INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY – DEMOCRATIC CONTROL MECHANISMS, COMPETENCES AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7251/AKPR2602105NKeywords:
SR Germany, intelligence-security system, democratic control mechanisms, competences, institutional structureAbstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the intelligence and security system of the Federal Republic of Germany, with particular reference to the mechanisms of democratic control, institutional structure, and the competences of federal intelligence and security services. The German intelligence system evolved from the experience of two contrasting models: the authoritarian use of security institutions and post-war democratization. During the Third Reich, the security apparatus was subordinated to the political goals of the regime. After the war, this experience was a major reason for the creation of a system based on a clear division of responsibilities and control mechanisms. The post-war model was based on the principle that the services must be able to protect the state while not becoming autonomous centres of political power. The paper examines changes in the international security environment through the prism of contemporary security threats. Particular attention is paid to the balance between the operational efficiency of intelligence services and the protection of fundamental rights, especially the right to privacy and the confidentiality of communications, in the context of current reforms. Finally, the authors conclude that the German model has a complex, multi-layered system of control, but that the expansion of technological and operational powers requires the strict application of the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and independent supervision.
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