is an immanent plane of signification or "semi-osis"; there are signs and codes throughout life, not just in the separate mind of man or language' (Colebrook 2002: 107). *Language*, as something specific and exclusive to humans, has to find its place, if indeed such a place can be found, amongst a pre-existing array of forms of signification and expression that take place between the dynamically entwined organic and non-organic forms that make up life. If the origin of language is to be found in the pre-linguistic this has implications for the boundaries between human and animal, child and adult, schizoid and *normal*, etc. as captured by Gabriele Schwab; 'the boundaries of the human have become more tenuous, and the ethics of self and other less exclusive, hegemonic and anthropocentric' (Schwab 2007: 16).

Given Deleuze's commitment to empiricism, – if by empiricism we mean starting an enquiry not from some general code or system but from the emergence of an idea from particular bodies and connections – our search for language must begin amongst the singular, partial or 'molecular' multiplicities of signification, even though this presents almost insurmountable hurdles to creating structures or general rules. Each piece of Deleuze's writing on language or literature creates novel concepts and multiplicities immanent to the material and work at hand. For example, *Proust and Signs* (Deleuze 2000) undoes the now clichéd reading of Proust in terms of memory, in place of which he substitutes an analysis of, or 'apprenticeship to', (Deleuze 2000: 4) types of signs (worldly, love, sensuous and art) and how they form intersecting circles: '*A La Recherche*

Du Temps Perdu is less an exploration of memories than signs, signs forming circles which intersect at various points' (Deleuze 2000: 5). *A Thousand Plateaus* is concerned with the structure and limits of language and how language functions in collective assemblages and 'regimes of signs'. In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze's task is to unravel the ontological structure of series and event which, according to Lecerle, *because* it is devoted to a theory of sense and the 'event', 'is indeed Deleuze's book on Language' (Lecerle 2002: 130). These are resolutely singular texts, each involves a particular 'image of thought' bound to the subject matter. Deleuze also intimates that a clearer example of his empiricism is unlikely to be found:

The Logic of Sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Ideas, and how to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience. (Deleuze 1990: 23)

Despite their reputation Deleuze and Guattari are not philosophers of unbridled chaos or of the breakdown of all systems of thought. Hence *The Logic of Sense*. The present paper then, will, almost despite Deleuze's avoidance of general solutions and fixed rules, have the character of determining a certain theoretical consistency. The first feature of this consistency is Deleuze's (and in their collaborative works, also Guattari's) insistence that language is 'an essentially heterogeneous reality (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7) in perpetual disequilibrium. It is enticing and seems intuitively correct to say that there is no such thing as *language* as a system of signifying phonemes or a deep syntactical structure that transcends social and historical milieux or the uses to which it is to be put. Deleuze could not be clearer; 'there is no universal propositional logic, nor is there grammaticality in itself, any more than

there is significance for itself' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 148). Writing against Saussurean structuralism and Chomskian linguistics (both insufficiently abstract) Deleuze and Guattari claim that 'language never has universality in itself, self-sufficient formalisation, a general semiology, or a metalanguage' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 124). Against Lacan we find that signs are never interdictions, 'they are always porous, transformative, they are always whatever use to which they are put ... a sign was always an intensity' (O'Sullivan 2008: 97). There is no limit to the acoustic range of language and there is no situation in which language does not function in the infinite variety of its forms.

In *A Thousand Plateaus* language is presented as intrinsically illocutionary. Deleuze and Guattari follow, to a certain extent, Austin's logic that not only are there two relations between speech and action (indicative and imperative) but also a third relation between speech and certain actions that are accomplished by saying. This *intrinsic* relation accounts for actions that are preformed in *saying* "I swear" and actions that are accomplished in speaking. The illocutionary, which is the act performed in saying something, such as warning, ordering or undertaking, is internal to speech, or constitutes immanent relations between statements and acts. This is interesting because, according to Deleuze and Guattari's, speech is not informational or communicative but constructive, as it effectuates a certain type of relationship between speaker and listener, addressor and addressee, statement and act; that is to say, in contrast to Austin, the illocutionary precedes the performative: 'the performative itself is explained by the illocutionary, not the opposite' and 'it is the illocutionary that constitutes the non-discursive or implicit presuppositions' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 78).

This paper will work through what seems to be a contradiction. On the one

hand, language is essentially illocutionary and this, as Deleuze claims, is aligned with the fact that the primary form of expression is the *Order Word* insofar as language has an ordering aspect rather than a representational, metaphoric or informational function. On the other hand, language is amorphous in form, unlimited in its potential to express and signify, and inexhaustible in the uses – from glory to malignity, enlightenment to destitution – to which it may be put. This is the surface upon which language articulates all the 'codes, conventions, narratives and representations of human wants and needs whose continuations and combinations are open and inexhaustible' (Bogue 2003: 180). However, this inconsistency is entirely consistent with a theory that speaks of language as both the primary manifestation of *becoming* and of philosophy's own poetic potential, as well as the expression of political and social assemblages which structure the collective regimes of signification that govern language in all its forms.

In sum, as will be shown below, what underpins all of the above is Deleuze and Guattari attempt to construct a pragmatics of language, a pragmatics internal or immanent to language. A pragmatics in which writing is always a becoming (Deleuze 2000) and language is never understood in terms of a system of codes but rather in terms of its capacity to effectuate intensities or transformations: 'Linguistics is nothing without a pragmatics (semiotic or political) to define the effectuation of the *condition of possibility* of language and the usage of linguistic elements' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 85).

Sense

Before we can unpack these caveats to the delineation of a theory of language, we need to examine the concept of Sense. Sense is the general field and language is an overcoding of images and intensities, as such, it has a more limited structure. Sense

does not mean *to make sense of* nor – as is self-evident from the contrast between the two titles *The Logic of Sense* and *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (Deleuze 1990) – does it mean sensation. Sense is neither the thing nor object, nor the phenomenological perception of the subject; it is something that exists between the two and is always indeterminate and indiscernible. In fact, sense is a ‘non-existent entity’ (Deleuze 1990: 254); ‘sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs’ (Deleuze 1990: 22); however, this describes sense in relation to language and, whilst language is the most generous habitat for sense, sense exceeds language. As Stivale reminds us, ‘although the event of sense (or the “sense-event”) is bound up with language, one must not conclude from this that its nature is purely linguistic’ (Stivale 1998: 34).

Sense is a pre-eminent term for Deleuze (at least before the term was superseded by a wider deployment of the concept of the Event) because sense (although ‘non-existent’) is everywhere in the world irrespective of human values or presentment. Deleuze conveys the full weight of this decisive idea in his review of Hyppolite’s highly influential book *Logique et existence* (Hyppolite 1997)?

Being, according to Hyppolite, is not *essence*, but *sense*. To say that the world is sufficient unto itself, and that it refers to being not as the essence beyond the appearance, not as a second world, which would be the intelligible world, but as the sense of this world. (Deleuze 1997: 1)⁵

To a significant degree, the idea of sense forms the theoretical underpinning to Deleuze’s antagonisms with various formalisms, materialisms and representational systems as well as his trenchant critique of dialectics, and it is also the measure of what is theoretically at stake in the phrase ‘the world or being is essentially sense’ (Williams 2008: 23). We should be

mindful that, as befits a book concerned with nonsense and paradoxes, there is no one definition of sense, and it would be quite wrong to reduce *The Logic of Sense* to one overarching thesis or law. As we have already noted, its multiple contradictions are integral to the book, however, since we must start somewhere, where better than Deleuze’s most elucidating analogy for sense.

When a knife cuts bread the bread is cut, certainly. The knife exists, the bread exists, and the two bodies are brought into a mixture, *corps-à-corps*. But the *cutting* itself is incorporeal, it is neither the knife nor the bread nor the cut. Cutting exists but it is not to be found anywhere. When the harbour contracts after the failure of rain, or the global financial markets contract in the downturn, or the polar ice caps contract due to climate change, these are all incorporeals, all phenomena of sense. What the deliberate use of the same terms in three different circumstances indicates is that sense can only be expressed as a pure act rather than attributed to *someone* or *something*. This is a slippery and difficult concept. We are discussing something that, it is claimed, does not exist, an ‘extra-being’ (Deleuze 1990: 21), and this raises complex epistemological questions about how *matters-of-fact* or *truth* can be verified without recourse to a *thing* or *object*. That this concern preoccupied Deleuze across at least his seminal texts is shown most plainly – in regard to the virtual – in his other originative single-authored text, *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze 1994).

Our question then is: what is this thing that does not exist, which disrupts our understanding of the relationship between knowing and the known (is unnameable to rational analysis), which is everywhere in the world, and provides the foundation for much of the purported revolutionary potential of Deleuze’s thought, and yet is, in and of itself, incorporeal?

If we return to our example of *contraction* in the financial markets, we find that even when all the dimensions that make up the action are taken into account – collapse in share price, people laid off, GDP reduced – contraction itself does not exist anywhere. As all three examples above show, the verb contraction is used in different ways on different occasions, because on any given occasion different dynamics produce different modalities and levels of actualisation. Contraction is an incorporeal sense-event, of which the reader might reasonably ask: sense in relation to whom? And yet its most important feature is precisely: sense in relation to no one! Sense is not played out in consciousness or perception or the mind but in the objective reality. Indeed, even though it is the ‘marker of increases and decreases in intensity’ (Williams 2008: 9), sense is neutral, if by neutral we mean indifferent to inside and outside, particular and general, the individual and collective, and neutral in relation to its temporal actualisation (Deleuze 1990: 100). In short, this incorporeal transformation, or sense, is not situated in, nor does it imply, any actual space and time. Sense only exists in relation to things, sense is always *produced*, it is never originary but is always caused and derived. If we accept that the truly theoretically and politically revolutionary aspect of this idea is Deleuze’s insistence that sense is in the world and not tied to any form of sentient being or thing, then we must ask: in what way could sense be *experienced* by non-organic life forms? Deleuze asks himself the same question, albeit in more detail: what is sense if it is not to be found in things or attributes of things, nor in concepts or mental activity, signification or essences? (Deleuze 1990: 23). The answer is that sense pertains only to significance, variation or intensity; but this must not imply any form of assignation, it is only *ipso facto* significant. If the harbour dilates it is not the case that wind suddenly *notic-*

es and responds to a signal from the silt – sense is not a process of signalling between two physical things. Instead, wind and silt are changed at once because they are moments or aspects of the existence of the same being that changes together, to create *contraction*.

James Williams notes how the inward rush of the sea has a sense in relation to the moon, the molluscs, the pier and the well, and the bather (Williams 2008: 8). We might talk of crowds contracting, expectations rising, balance sheets expanding, blood levels rising, and global digital signals pulsating across networks around a Champions League football match. Organic or urban, sense is dispersed and flows in waves through and across bodies. The sea and moon provide a picturesque example but the application of the same concepts to the retreating, filling, collapsing, rising, dispersing flows in the stock market lies at the centre of the controversy that surrounds Deleuze and Guattari’s account of capitalism.

The most important dimension of sense is that it runs in many directions at once and is not governed by a logic of movement (here to there), or of time (then and now), or of physics (here not here), or by any final goal or destination. ‘There is a multiplicity of movements involved in the event of sense, movements that do not necessarily point in the same direction or add up to a whole’ (Lundborg 2008). Thus, whilst the wind is moving faster it is *consubstantially* slower (than it will be); whilst a tree is becoming smaller it is at exactly the same time and space becoming larger (than it is about to be), a migration is nearer (to its objective) and further (from its start). Here is how Deleuze expresses it:

When I say ‘Alice becomes larger,’ I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one be-

comes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. (Deleuze 1990: 3)

Smaller does not denote a fixed and stable quality, neither does *fewer*, *tighter*, *calmer*, nor indeed, to use Deleuze's now familiar example, does 'to green'. Such infinitives do not signify definite qualities, things or facts. They are always processes of change, multiple heterogenic processes that traverse the single object or point without final cause or destination. We are here at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of becoming where everything is situated partially and transversally amongst these complexions (these various speeds and slownesses of sense) and nothing provides an ultimate (a priori or transcendental) ground. These movements, that appear to be moving in multiple (even contradictory) directions at once, are the 'paradoxes of identity that eludes the present', 'the infinite identity of both directions or sense at the same time, of future and past, of the day before and the day after, of more and less, of too much and not enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect' (Sedgwick 2001: 141).

Life flows in all directions, life contracts and pulses, intensifies and dilates, in an infinite variety of forms. These variations, whether objects, perceptions, or structures, systems of thought or modes of pure difference, are, in turn, perceived by a variety of apparatuses (sensate, empirical, intellectual) none of which offer a transcendent Zeus-like view. The implication here is that because life itself has no substantives, philosophy should neither be structured by, nor seek, the same.

Deleuze uses a number of formulations to discuss the relationship between the world and humanity – of stuff and ideas, or matter and sense. 'The fold' and the 'machinic' the 'plane of immanence' and 'plane of consistency' are just three of

the various ways in which these formulations are conceived. Each has the capacity to undo the reductive subject/object dualism but none can be hypostatized as the single concluding model according to which the above formulations can be organised.

It is important for Deleuze's entire intellectual enterprise that sense has a specific and complex relationship to representation in which *becoming* far exceeds the principles of signification, or, as elegantly phrased by Olkowski, 'the language of representation is ineffective with respect to the being of becoming' (Olkowski 1998: 213). As Deleuze says, 'sensible representations are denotations and rational representations are significations, while only incorporeal events constitute expressed sense' (Deleuze 1990: 164); here we are reminded of the irreducibility of sense to the denoted and to the signified. This is not to say that sense is somehow straightforwardly opposite to representation: 'If sense is never any object of possible representation, it does not for this reason intervene any less in representation as that which confers a very special value to the relation that it maintains with its object' (Deleuze 1990: 165).

As we have already intimated, the world of sense is alogical – 'the unlimited which eludes the action of the idea' – and *The Logic of Sense* is a book of 'speculative proposals about the paradoxical connections of sense, event, logic and series as interlinked processes' (Williams 2008: 24) rather than a book of logical inferences, deductions and representations; thus, in and of itself, *The Logic of Sense* is a fitting exemplar of a kind of conceptualisation appropriate for the issues at hand.

Which begs the question, why (as in this paper) one would seek an organising concept or logic or theory of language when 'sense is what allows language to evade final limited definitions' (Williams

2008: 41). It seems perverse then to proffer a transcendental position that will *nail* sense when sense is precisely:

Never the double of the propositions which express it, nor of the states of affairs in which it occurs and which are denoted by the propositions. This is why, as long as we remain within the circuit of the proposition sense can be only indirectly inferred. (Deleuze 1990: 141)⁶

However, it is worth persisting with because the demand for a specific definition of sense seems to endure, and so much depends on its formulation. Also, whilst propositional analysis and deductive reason may not be particularly useful in terms of assessing the validity and value of philosophical concepts, nevertheless certain questions remain pertinent to Deleuze's thought in terms of whether his ideas are consistent across the different milieu in which they are put to work, the different conceptual pressures that are brought to bear, their resistance to internal contradiction, and their sustainability in the face of the history of philosophy within which they are situated. In short, value may be attributed to a concept if it remains consistent across these vectors and affords both synchronic and diachronic consistency. Therefore, while for good epistemological reasons we may abandon our attempt to define sense precisely, we should be cautious in abandoning what appears to be an absolute requirement – consistency – even if it is the alogical, paradoxical 'inconsistency' of *The Logic of Sense*. In their most poetic book Deleuze and Guattari say: 'anexactitude is in no way an approximation; on the contrary, it is the exact passage of that which is under way' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 22). This might be conceived of as a loss of intellectual integrity but, on the other hand, there are numerous advantages, the first being a new productivity for concepts – the harnessing of new powers (the concept is released from the burden of repeating the already known or giving pri-

macy to the development of the form) – the second, a freedom that emerges from taking points and transforming them into lines, transforming lines into surfaces and planes, opening planes onto cosmologies and drawing cosmologies into singular points. That this might sound literary is echoed by Lecerle, who in eschewing logic argues that 'philosophy is the natural metalanguage of literature, and literature of philosophy' (Lecerle 2002: 105).

This solution has one main difficulty in that it creates a theoretical indeterminacy, which invites all manner of other kinds of imprecision. Indeed, this approach could be considered simply a license for vagueness. Moreover, without a strong notion of veracity, it could be argued that Deleuze and Guattari's critique of capitalism or their construction of alternative subjectivities (to name just two of their innovations) are at risk of failing. So we return once more to the question: what is this sense that is 'everywhere yet also different from actual things' (Williams 2008: 4); and in pursuit of this we may answer these other questions.

The Event

Sense and event are the same thing (Deleuze 1990: 191)

Incorporeal entities are 'not things or fact, but events. (Deleuze 1990: 7)

This can be achieved by taking up Deleuze's theory of sense as it functions within, or is subsumed by, his theory of the event. As we have said, Deleuze and Guattari are only partly interested in constructing a theory that explains chaos, although his thoughts on chaos are certainly dithyrambic:

Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a *virtual*, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately,

without consistency or reference, without consequence. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 118)

Deleuze is equally interested in theorising distributions or multiplicities ('assemblages', 'milieux', 'abstract machines' and so forth) that organise or facilitate the maximum degree of openness and potential for life. The series is one such structure. To phrase this pointedly: the world is not just pure unbridled, undetermined or atomistic chaos or pure potentiality for absolute difference. The things of the world (bodies, languages, systems of thought, etc.) are already actualizations of the infinite virtual.

The world, then, is populated, or punctuated, by determinant states that are series 'of actual things'. However, series do not operate on the basis of straightforward *Aristotelian* repetition, by which, for example, a clock ticks again and again and again, its identity conceived as repetition of the same. Instead we should think of the clock as a whole series of mechanisms put together by hundreds of years of industrial development: a capitalist system of production, reproduction, distribution and consumption. A spring that has a degrading tensile strength, bearings that wear, a whole series of interlocking and related parts composed into an 'Abstract Machine' that accords to a system of measurement called the Gregorian calendar. If we were to write for a month we would not be able to describe the dynamics that go into making the clock tick. The tick then is a multiplicity. At what point then is the tick a repetition of the same? It never is, each tick is a new variation. It is possible to say that after each tick a pure unpreconceived, unpre-determinable potential exists where absolutely anything could occur.

The point about series is that they are comprised of a multiplicity of variations that cohere again to make something happen that has not previously happened before. A clock ticked earlier, but *that* tick

had never happened before and will not do so again. A series of variations may reach the same configuration to produce the event again as the first tick is the variation that inheres within the series: 'For Deleuze series are not essentially series of objects or substances, they are variations independent of objects and not limited by them. The variation comes first, not the varied object or connected substance' (Williams 2008: 25).

These variations are potentially unlimited, infinite, to the extent that, coextensive with series, is a surface to life that is an unequivocal, boundless field of pure potential. This potential can never be completely erased no matter how molar or translated life becomes under the axioms of late capitalism. Indeed, out of these potentials, many of which are enhanced by capital's miraculous transformative power, emerge new series (repetitions of inherent variations) out of which, in turn, emerge the potentials for an inexhaustible variety of pure differences, which capital then *treats as its own*. The mantra of capitalism is that it is the only system capable of releasing human creativity, yet it imposes its empty axioms upon life, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as an 'infinite web of diverging and converging series' (Daniel Smith 1998: xxvii).

The event is certainly a novel occurrence – an action of pure difference – yet this action takes place within a series that is ongoing and continually altering; as Lecerle writes: 'the event is not so much the brutal emergence of the utterly new as the circulation of sense' (Lecerle 2002: 101). The event emerges only when two variations are brought into a new proximity or mixture. The crucial thing for this enquiry is that the event is an 'impersonal and pre-individual singularity' (Deleuze 1990: 164). 'There are no private or collective events, no more than there are individuals and universals, particularities and generalities' (Deleuze 1990: 173).

Here again we can see Deleuze's commitment to empiricism – the event is not a bolt of lightning from the heavens but an actual *something* happening to *something else* to create something new. However, the event does not just happen and then disappear. As we have said, it is not just the rupture or break, tear or extinction *per se*, the event becomes an event when it inheres within the new variation (series). Hence the event has two sides, it runs through a series *and* is changed by it. The 'event changes the series and the series carries and transforms the event' (source unknown). You cannot say that it exists, but you also cannot say that it does not. This is the precise point at which we resolve the issue of substantiating something that exists yet is incorporeal, or is an 'extra-being'. There are an infinite number of virtual and actual potentialities infusing life but they do not gain value until they assume a role of a continual variation within a continuing series, not unlike the multiplicity of movements that comprise 9/11 and that have inhered in time ever since. However, it is important to shed chronology. Series are not at all linear in time but are instead achronatic. Not only does time (according to the rule of Aion) move in two dimensions at once, but series are made up of variations that come from all directions (virtual, actual, sensate, material, ideational, machinic); as such, series are multimodal and transversal.

This theory finds its philosophical primogenitor in the Stoic conceptualization of corporeal modification and incorporeal transformations. The challenging and immensely consequential dynamic at work here is that bodies are causes, but causes not of effects but of actions or mixtures of bodies. They act upon each other to the extent that they are part of the same material universe. When the knife cuts the bread no distinction can be made between active knife and passive bread, it is bread/knife coenacted and as such they are in re-

ciprocal relation: 'there is a unity of active and passive principles' (Deleuze 1990: 7). This is a pan-somatism in which bodies do not cause one another because they are the 'moments or aspects of the existence of the same being' in relations not of cause and effect but of cause to cause. Returning to our example of contraction in the harbour: moisture changes temperature, sea salt effects vegetation, sea and earth encroach upon each other. A whole corporeal world is mixed, there are interpenetrations, dynamic compossibilities, and concrescences or, more straightforwardly, simple concurrences, upon which a notional relation of cause and effect is transposed only a posteriori. The effects – *rising, falling, contracting, reversing, filling, changing* – might be non-existent but, following *The Logic of Sense* we can see they are incorporeal transformations that remain distinct from corporeal modifications: 'events, being incorporeal effects, differ in nature from the corporeal causes from which they result' (Deleuze 1990: 184).

The incorporeal is not a fiction of human consciousness, which somehow imposes verbs onto the world because the event happens, it is real. As Paul Patton says, 'pure events are real but nonactual entities expressed in the successive configurations of material bodies but irreducible to any particular set of such configurations' (Patton 2010: 86). The river only changes course if the event inheres within the new course. However, the incorporeal effect does not cause bodies to change. Causes cannot proceed from effects. 'Falling', 'contracting', and so on, will not change the course of a river. According to Deleuze they are 'quasi-causes'. The essential thing is that incorporeal transformations are fundamentally grounded as they are attributes of bodies. Deleuze condenses the point as follows:

How could the event be grasped and willed, without its being referred to the corporeal cause from

which it results and, through this cause, to the unity of causes as *Physics*. (Deleuze 1990: 163)

This formulation allows Deleuze a notion of fidelity to the event as well as an extraordinary degree of openness to the potential for re-transcription and new imaginings. Take for example the massacre of the American Indians which is only now being understood as genocide (Stannard 1992). Such things indubitably happened, millions were killed, but the incorporeal transformation, the sense of the event, is not fixed, it has a surface that is amenable to limitless variation.

No event is one sided and no event is limited since they take place in infinite and multiple series that only exist as continuing mutual variations. (Deleuze 1990: 2)

When sense changes all senses are changed at once, and a re-evaluation of the American Dream as founded on genocide might certainly have something approximating that effect. (Imagine what would happen to the American consciousness if its mythology of the cowboy and heroic discovery of new worlds were to be dismantled in this way.) The repeated point is that becoming is never fixed, we are always in the middle or en route, without a clear beginning or a predetermined goal. We may cohere around aggregations, or build dynamic modulations and refrains, but fidelity to this theory of the event and sense requires that they remain open.

This is as perspicacious as it is poetic. If, for example, re-thinking a specific point in American history alters a series to create a new variation, we might equally see a multiplicity of interconnected worlds related through senses being changed all at once. We have innumerable examples in history of a change in theory (Darwin) or practice (ending the slave trade) or understanding (Quantum mechanics) that are corporeal modifications and at the same time changes in sense that ripple over domains of space and time, a priori catego-

ries, paradigms, epistemes, even worlds. Not least because in the event we find a paradoxical temporality: the present reaching back to transform the past and the past reaching forward to transform its future. 'The event is a circulation of sense; and it is both involved in chronological time (the event has a date) and outside time, in a kind of eternity' (Lecercle 2002: 109).

Our discussion thus far reveals the incongruity between Deleuze and Guattari's and any other theory of language. Their concepts of Sense, series and event appear to admit no grounds for comparison or analytical correlation with, say, the theories of Chomsky, Ferdinand de Saussure, Charles Austin or Ludwig Wittgenstein, and sit at some remove even from contemporaries such as Derrida and Lacan. However, we are not yet in a position to look at language proper (so to speak) because two vital dynamics still need to be put in place: Aion and Chronos. It has been logical, perhaps ineluctable, to approach the concepts Aion and Chronos through the logic of incorporeal transformations and corporeal modifications because, simply put, Chronos is the time of bodies, and Aion is the time of the incorporeal.

Chronos and Aion

Time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. First it must be grasped entirely as the living present in bodies which act and are acted upon. Second, it must be grasped entirely as an entity infinitely divisible into past and future. (Deleuze 1990: 7)

The crucial issue with any theory of time is how to reconcile four ideas that dominate commonsense as well as the classical philosophical canon and must be, if not substantiated, at least accounted for: 1) Time's arrow – time moves in succession in one direction from past to future. 2)

Time in which past and future are folded in the present. This is a present in which the past is not just that which has *gone* but also that which inheres in the present (as does 9/11). We must also allow for a future that equally inheres in the present, as that which now is will become the future. 3) The idea, *qua* Bergson, of multiple durations co-existing at once. 4) Finally, a time that is impossible to grasp, the present that never actually happens, in which the 'NOW' can never actually be located. These four divergent demands have to be drawn into a consistent (albeit an adjunctively consistent) relationship for any account to be reliable. Note that atomic time, the clock ticking through a succession of spatialised divisions, does not feature in this model because, as we will see below, atomic time is the subordination of time to space, and can be seen as extraneous to actual states of becoming and duration.

We shall also see that when the features of Aion and Chronos are put to use (rather than subjected to detailed exposition), philosophy, far from, as Keats would say, clipping the wings of angels, will allow the richest, deepest and potentially most exhilarating levels of becoming to be thought. Deleuze writes that 'the aim of philosophy is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativity)' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: vii). This is part of the reason why Chronos and Aion, along with Event, are amongst Deleuze's principal concepts. They provide the conceptual underpinnings and analytical landmarks, as well as some of the deepest notes and highest registers, for Deleuze's multiple theoretical systems ranging from painting to cinema, from music to philosophy, from political theory to aesthetics. The cardinal point being that the pulsations and movements of Chronos and Aion, Event and Series, are themselves not transcendental structures or manifolds but

folded, aliquid interactions that form the melodic counterpoints of life.

Like the upheaval in the relation between cause and effects (in corporeal modifications and incorporeal transformations) the terms Chronos and Aion entail a 'disassembling' of accepted philosophical canons – in this case, those pertaining to time and space. Chronos is the time of the present, but not the conventional present that is the past that is no more, nor the idea of a present that incessantly replaces the past. Analytically we can accept the idea that the present constitutes the past at the same time as it is constituted as present. Past and present are coterminous and cannot be categorically separated, as such, our presentness *requires* a notion of a pastness, making the dividing line between the two seem arbitrary. However, understanding past and present only in terms of abstract concepts results in a wholly impoverished account of a dynamic ontological relationship. Boundas captures precisely this formulation of the present as being much thicker than a putative *instant* of *now*: 'we should rather say that the present is not. The past, which has ceased to act, has *not* ceased to be' (Boundas 1996: 93). The past and present, then, envelop each other, as Deleuze says: 'only the present exists in time and gathers together or absorbs the past and future' (Deleuze 1990: 7).

This folding of past and present is easy to see in the manner of subjective experience (passions, compulsions and associations made in past can come to be of the present in consciousness) as the structure of the psyche seems to brook no distinction between past and present. However, how time is subjectively experienced is only one aspect; we are concerned here with the ontological nature of time, *real time* as pure duration insofar as, for Deleuze, life is comprised of multiple speeds and slownesses. We need only think of the utterly divergent times of eons, of Jesus' re-

nunciation of his divine nature, or of the time of the microbe or the industrial revolution. It is highly conventional to say that all these times are relatable to an overarching calendar time divisible by hours, minutes and seconds – that all these processes are measured against a static immutable time-line that is the receptacle for being. Indeed, we might think that conventional time does allow for different processes (flowers pollinating, tectonic plates shifting) that are afforded different speeds, and, moreover, that these may be amenable to (indeed invite) different perspectives of time but are nevertheless subsumable in terms of a transcendental manifold of time. In answer to this, however, Deleuze does not accept time as distinct from space and movement. All of these durations take place through the movements and actions of bodies that are quantitative (not qualitative) contractions and affectivities of being. Each being, in the broadest sense of bodies (industries, species, collectivities and so forth), encapsulates orders of vibrations and transmissions of movements, each having its own arrhythmic⁷ pulse. Life consists of a cacophony of speeds and slownesses rubbing against each other, modulating, variegating and forming each other. According to Deleuze, these pulsations (in the manner of series) interweave, cause frequencies and create individuations, haecceities, knowledges and transversal partial hybrid becomings. In short, instead of spatialised time, ‘Chronos is the number of movement’ (Deleuze 1994: 111), and things, people, and bodies move in an infinite number of directions. It is a movement through, within and across series and at the same time which create territories: ‘a pulsed time is always a territorialised time: regular or not, it’s the number of the movement of the step that marks a territory’; territories that Elizabeth Grosz, (2008) in particular, understands as *blocs of becoming*.

As we have seen, in the domain of corporeal modifications these are mixtures, causes of causes, which ‘must be grasped entirely as the living present in bodies which act and are acted upon’ (Deleuze 1990: 7) in one corporeal world of bodies. It is these pulsating variations of movements which form heterogeneity of pure differences: Chronos. Time under the law of Chronos, is the measure of the movements of bodies and depends on matter which limits and fills it out:

Sometimes it will be said that only the present exists; that it absorbs or contracts in itself the past and the future, and that, from contraction to contraction, with ever greater depth, it reaches the limits of the entire universe and becomes a living cosmic present. (Deleuze 1990: 72)

To use a more or less prosaic example: machines, divisions of labour and the immense accumulative power of capital provide the measure of the inherence of the industrial revolution in our time. All that is present depends upon the past in order to be here at all. Here is Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*:

The present does not have to go outside of itself in order to go from past to future. Rather, the living present goes from the past to the future which it constitutes in time. (Deleuze 1994: 91)

And to reinforce our previous discussions of theoretical consistency, here is Deleuze in *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*: ‘present, past and future are the immutable forms of change and movement’ (Deleuze 1985: vii). Constantine Boundas’ neat encapsulation is unlikely to be bettered: ‘the past is contemporaneous with the present which it has been’ (Boundas 1996: 93). Equally, the future is already vibrating, forming and being constructed in the present; it has no other present or past. This folding of the past within a fungible present means that pastness is not stable, over and done with, a fixed entity unamenable

to the present wherein new futures have yet to have their impact on the past.

Aion

It may appear that Chronos is conceptually abundant and by itself provides the grounds for overturning traditional conceptualizations of time. The latter might appear as a merely academic exercise or purely intellectual affectation, but when considered as contributing to a reconceptualisation of language which permits the rewriting of all the central tenets of subjectivity, and most importantly as part of a general enterprise to undo capitalist axiomatics, its merits transcend the purely academic. Chronos, however, is only one half of Deleuze's remodelling of time, our understanding of which is incomplete without addressing the concept of Aion:

[Chronos] measures the movement of bodies and depends on the matter which limits and fills it out; the other [Aion] is a pure straight line at the surface, incorporeal, unlimited, an empty form of time, independent of all matter. (Deleuze 1990: 73)

The relationship between Aion and Chronos is paradoxical: they have different laws, are 'labyrinths', 'each one is complete and excludes the other' (Deleuze 1990: 72), yet they interact with each other. It should come as no surprise that Deleuze absorbs these concepts from the Stoics: 'the greatness of Stoic thought is to show at once the necessity of these two readings and their reciprocal exclusion' (Deleuze 1990: 72).

Whereas Chronos is thick, potentially – indeed cosmologically – vast, Aion is the present instant divided into the future and past *ad infinitum*, 'it is the instant without thickness and without extension, which subdivides each present into past and future' (Deleuze 1990: 188); the infinite divisibility of the instant. As time moves forward there is never a pure moment of the instant 'now', there is only an instantaneous passing from past to future. Hence, what exists in Aion is 'always and at the

same time something which has just happened and something about to happen; never something happening' (Deleuze 1990: 73). Or to use Tom Lundborg's phrase, 'properly speaking, Aion escapes the present and only movements of past and future remain' (2008). Lundborg further reminds us that a pure moment of an actual present would be the end of becoming which is impossible. This is one of the conundrums of living; on those occasions when we attempt to capture a stilled or stable subjectivity, a self that is, we find subjectivity is always *becoming* in a world that is equally in process.

The empty form of time of Aion can be grasped in terms of a becoming of the subject. Lacan's subject famously oscillates; Deleuze's oscillations are equal in intensity, but his subject's displacements and deferrals are ontological rather than psychoanalytical. In place of the threat of castration, that Lacan for all his refinements never finally rescinds, we find that the threat has nothing to do with the familial order. One threat is that of the 'becoming mad' of the depths, the feeling that outside of the present matrices of multiple becomings (geological time, digital time, the time for love) there lies an infinity of other durations we cannot possibly subsume under an identity, even the identity of the Lack. The second threat is the threat of Aion divided instantly into past and future, which annuls the possibility of presence across the infinite speed of surfaces.

A point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination. ... A line of becoming has only a middle. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 323)

We are reminded that *The Logic of Sense*, in its structure and content, draws up 'the *mise-en-scène* of the paradoxes of sense' (Deleuze 1990: xiii), and we need look no further than Chronos for the quintessential example of 'the paradox of coexistence'. The most controversial paradox is

the idea, finally, that succession, qualitative and corporeal succession, may not follow time's arrow. For example, if the various Enclosures Acts provided the fundamental template for contemporary human society, if we sense this act in the divisions that now exist both between peoples and in individual consciousnesses, and if in making new social divisions we find again the same basic template of relations, can time be said to go backwards? If questions of justice find their provenance in the slew of Laws against property brought into force by the Glorious Parliament, certainly the present can be said to include the past, but can time be thought of as moving backwards? Olkowski certainly thinks it can: 'Duration is not even a succession, for if time unhinged is no longer subordinated to spatiality, it is released from its subordination to succession as well' (Olkowski 1999: 106).

Lecerle, however, appears to think not, as he describes Chronos as 'the time of chronology, in which the accident is dated, the time of the ever present sliding along time's arrow, the corporeal time of the mixture of bodies' (Lecerle 2002: 117). Am I suggesting a reverse time-travel or that events can happen twice? Or that causal action can happen backwards through time? If the past is rethought, and if a new conception of the past leads to a new conception of the present, can we say that we have travelled back through time and altered the past? Williams speaks of 'reverse effects' though time and argues that 'the present is a form of novelty that can change what it ages from' (Williams 2009: 158/159).

In response to that most pertinacious question, 'must time follow Time's arrow?' As we can say both yes and no, we have only a paradox. Ineluctably, one side of time is the time of succession, the other side knows nothing of chronology and frees time from its law. Here is Claire Colebrook's useful distillation:

Time moves forward, producing actual worlds in ordered sequences, but time also has an eternal

and virtual element, including all the tendencies opening towards the future and a past that can always intervene. (Colebrook 2002: 33)

This constant becoming, never able to subsume the present, past or future into a fixed entity or perspective, is the 'agonizing aspect of the pure event', the always just been and always yet to come, never, *here, now*. One of the key features of the ontological disjunction between Aion and Chronos is that, unlike negations, dialectics and the Lacanian Lack, it is an open and transformative and intensely creative relationship rather than a fixed structure. Therein lies the ontogenesis of language.

Singularities and the Event

Taken together Aion and Chronos constitute the 'double structure' of the event that retains a commitment to matter and grounds language in bodies, yet at the same time retains the maximum potential for things to be understood differently, to become something else, for different stories to be told and different potentials to be released – which is essential to the project of overturning of the axioms of capital. With its continued extraordinary and disgusting levels of exploitation, poverty, disease and death,⁸ the need for becomings to emerge out of the metaphysical narratives of capital and for revolutionary actions to inhere within the fabric of what may come to be known as the present is only amplified by the impeding climatic catastrophe. Deleuze's relationship with capital, however, is too complex to be reduced to righteous condemnation and declarations of outright opposition.

The events to which Deleuze refers are not necessarily (although they may be) the monumental events of history but are instead singular points that suffuse life, a life that is no more and no less than a myriad of singularities – condensations or contractions, ruptures or punctuations – formed out of a infinity of heterogenic pul-

sations. That is not to say that singularities are ineluctable ephemera; a true singularity is a contraction, that may indeed just be a single refraction, which possesses a 'mobile immanent principle of auto-unification' powerful enough to free itself from the modalities of the proposition and the supremacy of the sovereign individual and its provenances. Singularities are not exceptions or anomalies that need to be corralled into an overarching causal/explanatory logic but are particles or intensifications, that are asignifyable, atypical and a-conceptual (Deleuze 1990: 67) instantiations in and of themselves:

Only when the world, teeming with anonymous and nomadic, impersonal pre-individual singularities, opens up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental. (Deleuze 1990: 103)

And yet it would be quite misleading to give the impression that singularities are like so many millions of micro-events. Singularity does not mean single as in the opposition plural/single; it means significant, remarkable, unique, and can refer equally to the almost imperceptible or to the most significant events in history, in a life (a man, a woman, a child), or of literature, art, science and so on and so forth. In his brilliant introduction to *Essays Critical and Critical*, Daniel Smith illuminates how singular works of art carve out pure differences:

The elements or parts of the literary machine, in short must be recognised by their mutual independence, *pure singularities*, 'a pure and dispersed anarchic multiplicity, without unity or totality, whose elements are welded and pasted together by the real distinction or very absence of a link. (Smith 1998: XXII-XXIII)

Singularities galvinise life: Pele's pass to Carlos Alberto in the 1970 World Cup final, Billy Holiday's 'Strange Fruit', Muhammad Ali's 'what's my name', all the singularities out of which a life is made, a look, a shared idea, an airplane landing, the fleeting ineffable fragments of subjective lucidity, 'not one day has been promised to you',

an infinite variety of becomings that traverse the plane of immanence. Here is Lecerle, 'a philosopher of singularity as opposed to the universal as he is a philosopher of immanence'. (Lecerle 2002: 104)

The disruptive capacity of singularities or haecceities is difficult to overstate because through them we experience sensibility itself, rather than a sensible organised and contracted according to the specific interests of the perceiver. And whilst singularities move to the pulsations of Chronos - 'they are the events from which the difference of time flows' (Colebrook 2002: 127) - their becoming is the becoming of Aion

The Linguistic Event

In assembling the preceding matrix of concepts, we have held in abeyance the most important event, the event of language itself. The discussion of language that follows could have served as the introduction to this paper, but I venture that such a strategy may have yielded the impression that the matters of sense, series and event, Chronos and Aion, were issues of detail, clarification or addendum. Instead, I chose to discuss the complexions of becoming through the event and time because they form the essential fabric of the seminal text on language: *The Logic of Sense*. In which Deleuze stakes out his claim that Language's main function is not to illustrate, represent or symbolise; rather, language is the pre-eminent form for the expression of the incorporeal transformations of the events of the world. Bodies may change, materials may mix, corporeal modifications may issue, but only when they are conjoined with incorporeal transformations do we have the event, and in language we find the richest potential for expression and events. 'The event belongs essentially to language: it has an essential relationship to language' (Deleuze 1990: 25); or, to phrase this slightly differently, the event is becoming and language is becoming *par excellence*.

This paper started with, but deferred, an analysis of one of the most well-known of Deleuze's definitions of sense: as both 'the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side towards things and one side towards propositions' (Deleuze 1990: 25). On the one hand, language is, *inter alia*, a dynamic two-sided structure of becoming, as sound, voice, and air are the primary processes of the body, and meaning, image and sense are incorporeal transformations. The two combine, the expressive (to redden) and the expressed (red), to make sense. On the other hand, Language is not only capable of being an Event in and of itself, but also functions as the undecomposable becoming of the sense of the world. There are, then, two double structures; a double structure of expression which takes the form of mouth/air/spittle and the expressed, and a double structure of the event or sense in the world. The clearest example of the latter is when a person is pronounced guilty, and the accused is transformed into a convict – the incorporeal attribute is expressed in the judge's sentence which transforms these bodies and the multiplicity of relations connected to the convict into something else. This new attribute 'convict' is not to be found anywhere in the body of the convict, it remains incorporeal. This is why we cannot say that sense exists, but rather that it inheres or subsists (Deleuze 1990: 24) yet ultimately issues from bodies, as the judge, the courthouse, the carceral system and so forth constitute the objectivity or corporality of the event of the sentence. And, (here is the double structure of the event) as 'events of the surface are actualised in the present of the bodies (in accordance with complex rules) by imprisoning first their singularities within the limit of worlds, individuals and persons' (Deleuze 1990: 191), the transformation of the accused into convict is the transformation on both planes at once. We have discussed at length

how the incorporeal attribute is indeterminate and contingent, lacking a fixed essence and meaning. We get an approximation of this when we look back at the transportation or execution of individuals for the theft of a loaf of bread and mobilise ways in which history might be re-written and events differently understood as (perhaps) a further colonisation of the life-world by capital following the enclosures.

As we have noted, according to Deleuze the ontological structure of language is to be found in the essentially disjunctive interplay between bodies and incorporeal transformations. Language emerges not as a form of propositional statement, or connotative or denotative allusion, nor even as an attempt to represent the world. Instead, the pragmatics of acting as (rather than relating to) a world of events and series provides the ground for language to emerge: 'it is this new world of incorporeal effects or surfaces which makes language possible' (Deleuze 1990: 189). Language then does not correspond to a fixed and stable external reality but is part of a whole cacophony of becomings. For Deleuze, 'pure events ground language because they wait for it as much as they wait for us, and have a pure, singular, impersonal, and pre-individual existence only inside the language which expresses them' (Deleuze 1990: 189).

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ONTOGENEZA JEZIKA

Rezime

Tekstovi Deleza i Gatarija, koji se odnose na njihove ideje o jeziku, okarakterisani su ponekad postepenim, ponekad dramatičnim modifikacijama koncepata, približavanjem novim dimenzijama misli koje se suočavaju sa novim problematikama ili stvaraju nove problematike, aporijama koje su rezultat napuštanja koncepata i, uopšte, fluidnim i ponekad amorfnim idejama. Sve ovo čini prikladnim njihovo odbijanje da posvete jedan tekst isključivo pitanju jezika. Ovo se jasno uklapa u mišljenje Deleza i Gatarija, koje je suprotstavljeno modernim lingvistikama i semiologijama, da jezik nije epifenomen. Međutim, pitanje jezika, šta on jeste i kako funkcioniše, nikada nije daleko od površine Delezijevih i Gatarijevih tekstova i, tvrdiću ja, jedna precizna, a opet stroga dosljednost misli – ili barem određen broj relativno stabilnih tvrdnji u moru promjenljivih perspektiva i struktura – može se naći u njima. Ova mišljenja ili osovine daleko su od drugih jezičkih i lingvističkih škola, što čini komparativnu analizu problematičnom, budući da se oni oslanjaju na Delezove najiluzornije, ali i najmoćnije koncepte. Ovaj rad istražuje kako „Smisao“, „Slučaj“, „Aion“ i „Kron“ nude otvorene, a opet pouzdane parametre za jednu teoriju sposobnu da obuhvati istinski otvorenu i heterogenu prirodu jezika.

Za Deleza, „jezik sam po sebi nema univerzalnost, samodostatnu formalizaciju, opštu semiologiju ili metajezik“ i, zahvaljujući svojoj suštinski amorfnoj prirodi, on je primarna manifestacija *postajanja* i poetike života. Ovdje imamo ponavljanje osnovne logike delezijanske misli, prisutne u svim njegovim radovima, od slikarstva do bioskopa, od društvenih kolaža do bioloških miljea, koja je potvrđena ovom teorijom jezika. Stvaranje jednog konceptualnog sistema koji ima armaturu produktivno je, koherentno i iste naravi kao polimorfna priroda i kreativni potencijal života, a njegova obilježja (Slučaj, Aion i Kron) mogu biti izložene kritici i analizi. Suštinska tvrdnja jeste da pulsiranje i kretnje Krona i Aiona, Slučaja i Niza sami po sebi nisu transcendentalne strukture ili slojevitosti, nego savijene, tekuće interakcije koje formiraju melodične kontrapunktive života i u tome leži ontogeneza jezika.